Design and implementation of architectures for the deployment of secure community wireless networks by Hortelano Otero, Jorge
UNIVERSIDAD POLITÉCNICA DE VALENCIA
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING
Design and Implementation of










This Ph. D. Thesis would not have been possible without the support of many
people:
The author wishes to express his gratitude to my advisors Dr. Pietro Manzoni
and Dr. Juan Carlos Cano, who shared with me their expertise and research
insight. I also want to express my complete gratitude to Dr. Carlos T. Calafate,
who always has been like the third advisor.
I'd also like to express my gratitude to the members of the GRC research
group, those that will continue in the group and those who already completed
their studies before me. I much appreciate the exchanges of knowledge, skills and
assistance during all these years. I wish you all to complete your thesis succesfully!
The author would also like to convey thanks to the Ministry and the Univer-
sidad Politécnica de Valencia for providing the nancial means and laboratory
facilities. And I also express a gratitude to Massimo Mecella and the "Università
La Sapienza" in Rome, where I worked for almost four months.
I wish to thanks the NGOs "TeSo" and "PoliClick". Both associations helped
me to focus this research into a social context. Thanks to them, the results of this
thesis is now deployed in a developing country and it is not another forgotten thesis
into the deep of a bookcase. I proudly say that I am a piece of both associations.
I'd like to say how grateful I am with the people that is closest to me. All have
given to me the support needed to continue with this work. Particular thanks, of
course, to my parents, for the support they provided me through my entire life; and
for my brothers who have always take interest in the activities of their little brother.
I also must acknowledge to Paola, without her patience and encouragement I would
not have nished this thesis. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to all my





Recent advances in communication technologies, as well as the proliferation of
computing devices, are shaping our surroundings towards an ubiquitous Internet.
The Internet oers a global platform for low-cost access to a wide range of com-
munication services such as e-mail, e-commerce, tele-education, tele-health and
tele-medicine. However, even in developed countries, a large number of rural areas
are poorly equipped even with basic communication infrastructure. Nowadays,
there are some eorts to address this lack of infrastructure, but they are still
insucient.
With this aim we present in this thesis RuralNet, a community wireless net-
work to provide Internet access on a personalised basis to subscribers in rural
areas. The objectives of this study were the development of a new architecture to
oer a exible and secure Internet access in remote rural areas. RuralNet com-
bines the paradigm of wireless mesh networks and wireless devices, using cheap
o-the-shelf devices and oering a wide range of applications and Internet-based
communications services. The solution developed for RuralNet can cover large
areas at a low cost, and can also be easily implemented and extended in terms of
both coverage and services oered.
Since the implementation and testing of RuralNet was expensive and labour
intensive, we considered that simulation and emulation were a viable alternative to
reduce costs. For this purpose we developed Castadiva, a exible test bed designed
for testing MANETs and mesh networks. Castadiva is a test bed based on low-
cost devices, used to test the protocols and applications developed. Through a user
friendly interface, Castadiva oers the ability to dene and test dierent scenarios
and trac patterns, adding the ability to export to the ns-2 format, in order to
compare the results. Ns-2 is the most widely used simulator in research at an
international level.
Finally, we have added security features to our proposal. So we made RuralNet
safe from "malicious" attacks, thus making it more robust. We therefore analysed
the community network security, studying the most common attack in this type of
networks, namely the black hole attack. To detect this attack, we have combined
the use of the watchdog mechanism, a solution oered in the literature to detect
intrusions in wireless networks, and bayesian ltering, a technique for developing




Recientes avances en las tecnologías de la comunicación, así como la proliferación
de nuevos dispositivos de computación, están plasmando nuestro entorno hacia
un Internet ubicuo. Internet ofrece una plataforma global para acceder con bajo
coste a una vasta gama de servicios de telecomunicaciones, como el correo elec-
trónico, comercio electrónico, tele-educación, tele-salud y tele-medicina a bajo
coste. Sin embargo, incluso en los países más desarrollados, un gran número de
áreas rurales todavía están pobremente equipadas con una infraestructura básica
de telecomunicaciones. Hoy en día, existen algunos esfuerzos para resolver esta
falta de infraestructura, pero resultan todavía insucientes.
Con este objetivo presentamos en esta tesis RuralNet, una red comunitaria
inalámbrica para proveer acceso a Internet de forma personalizada a los subscrip-
tores de un área rural. Los objetivos de este estudio han sido el desarrollo de
una nueva arquitectura para ofrecer un acceso a Internet exible y seguro para
zonas rurales aisladas. RuralNet combina el paradigma de las redes mesh y el uso
de los dispositivos inalámbricos embebidos más económicos para ofrecer un gran
número de servicios y aplicaciones basados en Internet. La solución desarrollada
por RuralNet es capaz de cubrir grandes áreas a bajo coste, y puede también ser fá-
cilmente desplegado y extendido tanto en términos de cobertura como de servicios
ofrecidos.
Dado que la implementación y la evaluación de RuralNet requiere un alto
coste y una gran cantidad de mano de obra, hemos considerado que la simulación
y la emulación eran una alternativa válida para ahorrar costes. Con este objetivo
hemos desarrollado Castadiva, un emulador exible proyectado para la evaluación
de redes MANET y mesh. Castadiva es un emulador basado en dispositivos de
bajo coste, utilizado para evaluar los protocolos y las aplicaciones desarrolladas. A
través de su interfaz amigable, Castadiva ofrece la posibilidad de denir y evaluar
diferentes escenarios y patrones de tráco, añadiendo la posibilidad de exportarlos
a formato ns-2, el simulador más utilizado por la comunidad cientíca a nivel
internacional, para poder comparar la compatibilidad de los resultados con otras
propuestas.
Finalmente, hemos añadido funcionalidades de seguridad a nuestra propuesta.
Por lo tanto, hemos hecho RuralNet seguro contra ataques maliciosos, haciéndolo
así más robusto. Hemos por tanto analizado la seguridad en redes comunitarias,
estudiando el ataque más común en este tipo de redes, es decir, el ataque de
black hole. Para detectar este ataque, hemos combinado el uso de la herramienta
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watchdog, una solución ofrecida en la literatura para detectar intrusiones en redes
inalámbricas, y los ltros bayesianos, una técnica para el desarrollo de sistemas
robustos en escenarios con un alto nivel de ruido.
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Riassunto
I recenti progressi nelle tecnologie di comunicazione, così come la proliferazione
di dispositivi informatici, stanno plasmando il nostro intorno verso una Internet
omnipresente. Internet ore una piattaforma globale per l'accesso a basso costo
a una vasta gamma di servizi di comunicazione come l'e-mail, e-commerce, la
tele-istruzione, la tele-sanità e la tele-medicina. Tuttavia, anche nei paesi più
sviluppati, un gran numero di zone rurali sono ancora scarsamente dotate di una
infrastruttura di comunicazione di base. Al giorno d'oggi, ci sono alcuni sforzi per
risolvere questa mancanza di infrastrutture, ma sono ancora insucienti.
Con questo scopo presentiamo in questa tesi RuralNet, una rete wireless co-
munitaria per fornire accesso a Internet in forma personalizzata agli abbonati di
una zona rurale. Gli obiettivi di questo lavoro sono stati lo sviluppo di una nuova
architettura per orire un accesso a Internet essibile e sicuro in aree rurali iso-
late. RuralNet coniuga il paradigma delle reti wireless Mesh e usa i dispositivi
wireless o-the-shelf più economici per orire una vasta gamma di applicazioni e
di servizi di comunicazione basati su Internet. La soluzione sviluppata per Rural-
Net è in grado di coprire vaste aree a basso costo, inoltre, può essere facilmente
implementato ed esteso sia in termini di copertura sia in termini dei servizi oerti.
Dal momento che l'implementazione e il collaudo di RuralNet comporta costi
elevati ed alta intensità di manodopera, abbiamo considerato che la simulazione
e l'emulazione fossero una valida alternativa per ridurre i costi. A questo scopo
abbiamo sviluppato Castadiva, un emulatore essibile progettato per il testing
di reti MANET e mesh. Castadiva è un emulatore basato in dispositivi a basso
costo, utilizzato per testare i protocolli e le applicazioni sviluppate. Attraverso
un'interfaccia user friendly, Castadiva ore la possibilità di denire e testare diversi
scenari e modelli di traco, aggiungendo la possibilità di esportarli al formato
dell'ns-2, il simulatore più utilizzato nella ricerca a livello internazionale, per poter
confrontare la compatibilità dei risultati con altre proposte.
Finalmente, abbiamo aggiunto funzionalità di sicurezza alla nostra proposta.
Quindi abbiamo fatto RuralNet sicuro da attacchi "maliziosi", rendendolo quindi
più robusto. Abbiamo pertanto analizzato la sicurezza nelle reti comunitarie,
studiando l'attacco più comune in questo tipo di reti, cioè l'attacco black hole.
Per il rilevamento di questo attacco, abbiamo combinato l'uso dello strumento
watchdog, una soluzione oerto in letteratura per rilevare le intrusioni nelle reti
wireless, ed i ltri bayesiani, una tecnica per lo sviluppo di sistemi robusti in




Avanços recents en les tecnologies de la comunicació, com també la proliferació de
nous dispositius de comunicació, estan orientant el nostre entorn cap a una Inter-
net ubiqua. Internet ofereix una plataforma global per a accedir a un vast rang
de serveis de les telecomunicacions, com ara correu electrònic, comerç electrònic,
teleeducació, telesalut i telemedicina a baix cost. No obstant això, ns i tot als
països més desenvolupats, la majoria de les àrees rurals encara no tenen cap in-
fraestructura de telecomunicacions. Avui dia, hi ha alguns esforços per a resoldre
aquesta mancança d'infraestructures, però resulten encara insucients.
Amb aquest propòsit presentem en la tesi RuralNet, una xarxa comunitària
sense l basada en la tecnologia de portals captius (captive portals) que proveeix
accés a Internet a subscriptors rurals. Els objectius d'aquest treball són desen-
volupar una nova tecnologia d'informació i comunicació per a oferir un servei de
banda estreta i accés segur a Internet per a zones rurals aïllades. RuralNet com-
bina el paradigma de les xarxes mallades (mesh) i l'ús de dispositius sense ls de
baix cost encastats per a oferir un gran nombre de serveis i aplicacions basats en
Internet. La solució desenvolupada per a RuralNet és capaç d'aconseguir àrees
distants a baix cost. A més, pot ser fàcilment desplegat i ampliat tant en termes
de cobertura com de serveis oferits.
Pel fet que desplegar i avaluar RuralNet requereix un alt cost i un esforç intens,
simular i emular és una alternativa per a estalviar costos. Tanmateix, per a testar
RuralNet ens cal un emulador que s'adapte bé a les nostres necessitats. Per aquest
motiu, hem desenvolupat Castadiva, un emulador exible dissenyat per a avaluar
MANET i xarxes mallades. Castadiva és un emulador basat en dispositius encas-
tats de baix cost, usat per a avaluar protocols i aplicacions desenvolupades per a
MANET i xarxes mallades. A través d'una interfície amigable, Castadiva ofereix la
possibilitat de denir i avaluar diferents escenaris i patrons de trànsit, afegint-hi la
possibilitat d'exportar-los a format ns-2, el simulador més comunament utilitzat
per la comunitat cientíca, per a comparar resultats o per compatibilitat amb
altres experiments.
Finalment, hem volgut afegir característiques de seguretat a la nostra proposta.
Per tant, hem fet RuralNet segur contra atacs maliciosos i així és més robust. Per
això, analitzem la seguretat en xarxes comunitàries, estudiant els atacs més comuns
en aquest tipus de xarxes, com per exemple, l'atac de black hole. Per a detectar
aquest atac, proposem en aquest treball una fusió de l'eina del temporitzador de
vigilància (watchdog), una solució comuna, que es pot trobar en la bibliograa per
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a detectar intrusions en xarxes sense ls; i els ltres bayesians, una tècnica per al
desenvolupament de sistemes robustos en escenaris amb un alt nivell de soroll.
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Organisation of the Thesis
1.1 Motivation
In 2005, when the rst steps of this thesis were taken, there were still some areas
in the Comunidad Valenciana which had no Internet access. This was mostly
due to the reluctance of the Internet Service Providers, who hesitated to invest in
infrastructure in areas where there is not enough market, or where the physical
characteristics of the area makes the investment in infrastructure too expensive.
Nowadays, new choices for Internet connectivity are available, such as using
the mobile telephony as an ISP, being the easiest way to provide Internet in urban
areas. But there are still large areas in the world where traditional technologies
are not deployed, and so new solutions are needed to provide connectivity. The
causes for this lack of infrastructure are various, such as the prohibitive cost of
deploying a conventional wired infrastructure, or because of national policy issues.
These causes are present in almost all countries of the developing world, where the
Internet would allow access to all kinds of information to promote trade, education,
employment, health, and wealth and therefore, being an important tool for human
development.
One solution consists of using other non-conventional technologies such as the
IEEE 802.11 standard, which is still a good chance for improving the telecommu-
nications. Wireless Internet may be a very eective and inexpensive connectivity
tool, solving the problem of the prohibitive cost of infrastructure. But it does not
carry any magic in itself. More work must be done to make this technology useful
to the users. New protocols must be developed for these new networks, and new
security issues must be addressed before this technology can be widely accepted
by users.
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CHAPTER 1. MOTIVATION, OBJECTIVES AND ORGANISATION OF
THE THESIS
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
In this thesis we propose a new way to provide Internet connectivity among users by
combining wireless technologies. Our system is based in a low-cost infrastructure,
being available for all rural areas of the developing world. Although the main
objective of this thesis is to develop this low-cost infrastructure, and although a
lot of work related to wireless ad hoc networks was already done by the research
community, we need to do extra research work in order to solve new problems
inherent to the wireless networks that aect our work.
The rst contribution of this thesis is the design of a community network archi-
tecture for providing Internet connectivity at a low cost. The proposed architecture
allows us to control the user access, the services provided to the entire network,
and the bandwidth of each user.
The second contribution of this thesis is the development of a test bed where
we can test our proposed solution. In order to perform a realistic study of the
wireless networks, we need a test bed where we can test our real implementation.
In the literature we can nd some test beds already implemented that provide a
good approach to the wireless networks, but we need a more exible one, which
is completely suitable for our task. This test bed must be exible in the sense of
easily allowing to add new protocols or tools for testing.
As a third contribution we study security issues regarding to the wireless net-
works. In order to deploy a secure infrastructure, that is robust against attacks,
we study the watchdog, a basic brick in the Intrusion Detection Systems developed
for these kind of cooperative wireless networks. We performed a deep study of it
and found some drawbacks that can cause a malicious node to remain undetected
by the watchdog.
The fourth contribution is an improvement of the watchdog. We study the
bayesian lters, a very eective technique in other scenarios such as detecting
SPAM in the e-mail. We integrate the bayesian lter methodology with the watch-
dog to improve its accuracy in these scenarios. We also perform some tests to
measure the obtained improvements.
After describing our contributions in detail, we proceed by making a joint
evaluation of all the previous proposals, obtaining a clear picture of the overall
improvements achieved.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised as follows: in Chapter 2 we present a survey of dierent
community networks, describing the technology and the specic routing protocols
used in their deployment.
In Chapter 3 we present Castadiva, our test bed emulator created for testing
mesh networks and MANETs which has been used along this thesis for evaluat-
ing and testing our proposed solution. We also present on this chapter a deep
evaluation of this tool to validate the obtained results.
Chapter 4 shows our proposed solution for deploying a low-cost infrastructure
to bring Internet connectivity to rural areas. We call this architecture RuralNet.
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RuralNet is an architecture to strengthen networking support in rural environ-
ments, and it allows subscribers to access the Internet. It can also provide a group
of free services to all the people within a certain area, and it also allows segregating
dierent kinds of users with dierent privileges of the network. We also present
on this chapter an example of a real deployment of our prototype in Mozambique.
We describe the selected scenario and discuss some problems we faced to deploy
our community network in a developing country.
Chapter 5 highlights some important security drawbacks on MANETs and mesh
networks that RuralNet must face. In a cooperative network such as a MANET
or a mesh network, it is common that a selsh node refuses to cooperate to save
resources, causing a black hole in the network. The watchdog technique can be
used to detect this abnormal node's behaviour, but it is well known that it has
some drawbacks. We propose an improvement of the standard countermeasures
deployed in these networks by merging it with bayesian lters, which can detect and
reject this kind of attack successfully. We also perform several tests to validate our
proposal in dierent scenarios and to measure the accuracy of our countermeasure.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we present a summary of the main results of this thesis,
along with some concluding remarks. We also include a list of the publications
related to the thesis, and we comment on possible future research works that can





Within a few years, wireless networking may revolutionise the manner by which
we can access the Internet as well as communicate with other people. Although
the software behind wireless mesh networking is still evolving, the concept behind
this technology, that eliminates the need for a centralised control mechanism, is
well thought out and will remain in place.
This chapter presents an overview of the current state-of-the-art and examines
the concept behind wireless networking. We also detail how wireless networking is
used to deploy community networks at a low cost. Finally, we show the methodol-
ogy used to evaluate these networks, an important previous work before deploying
them in a real scenario.
2.1 Introduction
Mobile computers, such as notebook computers and personal digital assistants
(PDAs), are facing a rapid growth, being nowadays everywhere. Owners of these
devices also have desktop machines back at the oce and want to be connected to
their home base even when away. Since having a wired connection is impossible
in many scenarios, there is a lot of interest in wireless networks.
Wireless networks have many uses, like the portable oce, or rescue operations
at disaster areas where the communications infrastructure has been destroyed.
People on the road want to use their portable electronic devices to send and
receive telephone calls, faxes, and electronic mail, read remote les, and login
on remote machines; and all this from anywhere and at anytime. Furthermore,
wireless networks are of great value to eets of trucks, taxis, buses, and vehicles
in general, and eventually all wireless and xed-line networks will merge with the
global Internet.
There are three basic technologies to create a wireless network: infrared, radio
or laser. Infrared is used for local wire replacements over small distances (mouse
to PC). Laser technology oers much greater capability for distance and speed.
In networking, lasers typically bridge two network segments between two separate
buildings. Radio solutions are dierent for LAN and WAN uses. WANs use
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satellite and microwave portions of the radio frequency spectrum. LANs use radios
that operate in the free ISM frequency [Ole05]. Wireless networks are based on the
radio interface dened by the IEEE 802.11 [The99] standard, which is the radio
technology this thesis is based on.
2.2 Overview of the IEEE 802.11 Standard
The IEEE 802.11 [The99] standard is a technology whose purpose is to provide
wireless access to local area networks (WLANs). Stations using this technology
access the wireless medium using either the Point Coordination Function (PCF) or
the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). The Point Coordination Function is
a centralised access mode optionally used when a point coordinator (PC) is avail-
able. When relying on the PCF, contention-free periods (CFP) and contention
periods (CP) alternate over time. The Distributed Coordination Function uses
a listen-before-talk scheme named carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) [Tob80]
with collision avoidance (CA) [ZA02]. The CSMA/CA technology distributes the
medium access task among all stations, making every station responsible for assur-
ing the delivery of MAC service data units and reacting to collisions. The collision
avoidance scheme is used to reduce the probability of collisions between dierent
stations.
2.2.1 Network Architecture
There are three possible network congurations available within the IEEE 802.11
framework, and they are IBSS, BSS and ESS [ASWZ02].
 An IBSS (Independent Basic Server Set), also known as ad hoc network, is
a network established to connect a mesh of mobile stations without any sort
of infrastructure.
 BSS (Basic Server Set)-based networks, also known as infrastructure net-
works, are formed around an access point that typically has a wired connec-
tion with a external network infrastructure. Each mobile node communicates
directly with the access point.
 ESS (Extended Service Set)-based networks are characterised by the exis-
tence of multiple access points whose coverage area partially overlaps.
2.2.2 Physical Level
The bandwidths dened by the standard currently range from 1 to 54 Mbps, but
other standards being developed in the 802.11 family shall oer greater bandwidth.
The IEEE 802.11 standard denes three physical layers. Two of them were de-
signed for operation at the free ISM (Industry, Scientic and Medical) frequency
band (2.4 GHz); these are Frequency-hopping (FH) and Direct-sequency (DS)
spread-spectrum frequency techniques. A physical layer using infrared light (IR)
was also dened. The 802.11a technology is a physical layer annex to the IEEE
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802.11 for operating in the 5 GHz radio frequency. It supports several dierent
data rates ranging from 6 to 54 Mbit/s.
 IEEE 802.11a technology allows achieving good results supporting multime-
dia applications in environments with several users. The only drawback is
that more access points are required to cover a similar area than with IEEE
802.11b or IEEE 802.11g.
 IEEE 802.11b specication enhances the IEEE 802.11's physical layer to
achieve higher data rates on the 2.4 GHz band, combining the DSSS (Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum) technique based on Complementary Code Key
(CCK) with the QPSK (Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) modulation, which
is the key for achieving data rates of 5.5 and 11 Mbit/s.
 IEEE 802.11g is another enhancement to the IEEE 802.11 physical layer.
The main advantage of 802.11g is that it maintains compatibility with more
than 11 million Wi-Fi products (IEEE 802.11b) already sold.
 IEEE 802.11n is the most recent 802.11 standard for wireless local-area net-
works. The real data rate throughput is estimated to reach a theoretical 540
Mbit/s. IEEE 802.11n builds upon the previous 802.11 standards by adding
MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output) and orthogonal frequency-division
multiplexing (OFDM).
2.2.3 Summary
The main purpose of wireless networks is supporting computational and commu-
nication services while moving. The advantages of wireless networks are ease and
low cost of installation. In environments where deploying a wired network is dif-
cult, i.e. at home, in remote areas, or where the cost is high compared to the
benets, wireless networks are a valid alternative. As a result, this technology is
an alternative to deploy community networks and rural networks, which is also of
extended use in developing countries.
2.3 Community Networks
Community network is a term broadly used to indicate the use of networking
technologies by and for a local community. The primary goals of a community
network may include a sustainable, trusted platform for an urban neighbourhood,
suburban village or exurban town or region to enhance a vital community, as well
as oering easier access to already existing information and services, promotion
of local economic development and employment, strengthening of local identity,
and/or revitalisation, promotion, and/or maintenance of local communal ties.
Wireless community networks or wireless community projects are the largely
hobbyist-led development of interlinked computer networks using wireless LAN
technologies, taking advantage of the recent development of cheap, standardised
802.11 (Wi-Fi) devices to build growing clusters of linked, citywide networks. Some
are being used to link to the wider Internet, particularly where individuals can
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obtain unmetered ADSL and/or cable modem Internet connectivities at xed costs
and share them with friends. When such access is unavailable or expensive, they
can act as a low-cost partial alternative, as the only cost is the xed cost of the
equipment.
2.3.1 Examples of Wireless Community Networks
Apart from the technology used to deploy these kind of communities, we can clas-
sify the wireless community networks according to the purpose of the community.
2.3.1.1 Private Wireless Community Networks
Private Wireless Community Networks are communities formed by enterprises.
They provide a Internet connectivity to any customer in exchange of a fee. Some
examples of private wireless communities are:
FON (FON Wireless Ltd.) [FON10] is a company incorporated and registered
in the UK. FON was created in Madrid, Spain, and its high-tech investors include
Google and Skype. It is a company that runs a system for sharing wireless net-
works. The business was launched in November 2005. Members need to purchase
a low-cost wireless router (called a Fonera), which acts as a public Internet ac-
cess point. FON members can use any other FON access points free of charge and
non-FON members can buy Internet access passes or prepaid Wi-Fi from FON for
a fee.
Meraki [Mer] is a wireless networking company that provides hardware and
software for building large scale wireless networks. These networks are used by
businesses, schools, and other organisations that need several access points to oer
ll coverage to their users. It uses a centralised control system hosted on Meraki's
servers. Meraki was funded by Google and Sequoia Capital in March of 2006.
2.3.1.2 Free Wireless Community Networks
These community networks are open networks where any node can extend the
coverage area of the network. Some examples of free wireless community networks
are the following:
Gui.net [RP09] is an open mesh network initially deployed in Catalonia, north
of Spain, and it successfully connects almost 8000 nodes. This community also ex-
changes knowledge among its users about mesh networks and information about
devices in the market, allowing them to know the best way to extend their net-
work. Gui.net calls itself: Open-Free-Neutral because anybody can connect to
this network without paying a fee, it has not any imposition of a provider and the
trac is not controlled or limited.
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Netsukuku [Pum07] is the name of an experimental peer-to-peer routing sys-
tem, developed by the FreakNet MediaLab (Italian), born to build up a distributed
network, anonymous or censorship-free, fully independent but not necessarily sep-
arated from Internet, without the support of any server and with no central au-
thority. It does not rely on a backbone router, neither on any routing equipment
other than normal network interface cards.
2.3.1.3 Wireless Community Networks in developing countries and ru-
ral areas
Wireless community networks are particularly useful in developing countries or
rural areas where commercial telecommunications services are unavailable due to
important handicaps that make Internet connectivity a complex and costly task.
In rural areas and small towns the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) do not as-
sume the high-cost of technologies designed for the urban market. Moreover, low
population density and high deployment costs discourage ISP investments since
the estimated return on investment (ROI) is unattractive. It is widely accepted
that new information and telecommunication technologies are needed to allevi-
ate a wide range of obstacles for economic and social development in these rural
areas. Therefore, some eorts are being done for some non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) or governments to connect these areas using wireless networks as a
cheap alternative. The main dierence with the free wireless community networks
is that the last ones are deployed by the users, while the community networks
in developing countries or rural areas, are usually deployed by external entities.
These communities also have additional problems such as formation of local part-
ners. Another barrier is local telecommunication regulation, which is hindered by
limited technical sta, imperfect government, and the presence of local incum-
bent monopolies. Some of the problems we encountered are unregulated wireless
usage resulting in signicant same-band interference. An example of a wireless
community network in developing countries is:
EHAS (Enlace Hispano Americano de Salud) [MVPJ+07] is formed by the Uni-
versidad Politécnica de Madrid and the non-governmental organisation ISF (Inge-
nieros Sin Fronteras) in 2004. This Foundation has deployed dierent community
networks in countries such as Peru, Colombia or Cuba. The main objective of
this community is to connect dierent sanitary points across the country to ex-
change information and formation for its workers. Basically they are using Wi-Fi
or VHF-HF technologies for this purpose.
2.3.2 How a Wireless Community Network works
The main advantage of these networks in comparison to classical networks is that
wireless community networks do not needs a huge inversion. However, they have
some problems that must be addressed: users may need to purchase some hardware
to connect to the network as a Wi-Fi card, some specic protocols are needed, user
access control is dicult to achieve in an open network, and security is a complex
matter in a network where there is no authority.
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2.3.2.1 Infrastructure and Hardware
We can divide the community networks' infrastructure in two parts: the wired
network and the wireless network.
Wireless Network: The wireless network is commonly composed by the users
of the network themselves. Each user connects its device to an access point
of the network or to another user. If two nodes are not within radio range
of each other, they can communicate with the help of intermediate nodes.
These nodes forward data packets from one to the other, thereby transferring
packets from the source node to the destination node. In this manner, the
coverage area of the network is easily increased. We could think that users'
nodes in a wireless community network are usually composed by laptops,
but not only. PDAs and mobile phones can be also used to connect to our
network.
Wired Network: Independently of how many wireless clients are members of
the community network, the wireless network must nally connect to other
networks, such as the Internet. This is the main scope of the wired network
in a community network. It forms a kind of backbone network over the
community to transfer data to a small number of Internet gateways located
in areas where wired Internet connectivity is available to route data from the
wireless network. The wired network is usually composed by access points,
routers or gateways.
Another important point of the community network is that there is no any cen-
tralised infrastructure. The community is created using point-to-point or point-
to-multipoint links each time a new node joins the network. This encourages the
inclusion of new nodes and allows a high scalability of the network.
2.3.2.2 Software
As described in the previous section, there is an absence of a centralised infras-
tructure. This is paid in terms of client complexity. New protocols are needed
for these scenarios, which guarantee the interconnection of wireless devices across
the network. However, the routing protocols procedures must be incorporated
into all the mobile nodes, and, therefore, we need devices where we can install
these protocols or any extra tool we need to deploy in our network. This task
that is easy to perform in a computer, can be hard in other devices, specially de-
vices where the manufacturer has installed a specic rmware. Some eorts have
already been done to develop generic operative systems which replace the man-
ufacturer's rmware, and where we can install our own tools. The most widely
known operative systems for these embedded devices are the OpenWRT system
[Ope10] and the DD-WRT one [DD-10]. Both of them are open source operating
systems available for a wide range of router manufacturers, where we can install
new applications or develop new ones.
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2.3.2.3 Security in Wireless Community Networks
As in other scenarios, security is a major issue and it needs to be applied in
wireless community networks. On the radio level, since these networks are open,
encryption (e.g. WPA) is not usually active and, therefore, it is normal to use
encryption at the application layer. But these communities networks are also
vulnerable to intrusions and attacks such as other wireless networks. We perform
a deeper study of the security strategies used in these networks in Section 2.8.
2.3.2.4 Access Control: Captive Portals
As described in the previous sections, any device can become a member of the
network if it has the software and hardware required since there is no encryption.
But if the community network is not open to everyone, it can be an undesired
situation. Therefore, community networks need new techniques to regulate the
access to the network. The most extended solution is the use of Captive Portals.
Captive Portals are used for access control in community networks or other
scenarios such as Wi-Fi hotspots or wired access (e.g. apartment houses, hotel
rooms, business centres) as well.
The captive portal technique forces an HTTP client on a network to be redi-
rected to a special web page (usually for authentication purposes) before surng
the Internet. A captive portal turns a Web browser into a secure authentication
device, which is done by intercepting all packets, regardless of address or port,
until the user opens a browser and tries to access the Internet. At that time
the browser is redirected to a web page which may require authentication and/or
payment, or simply display an acceptable policy and require the user to agree.
In section 4.1 we explain RuralNet, our captive portal proposal. RuralNet
allows any user to connect to a network using devices such as PDAs, mobile phones
or laptops. It also provides access control to each user.
2.3.2.5 Non-technical Problems of Wireless Community Networks
Excluding the private community networks, we encountered a variety of non-
technical problems. These deployments present much larger installation, main-
tenance and servicing costs, mainly due to the lack of local technical expertise,
equipment availability and logistics. Consequently, there is a need for new quality
solutions, and not just research prototypes. The hardware and software must be
robust, user friendly, and simple to install, maintain and manage. Another ad-
ditional problem is the administration of the entire network. For example, if we
have a network composed by 200 nodes, it is a non trivial problem to change the
radio signal channel if the one used is aected by external interferences. The entire
network needs to set the new conguration following an order to avoid fragmen-
tation of the entire network, specially to avoid losing contact with nodes used as
repeaters and also with nodes having a dicult physical access.
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Figure 2.1: Internet penetration on the world.
2.4 Information and Communication Technologies
in Developing Countries.
All world countries are faced with substantial numbers of major challenges. Among
them we can remark the provision for their inhabitants of good health, adequate
education, opportunities for advancement, adequate housing, employment, su-
cient income to meet material needs, a sense of personal security within the law,
and a sense of security as a nation. Although individual countries may disagree
about how to go about achieving those goals, there is agreement in a general sense
about what the goals should be [Sad98]. In general, there is a great rush to be part
of the network age [Nat01]; the combined result of the technological revolutions
and globalisation, that are integrating markets and linking people across all kinds
of traditional boundaries, will help us to achieve these goals.
Rapid expansion of the Internet holds substantial promise for developing coun-
tries, which can benet greatly from the Internet's communication and information
delivery capabilities to help meet these needs. The accelerating transition of infor-
mation to electronic media is making information resources of the world available
to an increasingly global audience through the Internet. Developing countries have
much to gain from that revolution in communication and information access. In
contrast to the situation in the developed world, where transport and communica-
tions infrastructures for delivery of both physical goods and information services
are well established, the alternatives available within developing countries are gen-
erally slow, expensive, or nonexistent. Figure 2.1 shows the dierences between
the richer countries and the poorer ones with regard to Internet penetration.
People in richer countries have better access to information and communication
technologies (ICTs), and use it more intensively than do people in poorer coun-
tries. It is clear that Internet usage is far more common in richer countries than
in poorer countries, and also that the number of users has grown more quickly in
richer countries [Wal05]. But, if the development community turns its back on the
explosion of technological innovation in food, medicine and information, it risks
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Figure 2.2: Internet Users.
marginalising itself and denying developing countries opportunities that, if har-
nessed eectively, could transform the lives of poor people and oer breakthrough
development opportunities to poor countries.
However, the countries that can take more prot of the new technologies are
those which have less capacity of using it. This is due to a phenomenon called the
digital divide. Figure 2.2 shows a comparative of the increase of Internet usage,
in developed countries and in developing countries.
2.4.1 The Digital Divide
The digital divide [Rog01] refers to the gap between people with eective access to
digital and information technology, and those with very limited or no access at all.
It includes the imbalance both in physical access to technology, and the resources
and skills needed to eectively take prot of the new technologies. The term is a
social construction that emerged in the latter half of the 1990s after the Internet
came into the public domain and the World Wide Web exploded into history's
largest repository of human knowledge.
The essence of this concept is that, while low incomes cause low ICTs pene-
tration, low penetration may also perpetuate low incomes. In developing coun-
tries, information poverty is one of the more signicant and insidious obstacles
to eective exploitation of information processing and other types of technology.
Lack of adequate information regarding developments in other countries and other
environments is often not noticed, and in the absence of new information, old tech-
niques and procedures are continued without conscious knowledge of alternatives,
aecting the economy of the entire country.
From a global perspective [Vie08], we see that concentration of access to ICTs
abounds in the North America, Europe and the Northern Asia Pacic while access
is restricted in southern regions of the globe, most notably in Africa, rural India
and the southern regions of Asia. The poorer nations, plagued by multiple burdens
of debt, disease, and lack of education are those least likely to benet from Internet
13
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Figure 2.3: Global digital divide.
access. Figure 2.3 shows the global digital divide by country.
But not only Internet could help stimulate economic development, as has been
demonstrated in a number of countries recently: access to information aects
political democratisation eorts at the global level as well as within nations. In
developing countries, where much of the media is controlled by the state and
individual access to networks is currently limited, the need to decentralise control
over information and over networks themselves is clear.
2.4.2 Causes of the Digital Divide
The state of the physical communications infrastructure is crucial. Adequate in-
ternational and local links may be neither present nor reliable; equipment may
be dicult to obtain, maintain, and repair; electrical power may not be reliable.
Computers and the related peripherals required for networking may be absent or
inadequate. Transportation and communications links may be weak and retard
progress.
Many developing countries are beneting from direct assistance in transferring
computing technology to themselves. But, information poverty, nancial poverty,
and misperceptions about the costs and benets of network connectivity have
sometimes resulted in decisions to delay investment in networking activities, which
may be considered too expensive relative to other needs. Therefore, we can nd
a lack of investment in ICTs' infrastructure in developing countries, which slows
down the development of other sectors such as industry.
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2.4.3 Old Solutions for New Problems
In developing countries where local governments cannot solve all the problems
presented in the society, population groups usually face their problems by them-
selves to improve their quality of live. As a consequence, dierent communities
(associations, non-governmental organisations or other groups of people) appear
to solve a specic problem. In these communities each member collaborates with
the other ones to achieve a solution.
This behaviour is not dierent from the one presented in community networks,
where nodes collaborate with each other to form a platform to provide connectiv-
ity. Therefore, deploying a community network can be the solution for developing
countries to ght the digital divide in a straight manner thus improving the econ-
omy and the human development of the area.
In this thesis we propose a methodology to share Internet connectivity among a
local community, following the philosophy of people collaborating to face a certain
problem as this has proved to be very eective with other old problems.
2.5 Mesh Networks
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) [IXW05] are dynamically self-organised and self-
congured, with the nodes in the network automatically establishing an ad hoc
network and maintaining the mesh connectivity. Wireless mesh networks were
originally developed for military applications but over the past decade the size,
cost, and power requirements of radios has declined, extending it use to civil
applications. WMNs are comprised of two types of nodes: mesh routers and mesh
clients. Other than the routing capability for gateway/bridge functions as in a
conventional wireless router, a mesh router contains additional routing functions to
support mesh networking. Through multi-hop communications, the same coverage
can be achieved by a mesh router with much lower transmission power. In spite of
all these dierences, mesh and conventional wireless routers are usually built based
on a similar hardware platform. Mesh routers have minimal mobility and form
the mesh backbone for mesh clients. Thus, although mesh clients can also work
as a router for mesh networking as a Mobile Ad hoc network (explained in the
next section), the hardware platform and software for them can be much simpler
than those for mesh routers. Figure 2.4 shows an example of a mesh network
architecture.
Mesh networks dier from other networks since all the components can connect
to each other via multiple hops, and they are generally not mobile. It employs two
dierent connection arrangements: full mesh topology or partial mesh topology.
In the full mesh topology, each node (workstation or other device) is connected
directly to each of the other nodes. In the partial mesh topology, some nodes
are connected to all the others, while others are only partially connected. Mesh
networks are usually used to extend the coverage of access points, and can be seen
as a type of ad hoc network.
As we can see, mesh networks are the backbone of community networks, and
they are used as the basic infrastructure for deploying them. To date, several
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Figure 2.4: Example of a mesh network.
companies have already realised the potential of this technology and oer wireless
mesh networking products.
2.6 Mobile Ad hoc Networks
MANETs or Mobile Ad hoc Networks [SMSI04] became a popular research topic
as laptops and 802.11/Wi-Fi wireless networking became widespread. It consist
of devices that are autonomously self-organised. In ad hoc networks the devices
themselves conform the network, and this allows seamless communication, at a
low cost, in a self-organised fashion and with easy deployment. Users have the op-
portunity to create their own networks, which can be deployed easily and cheaply.
However, a price for all those features is paid in terms of complex technological
solutions, which are needed at all layers and also across several layers.
The importance of MANETs is shown in the wide application area where they
are involved. Special situations need communication networks without any short
of infrastructure, like emergency missions, military operations or meeting rooms.
These scenarios require the quick deployment allowed by MANETs. The research
spent in this new technology is growing every year, and it is important to have
some tools that allow researchers to evaluate their proposals before investing huge
amounts of money and developing eort.
MANET and mesh networks are, therefore, closely related, but mobile ad hoc
networks also have to deal with the problems introduced by the mobility of nodes.
In this work we use MANETs to extend the coverage of our proposed mesh network
(generating a partial mesh topology), thus increasing the number of subscribers




Both MANETs and mesh networks require ecient routing protocols to be cor-
rectly deployed. If an ad-hoc network consists of only a few nodes that are up and
running at all times, don't move and always have stable radio links, it would be
possible to write individual routing tables for all nodes by hand.
Unfortunately, those conditions are rarely met in a real mesh network and, far
from it, in a real MANET or mesh network. Nodes can fail, Wi-Fi enabled devices
roam around, and interference can make radio links unusable at any time. Also
no one wants to update several routing tables by hand if one node is added to
the network. By using routing protocols that automatically maintain individual
routing tables in all nodes involved, we can avoid these issues. Popular routing
protocols from the wired world (such as OSPF [Moy98]) do not work well in such
an environment because they are not designed to deal with lossy links or rapidly
changing topology.
A routing protocol is a protocol that species how routers communicate with
each other to disseminate information, allowing them to select routes between
any two nodes on a network. Many of the academic papers dealing with ad hoc
and mesh networks [CES03, TPA+01, IC06, DDJ01, DD96, PAPL02, TGLG01,
SCM99] evaluate protocols assuming varying degrees of mobility within a bounded
space, usually with all nodes within a few hops of each other, and usually with
nodes sending data at a constant rate. Dierent protocols are then evaluated based
on the packet drop rate, the overhead introduced by the routing protocol, and
other measures. Although there is a signicant number of proposed ad hoc routing
protocols, they basically dier in the methods to discover the routes between two
distant nodes, and on how the route failures are detected.
2.7.1 Basic Routing Techniques
Independently of how a routing protocol is classied according to those criteria,
the routing techniques used can be divided into three families: distance vector,
link state and source routing. We now detail briey the basic principles of each of
these techniques.
2.7.1.1 Distance Vector
This technique maintains a table for the communication taking place and employs
diusion (not ooding) for information exchange between neighbours. All the
nodes must calculate the shortest path towards the destination using the routing
information of their neighbours.
2.7.1.2 Link State
The protocols based on this technique maintain a routing table with the full topol-
ogy. The topology is built by nding the shortest path in terms of link cost, cost
that is periodically exchanged among all the nodes through a ooding technique.
Each node updates its routing table by using information gathered about link
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costs. This technique is prone to cause loops on networks with a fast changing
topology.
2.7.1.3 Source Routing
It is a technique where all data packets have routing information in their head-
ers. The route decision is made on the source node. This technique avoids loops
entirely, though the protocol overhead is quite signicant. This technique can be
inecient for fast moving topologies due to route invalidation along the path of a
packet.
2.7.2 Classication of Routing Protocols
Routing protocols based on algorithms such as distance vector (e.g. RIP [G. 98])
or link-state (e.g. OSPF [Moy98]) were available before solutions were sought in
the eld of wireless ad hoc networks. These routing protocols generate periodic
control messages, a procedure that is not adequate for a large network with long
routes since it would result in a large number of control messages. Also, all the
conventional routing protocols assume bidirectional routes with a similar quality,
something that is not always true on some kinds of networks (e.g. wireless ad hoc
networks). Routing protocols can be classied according to three dierent criteria:
 Centralised or distributed: all the decisions take place at a central node.
However, with a distributed routing protocol, all the nodes share the routing
decisions.
 Adaptive or static: an adaptive routing protocol can change its behaviour
according to the network's state, which can be the congestion on a certain
connection or other possible factors, contrarily to a static one.
 Reactive, proactive or hybrid: a reactive routing protocol must act to nd
routes when necessary, while a proactive routing protocol nds routes before
these are required. Reactive routing protocols are also known as on-demand
routing protocols. Since these are executed on-demand, the control packets'
overhead is considerably reduced. Proactive methods maintain routing ta-
bles, being these periodically updated. Concerning hybrid methods, they use
a combination of both reactive and proactive techniques to achieve a more
balanced solution.
2.7.3 Routing in Ad hoc Networks
An ideal routing protocol for ad hoc networks must have certain properties that
make it dierent from the rest: (a) It must be distributed to increase reliability
(when all the nodes are mobile, it makes no sense to have a centralised routing
protocol). (b) Each node must have enough capabilities to take routing-related
decisions with the aid of the rest of the nodes, (c) it should assume that the links
detected are unidirectional connections. On a wireless channel, a unidirectional
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connection may be formed due to physical factors, so that bidirectional communi-
cation may result impossible. (d) it should take into account issues such as power
consumption and security. Obviously, mobile nodes depend on batteries. This
means that a protocol that minimises the total power consumption of network
nodes would be ideal. (e) it should take into account that the wireless medium
is very vulnerable. At the physical level, DoS attacks can be avoided by using
frequency hopping or code-based Spread Spectrum techniques. At the routing
level, though, both the authentication of neighbours and the encryption of data
are required.
Concerning the routing protocols used on ad hoc networks, they should be,
according to the classication of Section 2.7.2, both distributed and adaptive.
Relatively to the third category (reactive/proactive/hybrid), there is no con-
sensus over which is the most adequate strategy. Below we present the dierent
proposals that are currently available for each of these protocol families, and we
also include other non-catalogued proposals.
2.7.3.1 Proactive Routing Protocols
The concept of proactive routing means that all the nodes (routers) periodically
interchange routing information (or upon detecting topology changes) with the
aim of maintaining a consistent, updated and complete view of the network. This
avoids delays associated with nding routes on-demand. Proactive techniques typ-
ically use algorithms such as distance vector or link-state. Both techniques require
routers to periodically broadcast information and, based on that information, to
calculate the shortest path towards the rest of the nodes. The main advantage of
proactive routing schemes is that there is no initial delay when a route is required.
On the other hand, these are usually related to a greater overhead and a larger
convergence time than for reactive routing techniques, especially when mobility is
high.
Examples of routing protocols using distance vector techniques are the Des-
tination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) [CP94] and the Wireless Routing
Protocol (WRP) [MGLA96]. Examples of link-state based protocols are the Open
Shortest Path First (OSPF) [Moy98], the Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR)
[TPA+01], the Topology Broadcast Reverse Path Forwarding (TBRPF) [RFM04],
the Source Tree Adaptive Routing (STAR) [GLAS99], the Global State Routing
(GSR) [CQS98], the Fisheye State Routing (FSR) [PGC00] and the Landmark
Routing Protocol (LANMAR) [PGH00].
2.7.3.2 Reactive Routing Protocols
Reactive routing does not depend, in general, of periodic exchange of routing
information or route calculation. Therefore, when a route is required, the node
must start a route discovery process. This means that it must disseminate the
route request throughout the network and wait for an answer before it can proceed
to send packets to the destination. The route is maintained until the destination
is unreachable or until the route is no longer necessary. On the other hand, the
route discovery process causes a signicant start-up delay and causes a considerable
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waste of resources. If the network is wide enough, the overhead will be similar or
superior to that achieved with proactive routing protocols.
The most common routing algorithms found among reactive routing protocols
are distance vector and source routing. Example of reactive routing protocols are
the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [PR99], the Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR) [DDY04], the Associatively Based Routing (ABR) [C. 97], the
Signal Stability based Adaptive routing (SSA) [DRWT96], the Temporally Ordered
Routing Algorithm (TORA) [VS00], the Relative Distance Micro-discovery Ad-
hoc Routing (RDMAR) [AT99] and the Dynamic On-demand MANET routing
protocol (DYMO) [IC06].
2.7.3.3 Other Strategies
There are other strategies proposed for the design of routing protocols. There are,
for instance, hybrid solutions such as the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [ZM99],
there are some protocols based on clustering and hierarchical architectures, such
as the Clusterhead Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) [Chi97], the Distributed
Mobility-Adaptive Clustering (DMAC) [Bas99] and the Cluster-based Energy Sav-
ing Algorithm (CERA) [JDP03]. The LAR protocol [YN98] tries to avoid this
problem by using GPS information so that only those nodes on a certain geo-
graphic area between source and destination must retransmit route requests.
Next we describe the OLSR and AODV protocols since we decided to use
both of them as the representation of a proactive protocol and a reactive protocol
respectively.
2.7.4 Why dierent protocols?
A key issue in MANETs is the need for routing protocols to respond rapidly to
topological changes in the network. At the same time, due to the limited avail-
able bandwidth achieved through mobile radio interfaces, it is imperative that the
amount of control trac generated by the routing protocols is kept at a minimum.
As shown in [Cla04] both classes, reactive and proactive protocols, complement
to each other. With TCP trac or networks with heavy load of trac, proactive
protocols outperform reactive ones; on the other hand, in UDP scenarios or sce-
narios with a light load of trac, a reactive protocol achieves better results.
It is clear, that none of the two protocol classes outperforms the other in every
domain. Therefore, both solutions should be considered. In this thesis we test both
reactive protocol - OLSR - , and a proactive protocol - AODV -. Both protocols
are explained in detail below.
2.7.5 The Optimised Link-State Routing Protocol (OLSR)
The Optimised Link State Routing protocol [TP03] is a proactive routing protocol
specically designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It is based on the
denition and use of dedicated nodes, called multipoint relays (MPRs). MPRs are
selected nodes which are responsible for forwarding broadcast packets during the
ooding process. This technique allows reducing the packet overhead compared
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to a pure ooding mechanism where every node retransmits the packet when it
receives the rst copy of it. Contrarily to the classic link-state algorithm, partial
link-state information is distributed throughout the network.
2.7.5.1 Basic Principles
The OLSR protocol inherits its stability from link-state algorithms. Due to its
proactive nature, it oers the advantage that available routes can be used imme-
diately.
Pure link-state algorithms declare and propagate the list of neighbours for each
node throughout the network. OLSR tries to improve this solution by using dif-
ferent techniques. To start with, it reduces the size of control packets since it
does not declare all of its neighbours, but only a subset of these referred as Mul-
tipoint Relay Selectors. A node's Multipoint Relay is in charge of retransmitting
its broadcast messages. The use of MPRs serves the purpose of minimising the
amount of retransmissions upon a ooding or broadcast event.
Besides periodic control messages, the protocol does not generate additional
control trac in response to failures or association with new nodes. The protocol
maintains routes towards all networks destinations, being useful in those situa-
tions where a great number of MANET nodes is communicating, especially when
source/destination pairs are changing frequently. This protocol is more adequate
for large and dense networks, where the optimisations achieved by introducing
Multipoint Relays oer important benets.
The protocol is designed to operate in a distributed fashion, so it does not
depend on a central entity. Moreover, it does not require reliable transmission of
its control messages: each node sends periodic control messages, being tolerant
to sporadic losses of control packets. Packet reordering, a frequent phenomena in
ad hoc networks, will not cause OLSR to misbehave since each message carries a
dierent sequence number.
The OLSR protocol uses per-node packet forwarding, which means that each
node uses its most recent information to route a packet. The ability to follow a
node can be adjusted by setting the interval between consecutive control messages.
2.7.5.2 Multipoint Relays
The Multipoint Relay concept consists in trying to minimise the ooding caused
by broadcast trac by eliminating duplicated transmission on a same region. Each
network node selects a subset of those nodes in its vicinity to retransmit its packets.
Nodes belonging to this subset are a node's Multipoint Relays (MPRs). The
neighbours not part of the MPR subset of a certain node N will still receive packets
from it, but will not re-transmit them again. That way, each node maintains a
table with the nodes which have selected it as their MPR.
Each node selects its own set of MPRs among their neighbours with a criteria
that consists of assuring that all those nodes two hops away from it can be reached
with a minimal number of MPRs. Figure 2.5 illustrates this concept.
OLSR trusts on the MPR node selection to calculate routes towards all the
destinations having these as intermediate stations. This solution requires each
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of the multi-point relay concept for node N
node to periodically broadcast the list of Neighbour nodes chosen as its MPRs.
When receiving this information, each neighbour node updates the routes towards
all known stations.
2.7.5.3 Neighbour Detection
Each node must detect those neighbours nodes towards which bidirectional com-
munication exists. To achieve this purpose a node periodically broadcasts HELLO
messages containing information about its neighbours and the state of the chan-
nel towards them. These messages are received by all neighbours nodes but not
retransmitted.
For adequate operation each node will then maintain a table with a list of all
the nodes it can see either directly or indirectly. Links to one hop neighbours
are tagged as either unidirectional, bidirectional or MPR. Each table entry has a
both a sequence number and a timeout value associated, so that old entries can
be removed.
2.7.5.4 Multipoint Relay Selection
Each network node independently chooses its MPR set. Maintaining a list of
the two-hop neighbours requires analysing HELLO messages and ltering all the
unidirectional links. The MPR set is only altered when a change is detected in
terms of one-hop or two-hop neighbours (bidirectional connections only).
2.7.5.5 MPR Information Broadcasting
Each node must broadcast topology control messages (TC) So that all nodes main-
tain their database updated. These messages are broadcasted throughout the net-
work using a technique similar to the one used for traditional link-state routing
protocols, with the only dierence that it employs MPRs to improve scalability.
A TC message is sent periodically to each network node to declare its MPR
selector set. This means that the message must contain a list with those direct
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neighbours that have selected it as their MPR. This list has always a sequence
number associated.
The list of addresses on each TC message can be partial, but it must be com-
plete before each refresh period ends. These messages will allow each node to
maintain its own table with the network topology. If a node has not been selected
as any other node's MPR it does not send TC messages, thereby saving power and
bandwidth.
The interval between the transmission of two TC messages depends on whether
there have been changes on a node's MPR selector set. If so, the next TC message
can be transmitted before the time scheduled, though respecting the minimum
inter-message time.
2.7.5.6 Calculation of the Routing Table
Each node maintains a routing table with information on how to access other
network terminals. When nodes receive a TC message they store sets of two
addresses indicating the last hop before reaching a certain destination node, as
well as the destination node itself. By combining the information in these address
pairs the node is able to nd what is the next hop towards a certain destination
node. Minimum distance criteria should be followed to restrict the search options.
Routing table entries are composed of destination, next hop and estimated
distance to destination. On this table we only register those entries for which the
route towards the destination is known. This means that the routing table must
be constantly updated according to the topology changes detected.
In a real implementation the OLSR daemon must update the kernel's forward-
ing table according to the routing table it maintains, so that packets are sent
through valid routes.
2.7.5.7 Versatility of the OLSR
As described in Section 2.3.2.2, for a community network it is imperative that the
routing protocol can be installed on any device which is part of the network. The
olsrd implementation of OLSR can be installed on several devices such as iPhone,
Nokia 770, Android, Windows or any Linux System such as Ubuntu, DD-WRT or
OpenWRT. Using this implementation ensures that any user can easily connect to
the wireless community network without purchasing specic devices.
2.7.5.8 Advantages and Disadvantages
Being a proactive protocol, OLSR uses power and network resources in order to
propagate data about possibly unused routes. While this is not a problem for
wired access points and laptops, it makes other devices such as mobiles or sensors
to spend battery and bandwidth only for maintaining the routes. Nevertheless, all
routes are refreshed constantly and, when a node needs to send data through the
network, it can use the route immediately.
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2.7.6 Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV)
2.7.6.1 Basic Principles
AODV is an on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks which uses hop-by-
hop routing by maintaining routing table entries at intermediate nodes.
2.7.6.2 Route Discovery
The route discovery process is initiated when a source needs a route to a destination
and it does not have a route in its routing table. To initiate the route discovery,
the source oods the network with a RREQ packet specifying the destination for
which the route process is requested. When a node receives an RREQ packet,
it checks to see whether it is the destination or whether it has a route to the
destination. If either case is true, the node generates an RREP packet, which is
sent back to the source along the reverse path. Each node along the reverse path
sets up a forward pointer to the node it received the RREP from. This sets up a
forward path from the source to the destination. If the node is not the destination
and does not have a route to the destination, it rebroadcasts the RREQ packet. At
intermediate nodes duplicate RREQ packets are discarded. When the source node
receives the rst RREP, it can begin sending data to the destination. To determine
the relative out-of-dateness degree of routes, each entry in the node routing table
and all RREQ and RREP packets are tagged with a destination sequence number.
A larger destination sequence number indicates a more current (or more recent)
route. Upon receiving an RREQ or RREP packet, a node updates its routing
information to set up the reverse or forward path, respectively, only if the route
contained in the RREQ or RREP packet is more recent than its own route.
2.7.6.3 Route Maintenance
AODV maintains routes for as long as the route is active. Because the network
nodes are mobile, it is likely that many link breakages along a route will occur
during the lifetime of that route. When a node detects a broken link while at-
tempting to forward a packet to the next hop, it generates a RERR packet that
is sent to all sources using the broken link. The RERR packet erases all routes
using the link along the way. If a source receives a RERR packet and a route to
the destination is still required, it initiates a new route discovery process. Routes
are also deleted from the routing table if they are unused for a certain amount of
time.
2.7.6.4 Neighbour management
Detecting the availability of new neighbours and, more important, detecting that
a neighbour has become unavailable is an important issue in mobile ad hoc net-
works. AODV allows nodes to detect their neighbours in two dierent ways. When
a neighbour receives a broadcast packet from one of his neighbours it updates its
internal tables to include that neighbour. Sometimes a node does not send any
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packets downstream, which could cause downstream nodes to consider it unavail-
able. In those cases such nodes broadcast an unsolicited RREP packet within a
hello_interval time so that downstream nodes become aware of their liveliness.
This packet has a TTL of 1, and so it is not re-broadcasted. When a node fails
to listen up to allowed_hello_loss consecutive packets from a node participating
on an active path, it considers the link with the upstream node to be lost and,
therefore, generates a route error message to be sent to the source of that stream.
In a real implementation this technique can suer in those situations where
the channel is very congested, causing frequent losses of broadcast packets. Nodes
could then erroneously infer that a link is down, when in fact it is not.
2.7.6.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
An important advantage of AODV is that it generates no extra trac for commu-
nication along existing routes. Also, distance vector routing is simple and doesn't
require much memory or calculation. However, AODV requires more time to es-
tablish a connection and, besides, the initial process required to establish a route
provokes more routing overhead than proactive approaches.
2.7.7 Other Protocol specically used in Mesh Networking:
B.A.T.M.A.N.
The Better Approach To Mobile Ad hoc Networking, or B.A.T.M.A.N. [JNA08],
is a routing protocol which is currently under development by the Freifunk-
Community [Fre].
B.A.T.M.A.N.'s crucial point is the decentralisation of the knowledge about
the best route through the network: no single node has all the data. Using this
technique, the need for spreading information concerning network changes to every
node in the network becomes superuous. The individual node only saves infor-
mation about the direction it received data from, sending its data accordingly.
Hereby the data gets passed on from node to node and packets get individual,
dynamically created routes. A network of collective intelligence is created.
On a regular basis, every node sends out a broadcast thereby informing all its
neighbours about its existence. The neighbours then relay this message to their
neighbours and so on and so forth. This carries the information to every node in
the network. In order to nd the best way to a certain node, B.A.T.M.A.N counts
the originator-messages received and logs which neighbour the message came in
through.
Like distance-vector protocols, but unlike link-state protocols, B.A.T.M.A.N
does not try to determine the whole path, but, by using the originator-messages,
only the packet's rst step in the right direction. The data is handed over to the
next neighbour in that direction, who in turn uses the same mechanism. This
process is repeated until the data reaches its destination.
B.A.T.M.A.N consumes less resources than other protocol such as OLSR and
causes less disturbances into the network, but it is only useful in networks where
the mobility is reduced such as urban networks because it needs more time to
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recalculate a new route when the previous one fails. B.A.T.M.A.N. could be also
a candidate approach in mesh networking.
2.8 Security on MANETs and Wireless Mesh Net-
works
Unlike the wired networks, the unique characteristics of mesh networks and mobile
ad hoc networks pose a number of nontrivial challenges to security design, such as
open peer-to-peer network architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent resource
constraints, and highly dynamic network topology.
Existing protocol specications, like AODV or OLSR described before, cope
well with changes in the network topology. However, defence against malicious
attacks is an issue which has not been addressed in the specications. The majority
of these protocols assumes that each node in the network is a peer and not a
malicious node. Therefore, a single attacking node can cause the entire network
to fail, i.e. ooding the MANET with useless packets or disseminating false routes
to prevent the MANET from working.
Then, trustworthiness is essential for the practical exploitation and use of
MANETs and mesh networks. In such context, network availability is a min-
imum requirement. To achieve such requirement, routing protocols should be
robust against both topology changes and malicious attacks. Therefore, there is
an emerging need of research focused on the provision of practical proposals for
securing ad hoc routing protocols [Hao04].
2.8.1 Challenges
One fundamental vulnerability of MANETs comes from their open peer-to-peer
architecture. Unlike wired networks that have dedicated routers, each mobile
node in an ad hoc network may function as a router, forwarding packets for other
nodes. The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate network users and
malicious attackers. As a result, there is no clear line of defence in MANETs from
the security design perspective. There is no well dened infrastructure where we
may deploy a single security solution.
Moreover, portable devices, as well as the system security information they
store, are vulnerable to compromises or physical capture, especially low-end devices
with weak protection.
The stringent resource constraints in MANETs constitute another nontrivial
challenge to security design. The wireless channel is bandwidth-constrained and
shared among multiple networking entities. The computation capability of a mo-
bile node is also constrained. For example, some low-end devices, such as PDAs,
can hardly perform computation-intensive tasks like asymmetric cryptographic
computation. Because mobile devices are typically powered by batteries, they
may have very limited energy resources.
The wireless medium and node mobility pose far more dynamics in MANETs
compared to the wire-line networks. The network topology is highly dynamic as
nodes frequently join or leave the network, and roam in the network at their own
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will. The wireless channel is also subject to interferences and errors, exhibiting
volatile characteristics in terms of bandwidth and delay. Despite such dynamics,
mobile users may request for anytime, anywhere security services as they move
from one place to another.
Therefore, any proposed solution deployed against an attack must consider
these constraints: mobility of the network, computation capability, limited energy
resources and high level of interferences in the wireless channel.
2.8.2 Routing disruption attacks
As reported in [HP04], one of the main attacks against ad hoc networks aects their
routing protocols and are named routing-disruption attacks. Such attacks can be
considered as instances of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack since they compromise
the routing process, thus aecting the availability of certain (or all) network and
application services.
An example of a routing-disruption attack is for an attacker to send false
routing packets to cause the routing protocol to misbehave. An attacker might
create a routing black hole with the objective of dropping data packets. An attacker
creates a black hole by distributing forged routing information (that is claiming
falsied short distance information); the attacker attracts trac and can then
discard it. Figure 2.6 shows how a malicious node perform this kind of attack.
Figure 2.6: Steps for a black hole attack.
1. The malicious node (M) induces a network topology propitious for the attack
success (Figure 2.6.b). To cope with that goal (i) M induces a possible
routing link between attack targeted devices (call them A and D), then (ii)
M emits protocol-compliant messages for leading both A and D to choose
such link for their communications.
2. M carries out the attack (Figure 2.6.c). In the case of a black hole attack,
M drops (does not retransmit) the packets.
In a special case of a black hole, and attacker could create a grey hole, in which it
selectively drops some packets but not other, for example, by forwarding control
packets but not data packets.
A similar kind of routing disruption is the selsh node. A selsh node uses the
network but does not cooperate, saving battery life for its own communications; it
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does not intend to directly damage other nodes. The selsh attack is very common
in community networks, where a node does not cooperate not only to save battery,
but also to increase its bandwidth by disrupting other trac ows if the network
is congested. In practise, a selsh node can be considered as a black hole.
In some recent publications [R+08], authors have explored to what extent ex-
isting ad hoc networks routing protocols, like OLSR or AODV, are sensible to
selsh nodes, black holes and grey holes attacks. Results are clear: although these
attacks are well-known, their detection and tolerance remain in most of the cases
an optional feature rarely implemented in practise. Therefore an extra eort must
be done to develop new tools to react against these malicious behaviours.
2.8.3 Watchdogs
In this context, intrusion detection systems (IDS) aim at monitoring the activity
of the nodes in the network in order to detect misbehaviour. A basic brick in
the construction of such systems is the watchdog, a sensor that can detect selsh
nodes and black hole attackers.
The watchdog is an intrusion detection mechanism proposed in previous stud-
ies [STKM00, CLY06] that copes well with the challenges described before. It
ensures that an intermediate node of a trac route has the expected behaviour for
a standard MANET's node, forwarding the packets to the nal destination. The
watchdog controls it by listening to the next node promiscuously. If the next node
does not forward the packet, then it is termed as misbehaving. The main advantage
of the watchdog is to oer a node the possibility of detecting an attacker using only
local information, thus avoiding that a malicious node aects the decisions made
by the mechanism and reducing the trac overload in the MANET that other
solutions may cause. Therefore, results provided by watchdogs are exploited by
other reputation systems, like in the case of the Pathrater [MGLB00] and Route-
guard [HZH05] solutions. Such systems then isolate and/or punish misbehaving
nodes or routes by decreasing their trustability rates. Although this methodology
should be enough to detect malicious nodes, collisions and signal noise make that,
in practise, the false detections problem will appear.
False detections is not the only problem of the watchdog. It is well known
that the watchdog is unable to detect cooperative attacks. Some previous works
[TS08, WF07, Deb08] dene techniques for avoiding the problem of cooperative
black-holing in MANETs. However, they have some limitations. For example, all
of the described methodology is based on the AODV protocol and [TS08, WF07]
need to change the implementation of AODV. In Chapter 5 we perform a deeper
study of the watchdog and we propose improvements to this strategy to avoid its
limitations.
2.9 Methodology Used to Evaluate MANET and
Mesh Networks Proposals
Deploying and testing applications and new protocols for MANETs and mesh
networks involves high cost and intensive labour. Hence, simulation and emulation
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is a useful alternative prior to evaluating actual implementations. In this section we
study the dierences between emulation and simulation for evaluating a research
work.
2.9.1 Importance of Evaluation in Research
Research eorts focusing on ad hoc networks and mesh networks are growing ev-
ery year, and it is important to have tools that allow researchers to evaluate their
proposals before investing huge amounts of money on it. Testing and evaluating a
MANET protocol is, therefore, mandatory for its success in any real word applica-
tion. Researchers in this eld have two options for testing new MANET protocols:
(a) simulation tools, and (b) emulators.
2.9.2 Simulators
A simulation tool is a program or system used during software verication, which
behaves or operates like a given system when provided with a set of controlled
inputs.
Currently, several simulators exist, like ns-2 [UBr98], OPNET [OPN10], Sea-
wind [MAJ+01], GloMoSim [XRM98], REAL [Kes88] and JiST/SWANS [RZR04,
RZR05, RZ04]. Computer simulation is the most popular way to evaluate MANET
routing protocols [JDD+98, PTN+99, SCE00] being ns-2 one of the most extended
under the research community.
2.9.2.1 Ns-2
Ns is an object oriented simulator, written in C++, with an OTcl interpreter
as a front-end. The simulator supports a class hierarchy in C++, and a similar
class hierarchy within the OTcl interpreter. Ns-2 uses two languages because the
simulator has two dierent kinds of tasks it needs to do. On one hand, detailed
simulations of protocols requires a systems programming language which can e-
ciently manipulate bytes, packet headers, and implement algorithms that run over
large data sets. For these tasks run-time speed is important and turn-around time
(run simulation, nd bug, x bug, recompile, re-run) is less important. On the
other hand, a large part of network research involves slightly varying parameters
or congurations, or quickly exploring a number of scenarios. In these cases, iter-
ation time (change the model and re-run) is more important. Since conguration
runs once (at the beginning of the simulation), the run-time of this part of the
task is less important.
Ns-2 is a discrete event network simulator and it is popular in academia for its
extensibility (due to its open source model) and plentiful on-line documentation.
Ns-2 is popularly used in the simulation of routing and multicast protocols, among
others, and is heavily used in ad-hoc research. Ns-2 supports an array of popular
network protocols, oering simulation results for wired and wireless networks alike.
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2.9.3 Emulators
An emulator is a platform for experimentation. Emulators allow for rigorous,
transparent and replicable testing of scientic theories, computational tools, and
other new technologies.
2.9.3.1 Comparative among Emulators
The idea of automatic computer-controlled routing in a mesh network is not new; in
fact the main idea dates back to Paul Baran in the early 1960s [Bar64]. Since then,
several prototypes for generating real ad hoc network experiments were proposed
and can be found in the literature:
ORBIT: an indoor radio grid emulator for controlled experimentation and an
outdoor eld trial network for end-user evaluations in real-world settings
[DIM+05]. This emulator needs an expensive noise generator since it em-
ulates higher node distances by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. It also
requires investing a high budget to create the grid of nodes (each computer
is a possible position of the node in a simulation), as well as extra support
servers for data storage. Thus, deploying the entire infrastructure requires a
lot of room.
mLab: an emulator that strikes a balance between desktop simulations and out-
door eld tests by allowing users to develop and test ad hoc protocols and
applications in a laboratory environment [AE05]. This emulator can only
generate network topologies and capture packets.
Carnegie Mellon University Wireless Emulator: supports real devices, ap-
plications, MAC and PHY layers on a network-wide scale while maintaining
experimental control and repeatability [GP07]. The disadvantages of this
emulator are that it does not use commercial o-the-shelf devices, using a
FPGA for digital emulation instead.
MobiEmu: an emulator to test an ad hoc network of any scale and with any mo-
bility scenario without actually moving the ad hoc nodes physically [ZL02].
We discarded this emulator for our tests since it relies on expensive clusters
to emulate the scenario.
Seawind: another emulator designed for performance studies of real protocols
and applications on wireless networks [MAJ+01]. It uses an emulated link
and router to generate the network topology and non-commercial o-the-
shelf devices, making it dicult to scale up the network. Also, it can only
emulate one trac ow.
WHYNET: this emulator is a hybrid wireless test bed environment targeting
realistic, scalable and exible evaluation of wireless technologies and appli-
cations [JZM+06]. These hybrid experimentation modes use physical and
simulated elements (e.g., protocol layers, subnets) in dierent combinations.
WHYNET uses a geographically distributed set of physical wireless test beds,
making results dicult to be replicated by other researchers.
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GUI: a graphical interface for an easy use of the emulator.
Real Devices: which devices can be used in the emulation tests.
Real Code: can users introduce real implementations of applications and protocols in the
emulations without doing an extra programming eort?
Flexibility: can any topology be implemented?
Size of the Emulator: can the emulator be deployed on a simple desktop of a lab, or does it
need an entire room for its deployment?
Initial Budget: the initial (approx.) inversion for generating a test bed of 10 nodes.
Scalable: is it easy to increase the number of nodes without increasing the deploying cost
signicantly?
Free: can it be used freely by anyone without purchasing a license?
Table 2.1: Comparative of existing emulators.
Castadiva: We developed Castadiva to deploy a cheap architecture that relies
on low-cost devices to generate a test bed. The test bed obtained eectively
uses low-cost hardware to achieve a complex, yet reliable wireless network
simulation.
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Table 2.1 compares the dierent emulators available against Castadiva. As
can be observed, only three emulators are free: Castadiva, MobiEmu and mLab.
MLab is almost a simulator since it does not use real devices. Castadiva can use
any devices with a wireless card, which oers exibility when purchasing devices,
thus reducing the budget to deploy the emulator. MobiEmu is more expensive
than Castadiva and does not have a GUI. Castadiva implements a GUI to guide
the users when creating the scenario and the trac pattern.
Overall, Castadiva outperforms the other emulators in terms of: (a) variety of
devices that can be use as nodes, (b) initial budged needed to deploy the emu-
lator and (c) ease of use provided by the GUI; this means that it makes a clear
contribution to the research community.
In Chapter 3, we explain deeply how Castadiva works.
2.9.4 Main Dierences between Simulators and Emulators
Simulation oers four important advantages [AGT+04] compared to emulators:
First, it enables experimentation with large networks. Second, it enables experi-
mentation with congurations that may not be possible with existing technology.
Third, it allows rapid prototyping. Finally, it makes reproducible experiments in
a controlled environment. On the other hand, simulations also have some disad-
vantages that emulators do not have: rst, researchers cannot test their own real
world implementation of a protocol in a realistic scenario, and second, simulators
also need to incorporate realistic models of node mobility and radio propagation.
Then, we can use a simulator to test a protocol or tool in a large network with
a high number of nodes, but if we want test the nal implementation, we should
use an emulator. In this thesis, we use Castadiva, our own implementation of a
MANET emulator, for testing the behaviour of our proposed architecture using
real devices. However, for testing some large scenarios used in Chapter 5, we also
use the ns-2 simulator, taking advantage of the simulations benets. In the next






In this chapter we present Castadiva, a test bed architecture that simplies car-
rying out realistic experiments; it relies on low-cost, o-the-shelf wireless routers
combined with a Linux platform. Castadiva allows generating network topologies,
exporting them to real devices and obtaining the test results. It can also generate
dierent types of trac between nodes, and it oers support for some well-known
ad-hoc routing protocols, i.e. AODV and OLSR. It relies on a cheap architecture
that includes two dierent networks: a wired network, called connection network,
that connects the server with a group of wireless nodes, and a wireless network
where the actual test bed experiments are made. We developed a group of tools for
administration purposes, with a friendly user interface designed to help the user
to dene the scenario of the network and the desired trac connections between
MANET nodes in a simple and straightforward manner. All of these tools were
developed with open source software, and they are freely available for the research
community at http://castadiva.sourceforge.net/.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the ob-
jectives of Castadiva. Section 3.3 describes the proposed architecture and Section
3.4 describes its implementation. Section 3.5 describes the evaluation made to
validate our Castadiva test bed. Finally, Section 3.7 draws the conclusions of this
chapter.
3.1 Introduction
Research eorts focusing on MANETs and mesh networks are growing every year,
and it is important to have tools that allow researchers to evaluate their proposals
before investing huge amounts of money on it. Testing and evaluating protocols
or tools for these networks is, therefore, mandatory for its success in any real word
application.
A test bed is a platform for experimentation in large development projects.
test beds allow rigorous, transparent and replicable testing of scientic theories,
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computational tools, and other new technologies. Several prototypes for generating
a real test bed can also be founded in the literature. But all available test beds have
some disadvantages: they use expensive clusters for testing, or their functionality
is limited (see Table 2.1).
Therefore, we need to develop a test bed which allows us to perform our eval-
uation tests to ensure the correct behaviour of our community network. In this
sense we create Castadiva, a test bed for studying MANETs and mesh networks.
3.2 Objectives of Castadiva
The objective of this chapter is to develop a test bed where evaluating our proposed
architecture for deploying community networks. This test bed is called Castadiva.
Castadiva is designed for emulating MANETs where we can test the behaviour
of the network with dierent routing protocols and dierent real applications.
Our test bed should use a low cost architecture based on commercial-of-the-self
devices and free software. We also wish to generate an application with an user-
friendly interface that allows dening the network's scenario. Castadiva must be
compatible with the ns-2 simulator used in our group for comparison purposes and
it should have an user-friendly interface that allows the user to generate the entire
simulation easily.
3.3 Architectural Overview
Castadiva is a test bed designed to deal with the development and the performance
evaluation of protocols and applications for MANETs. The test bed relies on actual
IEEE 802.11 wireless interfaces for communication among nodes. Castadiva is
composed by a server that runs the main application, several wireless nodes, two
dierent networks (wired and wireless), and an application that coordinates all
devices.
Castadiva's server executes the application and congures the network devices.
Concerning the wireless nodes used, they can be any sort of computing device, like
a laptop, a PDA or a wireless router. In our prototype, each node is a Linksys
router [Lin10] to minimise costs. The main requirement for a node is that it must
have a Linux/Unix operating system installed, and two network cards: an Ether-
net card and an IEEE 802.11 card. If the node is a wireless router, the OpenWRT
[Ope10] kernel is an excellent solution. OpenWRT is an open source operating
system available for a wide range of router manufacturers. This embedded Linux
system natively oers SSH connections, along with the possibility of running shell
scripts. Moreover, a programmer can develop its own application in a standard
Linux distribution and export it to this operating system. In our case, we devel-
oped some applications in C for trac generation and control purposes.
Figure 3.1 shows a schema of the Castadiva's architecture. The main appli-
cation, developed in Java, controls all devices and dynamically manages the links
among them according to the desired network scenario. It also manages trac
generation between pairs of nodes. Since the controlling application requires com-
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Figure 3.1: Schema of Castadiva's architecture.
municating with nodes to send control packets, Castadiva combines two dierent
networks: the coordination network (wired), that connects the Castadiva core with
the wireless nodes, and the wireless network, where actual tests run.
The coordination network is a wired network that connects Castadiva's core
server with the wireless nodes. This network allows the main application to send
conguration messages to all the nodes without creating any interference within
the wireless network itself. It is based on Fast-Ethernet technology, to avoid
large latencies. Basically, the coordination network requires a switch connected
to the main server and to all nodes. Through this network the main application
sends instructions to nodes, allowing them to re-congure periodically according
to the desired network topology, and also to run lightweight trac-generating
applications available on each wireless node. For communication purposes, we
rely on the SSH protocol [TC06] to send instructions through this network. Using
a fast network means that all nodes participating in a test will start at about the
same time, avoiding signicant latency eects and maximising result accuracy.
The wireless network is composed by Castadiva's wireless nodes, and the topol-
ogy of this network is dened by the GUI of Castadiva, so that it can change at
runtime. Nodes communicate in ad hoc mode using the IEEE 802.11g technology.
Castadiva's core has two main functions: (a) to allow a user to interact with
the system so as to dene all the test parameters required, and (b) to coordinate
the wireless nodes during an experiment. By using Castadiva's GUI a user con-
trols all of Castadiva's functionality, dening the network topology and the trac
ow among nodes. Castadiva allows xing the scenario area where nodes will be
deployed. When selecting a node, its location is highlighted and it can be changed
according to the desired network topology. When all nodes are deployed the user
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Figure 3.2: Scenario denition with Castadiva.
can press the Simulate button, and each physical node will be re-programmed so
as to enforce the chosen network topology. Figure 3.2 shows the GUI application
of Castadiva. We describe the whole functionality oered by Castadiva's GUI in
Section 3.4.2.
Figure 3.3 shows our test bed, where one switch connects Castadiva's server
with all the wireless nodes for coordination purposes. In the middle of the pic-
ture the group of wireless nodes being used is shown. It consists of twenty-four
Linksys routers (models WRT54G and WRT54GL). The wireless ad hoc network
conformed by these nodes is the one used in Castadiva's test bed experiments. The
experiments presented in this work required extending Castadiva to support trac
injected from outside applications. In particular, we connected laptops running
video-conference software to our MANET, allowing us to assess the performance
of video conference sessions as experienced by users.
3.4 Castadiva's Implementation Details
In this section we detail the requirements of Castadiva on the server and on the
wireless nodes. We describe the software tools we have developed to connect all the
wireless nodes with the server, and how Castadiva allows emulating connections
among them. We also explain the process of designing network topologies by using
the Scenario Generation tool, an interactive and user-friendly interface that allows
dening the network's scenario and the desired trac connections among nodes.
Castadiva requires some libraries and services to operate. The requirements of
Castadiva are dierent for the server and the wireless nodes. The server must be
a standard Linux-based system and must have a Java Virtual Machine, an SSH
client and an NFS server installed. Concerning nodes, each one must be a Linux
based system with an SSH server and an NFS client; besides, they must have the
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Figure 3.3: Castadiva's physical network.
libgcc library and have the Iptables tool-set installed (see gure 3.4).
The connection between Castadiva's core element (server) and each node is
made using both SSH and NFS connections. On Castadiva's server, the user
interacts with the GUI application by dening the network topology, the trac and
selecting the desired routing protocol. Then, through SSH, the application sends a
start instruction to each node through the coordination network (wired). Wireless
nodes achieve coordination among themselves by executing the required binaries,
which are stored in a server folder shared through NFS. This is an easy way to
spread instructions to all nodes, and it also solves storage limitation problems on
nodes. When tests start, a group of les with the results are created and stored
into Castadiva's server. Each individual router accesses its own conguration le
by relying on the NFS le system. We nd that Ethernet connections are fast
enough to export these les to the routers without signicant delays.
The main application parses the results, thus obtaining the dierent test bed
statistics. Finally, the application displays results to the user.
Next we present the Castadiva's implementation, which can be divided into
two parts: the lightweight applications running on wireless nodes, and the main
application.
3.4.1 Wireless Nodes' Software
Each node has a set of requirements that must be met for successful operation:
a Linux-based operating system, a set of special-purpose scripts, some specic
applications, and connectivity to the Castadiva's server.
The operating system installed on each router is OpenWRT. OpenWRT al-
lows executing BASH scripts natively; besides, it includes Dropbear, a simple
SSH server used to receive instructions from Castadiva's server. Concerning the
set of Castadiva's scripts, they are generated automatically by Castadiva's main
application. Their purpose is to congure the wireless network topology.
Each node makes use of three applications: Iptables, TcpFlow, and UdpFlow.
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Figure 3.4: Software components for Castadiva.
Figure 3.5: Example of a scenario with four nodes.
The rst one is open source and exists in most Linux distributions, while the other
two were developed for our own purposes.
Network topology conguration relies on the Iptables [Hub03] tool. According
to the selected topology, Iptables allows us to dynamically break the network links
between pairs of nodes. This tool exists for all Linux distributions, including the
OpenWRT embedded system. In Table 3.1 we show an example of Iptables' rules
generated from Castadiva in the scenario with four nodes shown in Figure 3.5.
To generate trac we created the UdpFlow and TcpFlow tools. Both tools are
designed to generate a trac ow between two nodes, being that each tool creates
a single trac ow. To create a ow of data we must specify a source/destination
pair, the starting and ending times for this ow, and the maximum amount of
bytes to be sent.
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Node (MAC) Iptables Rules.
1 (00:13:10:83:99:BE) /usr/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -m mac mac-source
00:13:10:83:99:CA -j DROP
/usr/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -m mac mac-source
00:18:39:BC:B5:8E -j DROP
2 (00:0F:66:D9:BE:01) (none)
3 (00:13:10:83:99:CA) /usr/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -m mac mac-source
00:13:10:83:99:BE -j DROP
4 (00:18:39:BC:B5:8E) /usr/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -m mac mac-source
00:13:10:83:99:BE -j DROP
Table 3.1: Iptables rules: example of usage in Castadiva's framework.
Castadiva also includes routing agents for well-known routing protocols, such as
AODV and OLSR, which are included with the OpenWRT, and initiated according
to user settings.
3.4.2 Main Application
Castadiva's core element, a Java application running at the server, includes all
the control functions required for test bed experimentation. It is responsible for
network topology maintenance, trac control, as well as result calculation and
presentation. A user can dene the characteristics of wireless nodes. Each node is
deployed at a specic position in a simulated area as chosen by the user. Once the
topology is dened, Castadiva must congure the wireless nodes according to that
topology. The application communicates with each node through SSH connections
to send the required instructions. The trac ow between nodes and the routing
protocol used are also set through this technique. When all the experiments are
nished, Castadiva's core must calculate the result statistics for the experiment
by gathering all the data obtained, and nally show these results to the user.
Castadiva's main application was created using Java's Swing library. We con-
sider that it is a good solution for visual design since most basic components are
already created, and can be easily modied by the programmer.
Castadiva is designed to be a test bed where network scenarios and trac
between nodes are generated so as to resemble a real MANET. Therefore, it is
expected to be an easy and useful tool for the study of MANETs.
To start a new experiment we only need to dene the network topology in the
corresponding window and then dene the trac ow and the selected routing
protocol. By pressing the start button tests begin, and Castadiva returns the test
results automatically at the end of the simulation. We now oer more details
about the services oered by Castadiva.
3.4.2.1 Main Menu
A standard menu allows accessing the dierent options of Castadiva. Basic options
were added, allowing a user to save and load a project, or export it to other test
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Figure 3.6: Application control menu.
environments such as ns-2. It actually generates all the les required as input to
this particular simulator, allowing to compare Castadiva's test results with those
obtained through simulation.
Figure 3.6 shows all the options available in Castadiva. By selecting the ap-
plication main menu you may start a new test bed experiment, load a previous
one, or save the last one dened. The Simulation menu option opens a window to
generate all scenario data. The Conguration option allows a user to adjust server
settings, such as dening the NFS folder used. It also allows conguring wireless
nodes and adding them to the experiments.
3.4.2.2 Network Scenario Generation
Once all the nodes are dened, they can be congured to create a scenario. Cas-
tadiva supports both manual and random topology generation, and the scenario
is set through Castadiva's blackboard. The blackboard is a representation of a
virtual environment where nodes are located. Nodes are dierentiated through
dierent colours and labels. If the adequate option is selected, the radio commu-
nication range is also shown through a circle of the same colour.
Figure 3.7 shows the topology generation environment. We can see a set of
nodes located in a scenario of 1000 x 1000 meters (scenarios bounds are marked
with a darker line).
At the right hand we may edit node properties, such as position and signal
range. Castadiva also can activate or deactivate the RTS/CTS 802.11 option
of each node. The group of buttons appearing below allow starting a new test,
stopping it, and rebooting nodes to reset all values.
At the left hand, Castadiva oers scenario option editing. We can dene the
scenario bounds, the test time, node mobility and the routing protocol used. The
Declare trac button allows setting trac, as shown later on, and the stop button
halts it.
A status bar provides general information to inform the user about what is
being done, and the horizontal scroll allows zooming in and out. Finally, the user
may alternate between two dierent views: radio ranges or a graph view. Every
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Figure 3.7: Scenario denition with Castadiva.
edge of the graph represents an IEEE 802.11 link connection, which is a more
intuitive view.
3.4.2.3 Adding Nodes to the test bed scenario
Before starting an experiment the user needs to dene the number of participating
nodes, along with their conguration. Such information allows Castadiva to access
nodes and manipulate them to generate a scenario. Figure 3.8 shows an example
of the denition of a node in the system.
All the information is dened automatically when the user wishes to add a
new one, though it can be changed by the user or can be read from a le. An
internal identier is required to distinguish a node from others in Castadiva's
framework. Such identier is then referenced when dening the network topology
and data connections. The remaining parameters will be used by Castadiva's main
application to connect nodes among themselves and with the main server. The
MAC address is required for Castadiva to enforce topology changes.
All the executable les and scripts are stored in an NFS directory that is
accessible by all nodes. This way Castadiva makes storage capacity independent
of wireless nodes' memory.
Castadiva relies on its own tools to generate trac between nodes. Such tools
run at each node, and must be compiled for all types of CPUs used. Currently,
tools are compiled for MIPS and Intel processors, though the list can be easily
augmented.
The SSH user and password elds are used by the main application to connect
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Figure 3.8: Node conguration interface.
to each individual router and submit commands. Also, a Ping button was included
to allow testing the connectivity between the server and the routers.
3.4.2.4 Mobility in Castadiva
Castadiva oers the user two dierent approaches for emulating mobility: (a) Any
scenario from the ns-2 simulator could be directly used within Castadiva, and (b)
Users can take advantage of the GUI to select their own mobility model. We
already included the random waypoint mobility model [CGP03] for comparison
purposes. This behaviour is similar to the one provided by the setdest tool
embedded in the ns-2 simulator: if a user picks a value greater than zero in the
speed option, each node acquires a random movement with a speed between zero
and the inserted value. When a node arrives to a destination point, it waits for a
selected pause time and then selects a new random destination point to move to.
Castadiva allows users to easily add new mobility models implementations.
For the emulation of mobility, Castadiva generates all node movements required
for the test before it starts. In particular it generates, for each node, a mobility
vector according to the selected user option in the GUI (see Section 3.4.2.10 to
see how to generate a mobility vector), or imports it from a ns-2 scenario. Also,
Castadiva calculates the variation of the topology continuously in time. Therefore,
our emulator obtains the new topology of the network, updating the wireless links
on each real device whenever necessary. The granularity used to upgrade the
wireless links is of one second, but it can be changed. Since the real devices do
not experience real mobility, we emulate the wireless links connectivity between
nodes using the Iptables tool. This tool allows each Castadiva node to only receive
packets from nodes that are within range according to the emulated topology, and
thus it blocks the reception of packets when nodes are out of range. All Iptables
rules are stored in script les. These scripts will be loaded on each node through
NFS when the simulation starts. Figure 3.9 shows the le loaded by AP1. We
can see in this gure dierent Iptables rules combined with sleep rules. The sleep
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Figure 3.9: Mobility implementation.
Algorithm 3.1 Iptables rules to emulate when a node goes out of range between
seconds 15 and 35.
sleep 15
iptables -I INPUT -m mac mac-source 00:14:BF:3C:39:EC -j DROP
sleep 20
iptables -D INPUT -m mac mac-source 00:14:BF:3C:39:EC -j DROP
time allows enforcing Iptables' rules at suitable times. Hence, each rule is loaded
only when the emulation requires a node to change its connectivity state towards
other node; e.g. Algorithm 3.1 shows the behaviour of Castadiva when a node
(with MAC 00:14:BF:3C:39:EC) goes out of range at second 15 and comes back
into range at second 35.
Castadiva also allows an user to see all node positions at a certain instant of
time. When a simulation nishes, the user can activate the Show option and pick
an instant of time. Immediately Castadiva shows the network topology at that
time. This option is useful to do a later evaluation of the changes occurred in the
network topology when mobility was activated.
3.4.2.5 Network Trac Declaration
Castadiva's trac generation tool allows dening dierent types of trac ows
between pairs of nodes. With that purpose Castadiva provides a table where
each row denes a connection. Trac parameters for each connection can be set
depending on the type of protocol selected, and invalid values are marked in red.
Examples of parameters are: packet size, packets per second, start time, end time
and maximum number of packets sent. Figure 3.10 shows a usage example of this
tool, where rows dene seven trac connections. It contains some helpful buttons
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Figure 3.10: Trac declaration window.
Figure 3.11: External trac declaration.
that allow making row operations (delete, order by starting time, or copy).
When an experiment nishes, Castadiva lls this table with results, including
the average throughput, in the case of TCP trac, or the percentage of packets
received in the case of UDP trac. Note that trac settings are exportable to
NS-2 format also.
3.4.2.6 Castadiva Extensions for External Trac Injection
Such functionality allows external nodes to generate real trac of any kind and
redirect it to specic nodes of Castadiva. Castadiva also incorporates an extra
component that allows attaching a laptop or a computer to a node. Figure 3.11
shows an example of this functionality.
This way we can use laptops to generate any ow of trac and redirect it to
specic nodes of Castadiva. For example, you can use real applications like Ekiga
to launch a video-conference and study the behaviour of H.323, SIP and video
streaming protocols in MANETs.
Figure 3.12 shows an example were two laptops are connected to Castadiva.
Both laptops have a webcam and run the Ekiga application to generate a videocall.
Castadiva redirects all trac related to this video-conference through the emulated
MANET, from the entry point to the output point.
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Figure 3.12: Example of how to add external trac injection.
3.4.2.7 Random Simulation Generator
Sometimes it is useful to automate the test bed evaluation process varying dier-
ent parameters. With that purpose Castadiva includes functionality to generate
random tests, where a user can dene trac and automatically test with dierent
number of nodes and randomly-generated network topologies. This is achieved
through the Random test window shown in Figure 3.13.
The user can specify the bounds of the scenario and the routing protocol used.
The minimum and maximum number of nodes for testing must also be dened,
along with the granularity interval. (e.g., with a node interval between 4 and
10 nodes and a granularity of 2, Castadiva executes four tests with 4, 6, 8, and
10 nodes). Castadiva also allows specifying how many times each test will be
repeated, averaging the obtained results.
At the top left side the current generated scenario is displayed, though it cannot
be modied. Again, all the tests can be stored in either Castadiva's format or NS-
2's format.
3.4.2.8 Execution Planner
This window is designed to allow automatic execution of various and possibly
dierent simulation scenarios. The user can generate a list of previously saved
scenarios, indicate how many times each simulation should be run and let the
system process itself. Results for each simulation are written in a text le.
This window also allows the user to set a timeout, which will delay the start of
the simulations. For dierent reasons, it can be useful to launch the simulation at a
specic time, such as during the night or the weekend. For example, if the test are
made in a university with a public Wi-Fi, it can cause interferences with the tests,
and so performing simulations during the night can palliate these interferences.
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Figure 3.13: Random Simulation window.
Figure 3.14: Execution Planner.
Figure 3.14 shows an example of use of this functionality. We can see a list of
scenarios on the left of the windows, and a group of buttons on the right to add
new scenarios or start the simulations group at a specic time.
3.4.2.9 Adding New Routing Protocols
Routing Plugins allow something simple but also very useful. When a routing
plugin is congured, it receives the instructions of how to start and stop a specic
routing protocol on the Access-Points.
Routing Plugins do not install any routing software on the Access-Points. Thus,
it is mandatory to previously install the adequate routing software on each Access-
Point. The only thing routing Plugins can do is to send start and stop instructions
for the routing protocol, and replace conguration les on the Access-Points. This
will allow Castadiva to integrate the new routing protocol within the interface.
46
3.4. CASTADIVA'S IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Figure 3.15: New Protocol Window.
Figure 3.15 shows the windows used to add a new routing protocol to Castadiva.
The Name eld allows us to identify the protocol and it's conguration. It must be
unique and if an existing name is re-used, it will be overwritten. The bin eld must
point to the location of the binary le on the Access-Point, which allows to start
the routing protocol. Conguration le content is the content of the conguration
le that will be written in the Path protocol.conf, on each Access-Point. With
this information, Castadiva can start the protocol, load the desired conguration
of this protocol, and end it when the simulation time is nished.
3.4.2.10 Mobility Plugins Designer
A Mobility Plugin is supposed to enable a custom mobility pattern denition in
Castadiva. In other words, Mobility Plugins can be congured to add dynamic
mobility to Castadiva's scenarios. Controlled mobility allows the usage of an
algorithm to dene the positions of the nodes during the simulation. The Mobility
Plugin enables the system to use several parameters, like the amount of nodes, the
maximum speed, and so on.
Figure 3.16 shows the unique user interface that can be used to generate a
custom mobility plugin. In the upper part of the gure, we can see the header of a
JAVA function. The variables shown in that header are the one that the user can
use in order to design his algorithm. The only requirement for the nal algorithm
is that it entirely lls the NodeCheckPoint[][] nodes matrix. After the Generate
Plug-in button is pressed, the program will try to compile the code, and if there
is any compilation error, it will be displayed in a special window.
When it is compiled, the Mobility Plugin will be stored and will be available
in the Mobility Model drop-list of the Simulation Window for a future use.
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Figure 3.16: Mobility Plugins Designer.
3.4.2.11 Compatibility with the Ns-2 Simulator
Castadiva can also import/export scenarios to/from ns-2 [UBr98], making it com-
patible with the most widely used MANET simulator. This characteristic oers
the possibility of comparing results and reaching more meaningful conclusions.
3.4.2.12 Compatibility with the Maya Tool
For evaluation purposes, Castadiva can export the topology dened to the Maya
tool [JJCP07d] (see Section 4.7 for more information about theMaya application).
This option generates a le that can be used by the mentioned tool to obtain all
the information regarding the nodes used in the Castadiva's scenario, and allows
Maya to use its emulated network.
3.5 Performance Evaluation and Validation of Cas-
tadiva
In this section we validate the functionality and accuracy of Castadiva in dierent
MANET scenarios. We divide our tests in two groups: rst, we compare Castadiva
with the ns-2 simulator using both TCP and UDP trac in a static scenario. We
then proceed with a similar analysis in a mobile scenario.
3.5.1 Evaluation of Castadiva with a Static Scenario
To validate the functionality of the proposed tool, and to test its eectiveness, we
have chosen a representative scenario where nodes are located in such a way that
the maximum number of hops between nodes is of four. The topology used in our
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TCP: Castadiva comparison with NS-2.
NS-2 with TCP
Castadiva with TCP
Figure 3.18: Performance comparison between Castadiva and ns-2 in a static sce-
nario using CBR/UDP trac (left) and FTP/TCP trac (right). Routing dis-
abled.
evaluation is shown in Figure 3.17. The scenario is dened in a 1000m x 700m
area, and the test time is of 100 seconds. The selected scenario was generated by
ns-2 and imported to Castadiva.
Since Castadiva is completely compatible with the ns-2 le format, we were
able to compare both in a simple and straightforward manner.
We set the Castadiva's wireless nodes' range to 250 meters. In terms of trac,
we dene both UDP and TCP connections between each participating node and
node 6. For TCP connections, the maximum transfer size is of 100 MB. Each UDP
ow generates 55 packets per second, and packet size is xed at 512 bytes.
In our rst evaluation no routing protocol is being used, so that we can check
the functionality of our tool. Figure 3.18 shows the obtained results in these tests.
We can see that, as expected, wireless nodes that are out-of-range from node 6
are not able to communicate with it. This shows that both network topology and
trac denitions of Castadiva are being enforced correctly.
In both tests we observe that Castadiva has a lower throughput than ns-2.
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TCP: Castadiva comparison with NS-2 using static routing
NS-2 with TCP
Castadiva with TCP
Figure 3.19: Performance comparison between Castadiva with ns-2 in a static
scenario. Using CBR/UDP trac (left) and FTP/TCP trac (right). Routing
enabled.
We should consider that the shared wireless media is prone to both transmission
errors and contention among stations, which is due to the wireless devices being
placed physically close to each other. In the case of ns-2, only contention eects
are simulated, which explains the observed discrepancy.
We now repeat the previous experiment with routing and forwarding enabled.
We pick the Optimum routing option, so that Castadiva is responsible for calcu-
lating the best route to reach a destination node and modifying the routing tables
of nodes to enforce the chosen topology. Figure 3.19 shows the results for this test.
UDP tests show that trac from nodes AP7, AP8, and AP9 is now able to
reach the destination, while node AP10 remains isolated as intended. Notice that,
for the former nodes, the packet loss ratio increases slightly with the number of
hops to destination. With ns-2 we don't observe this behaviour for the reasons
referred above.
Results with TCP trac show that the throughput for nodes 1 to 5 is reduced
compared to the previous experiment (Figure 3.18), which is due to competing
trac from AP7, AP8 and AP9. For these nodes, throughput decreases as the
number of hops increases, as expected. With ns-2 we observe that both AP8 and
AP9 suer from starvation; one of the reasons for this behaviour is that, with
Castadiva, all nodes share a same medium and so packet collisions between out-
of-range nodes do not occur.
Figure 3.20 (left) shows the eect of collisions as the number of hops increases in
a 802.11g wireless network. We make dierent tests, varying the load from 256kb/s
to 3Mb/s. As can be seen, the number of hops causes the packet loss to increase.
This behaviour is normal in a wireless network due to interferences among devices
but, in Castadiva, it can be aggravated by the fact that all devices are close to one
another. To better study how the proximity of the devices aects performance,
Figure 3.20 (right) compares the capacity oered by Castadiva with respect to
other capacity models proposed in the literature for dierent scenarios. We select
the following scenarios: (a) a grid topology [GK00], (b) a random topology [GK00]
and (c) a chain topology [LBDC+01]. We observe that, as expected, the capacity
of the network obtained in Castadiva is lower than the other ones since all devices
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Figure 3.20: Packet loss due to the proximity of the devices in an emulation (left)
and capacity of an ad hoc network compared with Castadiva (right).
of Castadiva interfere with each other. Solutions such as ORBIT try to cope
with this problem by mitigating the eect of the noise among nodes; however,
it introduces new problems into the emulation as limiting the network topology
and limiting the transmission range of all nodes, which is also far from the real
behaviour in a MANET. Castadiva makes a trade-o between accuracy and price,
oering a cheap and portable platform that is good enough for almost all tests.
In terms of the control network (wired), we observe that the bandwidth con-
sumption of the SSH protocol over Ethernet is far from approaching saturation,
and that latency is low enough to allow adequate coordination of all nodes.
3.5.2 Evaluation of Castadiva with a Mobile Scenario
We now dene a mobile scenario with an area of 1000m x 700m. Simulation time
is of 500 seconds, and we set the wireless nodes' range to 250 meters. In terms of
trac, we dene both UDP and TCP connections between each participating node
and node AP7. For TCP connections, the maximum transfer size is of 1000 MB.
UDP ows generate 4 packets per second, and packet size is xed at 512 bytes. In
the rst test, each node has a maximum speed of 5 m/s and no routing protocol
is used.
Figure 3.21 shows a node-by-node comparison between Castadiva and ns-2 for
both UDP and TCP trac. The selected scenario was generated by ns-2 and
imported to Castadiva to have the same mobility pattern.
This gure shows that the obtained results are quite similar, which validates
Castadiva's implementation. Since we have not selected any routing protocol,
transmissions are successful only when the destination is a 1-hop neighbour. In the
case of TCP trac, results are more heterogeneous since it is a stateful, bandwidth-
greedy protocol prone to present non-linearities, specially in mobile ad hoc network
environments. We also observe that Castadiva has, in general, a lower through-
put/delivery rate than ns-2. When Castadiva is used, the shared wireless media is
prone to both transmission errors an contentions among stations. In the case of ns-
2, only contention eects are simulated, which explains the observed discrepancy
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TCP: Castadiva comparison with NS-2 (max node speed 5m/s).
NS-2 with TCP
Castadiva with TCP







Table 3.2: Default OLSR parameter values.
for UDP trac.
To evaluate how the routing protocol behaves in Castadiva, we used the OLSR
protocol. We choose this routing protocol since its implementation is available for
both testing environments (simulated and real), being quite similar. Concerning
OLSR-related parameters choices, we use the values proposed in the RFC [TP03],
shown in Table 3.2 for the reader's convenience.
Figure 3.22 shows the similitude between Castadiva and ns-2 for both UDP
and TCP trac. In these tests, those nodes virtually located more than 1-hop
away are also able to send trac to the destination node thanks to the routing
protocol. Similarly to the test without a routing protocol, Castadiva has a lower
throughput/delivering rate than ns-2, for the same reasons explained before. In
the case of TCP trac, results are more heterogeneous as in the test without
routing.
We now evaluate the impact of node speed. We vary the degree of mobility
in dierent scenarios, testing with maximum node speeds of 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20
m/s. As for the previous test, each scenario was generated by ns-2 and imported
to Castadiva to have exactly the same mobility patterns. Figure 3.23 shows the
results obtained in this test.
In both tests we observe that Castadiva has a lower throughput than ns-2. For
TCP we observe that the dierence between Castadiva and ns-2 is more signicant
that for UDP. To discover the reason of this eect, we study a controlled scenario
with only two nodes, and measure the arrival time of each packet. With this
experiment we obtain the mean delay to do a rerouting when OLSR performs a
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TCP: Castadiva comparison with NS-2 (max node speed 5m/s) using OLSR
NS-2 with TCP
Castadiva with TCP
Figure 3.22: Result comparison of Castadiva with ns-2 for UDP (left) and TCP
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TCP: Castadiva comparison with NS-2 testing different node speeds
NS-2 with TCP
Castadiva with TCP
Figure 3.23: Comparison of Castadiva and ns-2 at dierent node speeds with both
UDP (left) and TCP (right) trac. Routing disabled.
topology update. In ns-2 it is of ve seconds; however, Castadiva's nodes have an
average delay of almost eight seconds. This three-second dierence causes TCP
agents in ns-2 to achieve a higher throughput.
We now repeat the previous experiment with routing and forwarding enabled.
Figure 3.24 shows the average percentage of packets received for maximum node
speeds of 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20 m/s using the OLSR protocol.
Again we observe important similarities between Castadiva and ns-2's results.
For both UDP and TCP trac the behaviour of these platforms is quite similar.
Tests show that the average percentage of UDP packets received is increased when
a routing protocol is used, since it allows nodes AP9 and AP10 to reach their
destinations. When studying the behaviour of the network using TCP trac
instead, we observe that the average throughput is not increased because, in both
simulations, the network is saturated. When looking at the overall trend, though,
we nd that there is a high degree of resemblance between both sets of experiments.
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TCP: Castadiva comparison with NS-2 testing different node speeds using OLSR
NS-2 with TCP
Castadiva with TCP
Figure 3.24: Comparison of Castadiva and ns-2 using OLSR at dierent node
speeds with both UDP (left) and TCP (right) trac.
3.6 Assessing the performance of videoconferenc-
ing in MANETS with Castadiva
We now describe the performance results obtained when transmitting real-time
video trac through Castadiva. We test with several dierent scenarios where the
purpose is to stress the application and evaluate the impact of the number of hops
in the quality of the received video stream. We are going to employ two dierent
kinds of video streams: a standard videocall, where the video sequence is almost
static, and a more dynamic videocall, where we will point the webcams towards a
screen displaying a movie. Similarly to the previous section, we will perform tests
in both static and mobile scenarios.
3.6.1 Static Scenario
Initially we evaluate the performance of a videocall in a static MANET for refer-
ence.
The scenario is dened in a 1500m x 1800m area, and the test time is of 5000
seconds. We set the wireless nodes' range to 250 meters. To monitor the video
trac we use the tcpdump application [SVV89].
To generate the video trac we have two laptops with a webcam attached and
running Ekiga, an open source VoIP and videocall application for Linux.
We generate an emulated MANET topology where all nodes are aligned accord-
ing to a chain topology. Figure 3.25 shows the topology used when eleven nodes
are deployed. In each laptop we redirect all trac sent to the other laptop through
the wireless routers located at both edges of the simulation (AP1 and AP11 in this
scenario). We also congure Castadiva to route all video trac through our test
bed.
Each node runs the OLSR daemon to obtain consistent routing tables. We
initially selected the values proposed in the RFC, but the results obtained in static
environments were not good since OLSR was unable to nd the routes, or the
routes were lost too quickly due to network congestion. Therefore, instead of the
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Table 3.3: OpenWRT parameters values for the OLSR protocol.
default RFC parameters, we used the default conguration of OLSR implemented
in the OpenWRT system, which are considered optimum for a standard mesh
network. Table 3.3 shows these values.
The eects we want to study are the variations in terms of throughput, delay
and jitter when varying the number of hops in the network.
3.6.1.1 Evaluating the Performance with a Standard Videocall
We now present the results obtained when using Castadiva to evaluate a standard
videocall between two users. Based on trac traces at source and destination, we
measured the throughput and the inter-packet delay (jitter).
Figure 3.26 (left) shows the mean throughput obtained for the generated data
rate at dierent number of hops. As we increase the number of hops, we appreciate
that the average throughput is decreased to less than a twentieth compared to the
one hop scenario (from around of 700 Kb/s to close to 30 Kb/s). Figure 3.26 (right)
shows how the packet loss increases when we vary the number of intermediate hops
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Figure 3.26: Average data rate generated (left) and packet loss ratio (right) for





















































































Figure 3.27: Cumulative distribution function for the inter-packet generation in-
terval and inter-packet arrival interval in a scenario with one hop (left) and ten
hops (right).
between sender and receiver. In a scenario with more than 9 hops the packet loss
rate is signicant for a videocall. In particular, for a scenario of 10 hops, the
videocall experiences a 10% of packet loss.
Figure 3.27 shows the cumulative distribution function for the inter-packet
generation interval and inter-packet arrival interval in two scenarios where source
and destination are one and twelve hops away, respectively. In the scenario with
one hop, the smallest network possible, we can appreciate the dierences between
the minimum inter-packet generation time at the source (about 0.01 milliseconds)
and the minimum inter-packet arrival time at the receiver (about 0.1 milliseconds).
Also, 50% of the packets have an inter-packet generation time lower than 0.03
milliseconds, but the inter-packet arrival time is typically higher than 1 millisecond.
In the scenario with ten hops, if we compare the inter-packet arrival time with
the one obtained in the one hop scenario, we can appreciate an increase of more
than 2 milliseconds. This is caused by the forwarding time of the additional nodes
on the path. This is expected since these packets, usually generated back-to-back
by the videoconferencing application, experience signicant jitter when traversing
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Figure 3.28: Testing a videocall when both webcams point to screen with a movie.
an ad hoc network with a high number of hops. But, in a real scenario, the average
number of hops is usually less than ve hops.
3.6.1.2 Evaluating the Performance of a Movie Transmission
In the previous section our experiments relied on a standard videocall. The char-
acteristics of such video-conference - low degrees of video motion - do not impose
signicant demands in terms of network bandwidth. Therefore, we repeated our
experiments with a higher motion video. With that purpose we pointed both we-
bcams (each linked to a communication endpoint) to a screen showing a movie.
Such strategy also allows running long experiments without the intervention of
users. By repeating our experiments and taking long sampling periods we were
also able to obtain meaningful values for the end-to-end delay, and so we include
them in this section, as well as the measured throughput and jitter for comparison
against the previous test. Figure 3.28 shows the working area used in these tests
where we can observe both webcams pointing to a screen showing a lm.
Figure 3.29 shows two frames obtained in the test for dierent hops, where we
can see the quality of the video received in both scenarios. In the scenario with one
hop, there is no signicant delay between the real video sequence and the decoded
one because the path is too short. In a scenario with ten hops, though, we can
verify the poor performance obtained by comparing the received and transmitted
sequences. We also appreciate a delay of the received image compared to the real
image (notice that both webcams aim at a same target for comparison purposes).
Figure 3.30 (right) shows the mean throughput obtained for the generated data
rate obtained for a dierent number of hops. In a scenario with one hop, we have
a mean data rate above 500 Kb/s. In a scenario with 13 hops, the average value of
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Figure 3.30: Cumulative distribution function for the throughput in a scenario
with dierent hops (left) and packet loss rate in dierent scenarios (right).
the generated data rate decreases to less than 100 Kb/s due to Ekiga's bandwidth
throttling mechanism. We also evaluate the packet loss in each scenario. Figure
3.30 (right) shows how the packet loss increases when we vary the intermediate
number of hops between sender and receiver. If we compare this graphic with the
one obtained in the evaluation of a real video-conference, we can observe that now
the packet loss rate increases more signicantly. In fact, for more than 6 hops, the
packet loss rate surpasses 10%.
Figure 3.31 shows the cumulative distribution function for the inter-packet
generation and arrival times in a scenario with one hop and in a scenario with ten
hops. Notice that high delay values are quite prone to occur in this case, often
introducing signicant jitter (above 100 ms).
3.6.1.3 Evaluating the Round-trip Time in Dierent Scenarios
We also evaluated the impact of increasing the number of hops on delay by using
ping sessions and measuring the impact on round-trip time while maintaining
video-conference sessions active. We generate a ping session between the two
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Figure 3.31: Cumulative distribution function for the inter-packet generation in-
























Figure 3.32: Evaluation of the ping sessions in dierent scenarios.
laptops in the chain scenario described earlier, varying the number of hops from
one to ten. We obtain the average time of the ping session used to send a packet
and receive the answer. To obtain the one-way delay, we proceed by dividing the
results obtained by two.
Figure 3.32 shows the average delay and the standard deviation for each sce-
nario. As expected, delay increases almost linearly with the number of hops be-
tween sender and receiver. Of special interest is the increase in terms of standard
deviation, which can be quite problematic for real-time video transmission.
3.6.2 Dynamic Scenario
In this section we evaluate dierent scenarios with a dynamic topology. We change
the nodes' mobility by testing with the following speed values: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 meters
per second. The scenario is dened in a 1500m x 900m area, and the test time
is of 5000 seconds. We set the wireless nodes' range to 250 meters. In this test,
as for the static scenario, we also dierentiate between two types of scenarios:
a standard videocall and a videocall where the webcams point to a movie being
59










Table 3.4: OLSR values used for the mobility scenarios.






Table 3.5: Percentage of the simulation time when a route between both laptops
exists.
displayed. Regarding to OLSR, and according to [CDJ05, YSD06], we need to
tune up the protocol when it is used in mobile scenarios. The new conguration
of the protocol is shown in Table 3.4.
Since, for these tests, we picked a particular OLSR conguration, the rst step
is to measure the total amount of time that the route between both laptops is
established. For this test we emulate 20 random scenarios for each speed, and we
use a ping to determine whether the route is established or not.
Table 3.5 shows the total percentage of time when the route is established.
The percentage of time without route is directly related to the amount of time
that OLSR needs to obtain a route when the topology is changing plus the time
when the network is split, and there is no possible route between the two laptops.
3.6.2.1 Evaluating the Performance with a Standard Videocall
We rst evaluate the behaviour of a standard videocall in a MANET. Since the
number of hops is variable in each simulation due to mobility, in this case we study
the variation of the throughput with dierent node speeds, as well as the packet
losses.
Figure 3.33 shows the results obtained in this set of tests. As we can observe,
higher mobility translates into better performance of the network and less per-
centage of packets lost. This is due to a the higher route availability, as shown
in Table 3.5. Higher speeds avoid lengthy network partitioning eects, which are
translated to a better service with a higher average throughput.
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Figure 3.34: Throughput and packet losses with a movie in a scenario with mobil-
ity.
3.6.2.2 Evaluating the Performance of a Movie Transmission
In this section we also measure the throughput obtained by the videoconferencing
participants when streaming a movie.
Figure 3.34 shows the throughput obtained and the packet losses in a scenario
where the webcams point to a screen displaying a movie. As we can see, the
throughput is higher than in the previous test: if the webcams capture a movie,
the video is more complex than the nearly static image of a standard videocall.
If we compare this gure with the one shown when evaluating a standard
videocall, we can see a similar trend. The last test shows a higher throughput, as
the transmitted video generates a higher data rate. Packet losses decrease as in
the standard videocall because: (1) we have a higher throughput when a route is
established due the characteristics of the video, (2) Ekiga's bandwidth throttling
mechanism decreases the packet injected when a route is lost, and (3) on average,
we have the same time periods without routes between the two laptops as in the
previous tests. Jointly, these factors explain why the total percentage of packets
lost is reduced at higher node speeds.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented Castadiva, a novel architecture to improve research
in the MANETs eld by allowing to make real test bed experiments. Castadiva
combines the convenience and productivity of Java with the power of the Linux
kernel and accompanying tools to emulate an ad hoc network environment. The
system was designed to simplify the tasks of scenario implementation and trac
generation among independent, IEEE 802.11-based, wireless nodes. One of its key
advantages is that it is fully compatible with the ns-2 simulator.
The architectural design of Castadiva dierentiates wireless nodes, used for
the actual experiments, from the core application, which has management and
control purposes. This core application provides an easy interface to dene network
topologies and trac ows between nodes. Those denitions are then translated
into run-time instructions sent to test bed nodes while experiments are on-going.
We observed that the use of SSH protocols and Fast Ethernet connectivity allows
nodes to synchronise the start of an experiment with high accuracy, being all
instructions read at once; afterwards, the test bed relies on individual clocks to
synchronise instructions throughout the remaining time of an experiment.
By using both TCP and UDP data trac, and under a variety of static and
dynamic MANETs scenarios, we show that Castadiva is able to oer condent
results while using cheap wireless o-the-shelf devices.
To summarise, this chapter shows that the advantages of using Castadiva with
respect to other MANET test beds are: (i) it is a very low-cost test bed since each
node costs about 50$, (ii) it is fully compatible with the ns-2 simulator, allowing
to compare results between both in a straightforward manner and, (iii) does not
occupy a lot of physical space.
Now we have a complete test bed where we can test our proposal of a com-
munity network. We use Castadiva to evaluate our proposal before deploying in a
real scenario. In the next chapter we describe RuralNet, our architecture proposed






In this chapter we present RuralNet, our captive portal based system providing
Internet connectivity to distant areas where deploying a wired-based infrastruc-
ture is too expensive. Such an infrastructure can provide the TCP/IP based
services required, besides avoiding the problems referred in Chapter 2. RuralNet
is an architecture to strengthen Internet support in rural environments that allows
subscribers to access the Internet and provides a group of free services to all the
people within a certain area. RuralNet also includesMaya, an extension developed
for managing the access points of the mesh network which compose the RuralNet
infrastructure, simplifying the administration of the entire network.
RuralNet began in 2005 as a research project at the Universidad Politécnica de
Valencia, in Spain. The project intended to develop new information and commu-
nication technologies to oer low-bandwidth Internet access to isolated rural ar-
eas. With this purpose we developed RuralNet, an experimental wireless platform
which combines the paradigm of wireless mesh networks with cheap o-the-shelf
wireless devices to oer a wide range of Internet-based communication services
and applications. RuralNet has targeted rural areas of the Comunidad Valen-
ciana, in Spain, with increasing demand for Internet connectivity to support the
emerging industrial activity and population demands. In this chapter, we present
the system architecture of RuralNet and provide details of its implementation and
deployment.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 shows the problems
detected in rural areas. Section 4.2 explains the objectives of RuralNet. Section 4.3
describes the proposed architecture and Section 4.4 describes its implementation.
Section 4.5 describes some features designed to improve the RuralNet performance
in a developing country. Section 4.6 describes the evaluation made to validate
our proposal of community network. Section 4.7 shows an extension of RuralNet
for administrating the entire mesh network. Section 4.8 shows an example of a
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real deployment of our prototype in Mozambique. Finally, Section 4.9 draws the
conclusions of this chapter.
4.1 Introduction
Besides universal connectivity, the Internet oers a global platform for access-
ing a wide range of telecommunication services such as e-mail, e-commerce, tele-
education, tele-health, and tele-medicine at a low cost. However, outside the main
urban areas, there are still important handicaps that make Internet connectivity
a complex and costly task. Over 40% of the world's population lives in rural and
remote areas of developing countries and have poor or no access to basic telecom-
munications services [ITU10]. In rural areas and small towns the Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) do not assume the high-cost of technologies designed for the urban
market. Moreover, low population density and high deployment costs discourage
ISP investments since the estimated return on investment (ROI) is unattractive.
This problem is emphasised by the study of Bright [Bri01], who shows the
Digital Divide between urban areas and rural areas. Others works [Hud99, Li04,
MZ04] also focus on this problem, emphasising on how serious and dicult to
handle it is.
The solution to provide Internet connectivity in rural areas have the following
characteristics: (a) implementation should be possible at a low cost in areas where
population density is low, (b) the system should be easily installed, even in remote
and inaccessible locations, (c) system operation and maintenance should be carried
out even when qualied technical personnel is scarce, (d) implementation should be
possible even when basic infrastructure, such as electricity, running water, paved
road networks, etc., is absent; and (e) the infrastructure must be characterised by
long life cycles.
The promises of wireless Internet technologies have generated a lot of interest
from the international-development community. While in developed nations these
technologies have primarily been associated with mobility applications and local
area networking in homes and oces, their most intriguing application in develop-
ing nations is the deployment of low-cost broadband Internet infrastructure and
last-mile distribution. These technologies seem to cope well with the requirements
of the solution described above.
As said, the newly available technologies are much cheaper to use, making the
infrastructure required to connect a village to a big city aordable at a low-cost
[LYHO04, Li04, Ken02]. This new technology allows users to automatically relay
radio signals, thus creating a mesh network of wireless connections that could
develop a life of its own, reducing the number of required base stations. It lowers
the cost of infrastructure while increasing the cost to users only marginally, and
provides connectivity redundancy in dense areas.
But not only the wireless technology allows a low-cost Internet connectivity.
Nowadays, thanks to this new way of accessing Internet, each user can exchange
data when going to work using a public transport, in their home or at dierent
public places. Therefore, access control is now a priority to restrict the use of
networks, controlling what users can and cannot access in terms of services oered.
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Access control is a main priority in non encrypted wireless networks like MANETs
and mesh networks. However, not only computers and laptops can connect to the
Internet. Each year new devices appear that incorporate the technology to connect
to a wireless network, likes PDAs or mobile phones. Therefore, our proposed
solution must be compatible with all the devices on the market.
RuralNet is designed to provide Internet Access to a high number of users
taking prot of the wireless technologies as described before, providing access
control to the users and extending some services in the covered area. Maya, an
extension of RuralNet, is a management tool for wireless mesh networks. It allows
performing critical conguration tasks, such as global ESSID and channel changes,
in a simple and ecient manner.
4.2 Objectives of RuralNet
The general purpose of RuralNet is to strengthen Internet support in rural environ-
ments through wireless technologies in dierent scenarios such as the rural areas
of developed countries, or in any scenario of the developing countries. The system
should empower mobile users with the ability to access Internet applications on
the move.
Rather than creating a new wireless technology, the major challenge has been to
demonstrate the practicality of designing and building a system that, by combing
existing wireless network paradigms, is able to reach distant areas at a low cost,
while oering a wide range of telecommunication services and applications.
4.3 The RuralNet System Architecture
The system is designed to cover a wide area, connecting all the clients with a
main server that has full control of the system. The overall system architecture
for our RuralNet telecommunications network is shown in Figure 4.1. The system
is composed by dierent nodes connected to each other, forming a mesh network.
This approach allows creating a scalable network which is able to cover a vast
area, connecting the main server with all the clients within range of any of the
nodes deployed. All the software developed as part of the RuralNet project is free
software and it can be downloaded at http://ruralnet.sourceforge.net/.
We have built a prototype composed by multiple Wi-Fi access points connected
to a main server. Our architecture is conceptually organised into three dierent
levels, which are: the management level (main server), the network connection
level (called Backbone Network), and the user level.
 Management level. The top level of the system is composed by a server
that controls user authentication. This level is based on a web server to
interact with the subscribers, a database used to store system information,
and a control unit that converts management decisions into trac rules. Be-
sides, the server has also a high-speed connection to the Internet, along with
a wireless or an Ethernet connection to link it with the Backbone Network
level. It is at this level where the user access control functionality resides.
65
CHAPTER 4. AN ARCHITECTURE SUPPORTING WEB-BASED
SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION
Figure 4.1: The RuralNet system architecture.
 Backbone Network level. This second level is composed by a group of
nodes distributed in a wide area, composing a mesh network. These nodes
are connected to the main server and to other nodes through either Ethernet
or IEEE 802.11 technology. Wireless connections are preferred since they
can benet from antennas to achieve increased range at little cost. The
main purpose of this level is to work as a bridge, connecting subscribers to
the main server. Each node runs upon a modied version of the OpenWRT
[Ope10] rmware, which allow us to implement access control into the node
while increasing the hotspot coverage by implementing a multihop wireless
mesh network. The OpenWRT rmware oers us all the functionality of the
usual GNU/Linux tools for monitoring, bandwidth shaping, rewalling, and
so forth. This rmware also allows us to install the OLSR routing protocol
to create the mesh network, used by the client to connect to the server. In
our prototype, each node is a Linksys router.
 User level. At the lowest level we have the actual subscribers. These
can connect directly with the wireless infrastructure using their own Wi-Fi
enabled computing devices. Such devices can be quite heterogeneous e.g.,
cell phones, PDAs, laptops, etc. The only restrictions are that these devices
must include a Wi-Fi interface, a web browser, and a OLSR routing protocol
to connect to the mesh network. At this level we can deploy a MANET to
extend the coverage area of RuralNet, using users' devices as repeaters.
66
4.4. RURALNET 'S BASIC FUNCTIONALITY
Every client within the coverage area of RuralNet can have access to all the services
oered, which does not mean free access or uncontrolled access. Our system is
implemented under a captive portal solution based on the use of wireless access
points to provide both an eective user authentication and physical connectivity to
the backbone. Therefore, a client only needs a web browser to access the system;
further knowledge about wireless networks is not required, neither it is required
the use of special software.
4.3.1 Technologies Used
The RuralNet system was developed using several programming languages and
tools. We split it into three conceptual areas: web interface, system interface and
database interface.
 The implementation of the web interface makes use of dierent program-
ming languages, i.e., PHP, Javascript, HTML and XML. The combination
of these languages allows achieving complex solutions, and yet compose the
user interface in a simple and straightforward manner.
 The system interface uses PHP to access TC [Hub03] and IPtables [Izu03],
and both tools are provided by default on a GNU/Linux system. These
tools oer the functionality to control the system's rewall and to regulate
the bandwidth for the dierent user connections.
 The database interface uses PHP technology to access data stored by a
MySQL database engine.
Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between the software components of RuralNet.
We can see that the main server also oers a centralised DHCP service, making it
possible for subscribers to be congured automatically.
Figure 4.2 also evidences the dierent support les created and the related tools
that use them. A single arrow line represents a reading action and a double arrow
line represents a read/write/execute action. This design provides the required
exibility to make changes or add new modules in a straightforward manner.
4.4 RuralNet 's Basic Functionality
When clients connect to RuralNet they usually do not know any connection infor-
mation. Our system re-directs all the unregistered client accesses to the identi-
cation page of RuralNet. The most appropriate solution for this task is developing
a captive portal. The enhancements required to make RuralNet a captive portal-
enabled platform are the following.
4.4.1 Controlling the Access to RuralNet
A captive portal is a system used to control the access into a network using web
technology. Nowadays several captive portals exists like NoCat [NoC], WiDog
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Figure 4.2: Relationship among RuralNet 's software components.
Figure 4.3: Typical captive portal connection scheme.
[Wif] and Firstpot [Pat], but we will not use them since they are either commercial
software or they do not have the functionality required to satisfy our requirements.
In a captive portal tool, when a client rst connects to the system and opens
a web browser, he is automatically redirected to the main page of the portal; this
process is completely transparent to the user (Figure 4.3). The main server controls
client access depending on whether the user is registered or not. Depending on
the client's access level, dierent services will be provided.
The rst time a client accesses the system, he is asked to register with the
captive portal. After a login process the user can use any of the freely available
services or purchase others. Concerning the Internet access service, RuralNet al-
lows each client to choose among multiple connection speeds. Just as an example,
Figure 4.4 shows the welcome window for a client accessing the RuralNet system
for the rst time.
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Figure 4.4: RuralNet presentation screen.
Thanks to the captive portal technology, users only need a web browser to
access RuralNet. When they access the network they are automatically redirected
through the captive portal system to the main web page. Further knowledge about
wireless networks is neither required, nor it is necessary to use special software.
Therefore, the only requirement to access the system is that clients run a web
browser.
4.4.1.1 Controlling the Access to the System
When an unregistered client tries to access a web page, the system must re-direct
the request to the registration page instead. Once a client has been authenticated,
e.g., introducing his user name and a password, he gets access to the web page
he originally requested (if he has credit to do so). In a GNU/Linux system we
implemented the capture process using the IPtables tool [Izu03].
IPtables allows a computer to redirect all the trac that arrives to a Linux
system. Redirecting all the trac coming from an unknown client to the control
server allows the system to show a login page. To allow an user to have access to
the Internet, the system must delete the rule that redirects a client to the control
server. This option can only be visible for those clients who are allowed to access
the Internet.
To know how many clients are connected at any time the system must detect
the remaining clients, disconnecting and registering as o-line clients as quickly
as possible. To do that, the system uses Algorithm 4.1. This algorithm classies
clients into four groups: (a) clients recently connected to the system, (b) clients
connected but without any new connections in the last few seconds, (c) clients that
must to be disconnected because they are o-line for a long time, (d) disconnected
clients. The algorithm basically decreases periodically the group counter of each
user. Users have a window in their web browser that updates their state to the
maximum value. If a user does not refresh his state, the algorithm decreases it
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Algorithm 4.1 User disconnection from RuralNet.
#The server runs periodically a script containing:
Do for ever:
For every IP used by the DHCP:
read the state of a client:
If the state is:
3) The client is connected, update it to level 2.
2) No news of the client in a few seconds, another chance:
Update the state to level 1.
1) No news for a long time. Disconnecting the client:
Redirect all the Internet connectivities to the server.
Update the client state to 0. Register the disconnection.





#Each time the client access to the system:
Put the client state to 3.
periodically until it arrives to 1, hence disconnecting the user.
4.4.1.2 Controlling the Connection Speed for each Client.
When subscribers get access to the Internet using our system, they could, in theory,
use all the available bandwidth. This is an undesirable situation. So, it would be
desirable to have, for each user, a exible control of the connection speed. In
RuralNet this characteristic has been named City-ticket. Depending on the City-
ticket each user has, they acquire the corresponding connection speed. RuralNet
implements the City-ticket functionality by using the Trac Control (TC) [Hub03]
Linux tool.
Using TC the main server can regulate the bandwidth for each user, by control-
ling both download and upload packets passing through the interface that provides
access to the Internet. TC generates virtual queues assigned to a network device.
These queues allow the operating system to control the connection speed associ-
ated to this device.
RuralNet uses TC to create a hierarchy where every client has two queues and
each of these queues controls the download or the upload connection speed. Figure
4.5 shows this hierarchy. The TC tool is controlled by RuralNet 's server when it
starts, and generates a couple of new queues every time a client connects to the
Internet. These queues are exclusive to that client, controlling the connection
speed separately. Depending on the City-ticket assigned to a client, he acquires a
dierent connection speed. Algorithm 4.2 shows the creation of the corresponding
queue for each client.
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Figure 4.5: TC queue hierarchy.
4.4.1.3 Oering Free Access for Specic Web Servers.
For dierent reasons, it could be necessary for all clients to have access to a selected
group of external web servers, including those clients that do not acquire Internet
connectivity. RuralNet has the option for an administrator to choose a group
of servers that can be accessed by everyone, regardless of the Internet privileges
granted. For example, if RuralNet is installed in a certain town, a free web server
could be the city-hall's web server, which has news addressed to every citizen.
RuralNet has two ways to add a free web server: by IP address and by connection
port.
 Free web server by IP: the system can add new rules to the rewall to allow
a specic IP to be reached by all clients connected to the wireless network. If
a web server is added here, every request to this server will not be redirected
to the RuralNet captive portal.
 Free web server by connection ports: the system redirects all the free requests
to a specic port to an external web server. RuralNet has a list of servers
in the main page. If a client selects a server in this list, the system redirects
the request to the appropriate port.
The choice of free server based on IP or connection port depends on the desired
behaviour of RuralNet.
4.4.2 The RuralNet Interface Implementation
The RuralNet Interface is designed to be maintained mostly unaltered regardless
of which web browser, operating system, or device is used. With this objective
RuralNet is designed using both HTML and XML. Other specialised languages like
ActionScript (Flash) and DHTML (a mix of Javascript and HTML) are able to
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Algorithm 4.2 Connection speed of each user using RuralNet.
#Server algorithm. Its supposed to be one device to connect to Internet (client
upload speed) and another to make the WI-FI net (client download speed).
For every device
Delete all the old rules assigned to the device.
Generate a root queue and assign it to the device.
#It must not to use the 100% of the bandwidth to avoid saturation.
Generate a main queue attached to the root queue:
Select a type of queue (FIFO, stochastic,...).
Assign 75% of the bandwidth.
Generate a default queue attached to the main queue for all the trac no
regulated.
Select a type of queue (FIFO, stochastic,...).
Assign the desired bandwidth.
Mark all the default packets to use this queue.
end for.
#Client algorithm. The client must create their own queues for upload and
download speed.
For the download and upload connection do:
Delete all old queues assigned to this client IP.
Generate a client queue attached to the main queue.
Select a type of queue (FIFO, stochastic,... ).
Assign the bandwidth of the client.
Mark all the packets from/to the client IP to use this queue.
end.
oer a higher programming level for the design and implementation of the visual
interface. Notice that all these programming languages are available for every
client regardless of the system architecture used. By making use of PHP, we are
able to adapt the web pages to interact with the RuralNet Core, hence allowing
every device with web browsing capabilities to access the Internet and connect to
the RuralNet system.
Once inside the system the interface is rather intuitive. Figure 4.6 shows the
developed interface. A left-hand menu provides the user access to all the options
made available to him. There are three types of users dened in the system: (a)
regular users, (b) users with Internet access, and (c) system administrators. The
dierences among them are reected in terms of options appearing in the menu.
For a regular user only the most basic options appear, i.e., user prole, Internet
access, allowed servers and help. An administrator has all the options available,
including the system administration options, i.e., user management, connection
properties, and City-ticket administration. By selecting a menu option the user is
able to navigate through the system, thereby accessing the desired service.
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Figure 4.6: RuralNet interface.
Figure 4.7: Accessing RuralNet with a mobile phone.
RuralNet has been implemented to support multiple languages. To implement
this functionality, we separate the web structure from the text. This means that
web pages have two components: a basic structure written in HTML language and
text in the XML format on a separate le. This separation allows an administrator
to easily update the system with a new language. It merely requires editing the
appropriate XML les and adding to every paragraph the appropriate translation
for the new language to be supported. The current prototype version of RuralNet
supports English, Spanish, and Valencian.
RuralNet also allows any user to connect to a network using devices such as
PDAs, mobile phones or laptops. Therefore, the interface implementation must
be adapted according to the device used. Figure 4.7 shows an example of a user
accessing to RuralNet using a mobile phone.
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4.5 RuralNet for Developing Countries
Nowadays, in the richer countries the use of ADSL or other technologies such
as optical ber to achieve a high bandwidth per user is extended. However, old
technologies such as RDSI or 56k Modems are still in use in developing countries.
The technology available in the scenario is one of the main factors to think about
when deploying a system such as RuralNet. Therefore, RuralNet needs to cope
well with dierent situations: (i) low bandwidth in the Internet connectivity, (ii)
scalability of the system to increase the number of users, and (iii) cope well with
the frequent disconnections due to a bad service provided by the ISP.
4.5.1 Using Multiple Internet Connectivities
This feature allows RuralNet to connect to Internet with dierent physical inter-
faces. Thus, more bandwidth can be used by the system and, if one connection
fails, RuralNet can still access the Internet using the other connections. For ex-
ample, if we deploy RuralNet in a country where ADSL does not exist, we can
purchase two or more Internet connections using dierent telephone lines and
modems, and RuralNet will use all of them, sharing the dierent users among the
dierent connections. With this option we can improve our RuralNet system and
accept more users into the system.
RuralNet uses iproute2 [KH10] to congure the multiple Internet connectivi-
ties. Iproute2 is also used to obtain a load balancing among the dierent connec-
tions, since it shares each IP request on each connection.
4.5.2 Scalability
To improve scalability, RuralNet can also be a client of other dierent RuralNet
system. For example, dierent villages can use their own RuralNet system but, if
only one of them has Internet connectivity, each RuralNet can share its connection.
For example, in Figure 4.8 RuralNet A has access to Internet, and RuralNet B can
use this Internet connection because it is also a client of RuralNet A. In this Figure
each RuralNet in the example has its own users and services. Therefore, we can
extend the range of our architecture without modifying the design of the RuralNet
main core.
4.5.3 Services without Internet Connectivity
Since RuralNet is designed for developing countries, in some scenarios it is possible
that Internet connectivity is frequently down or without enough bandwidth to
support all the users. Then, it can cause the entire infrastructure to be useless.
In RuralNet, we oer some extra services as an intranet that can be used without
Internet connectivity.
RuralNet integrates an FTP server to share documents with the entire network.
This is the easiest way to exchange information, documents or other data among
the nodes of the networks. Figure 4.9 shows how a user interacts with this FTP
service integrated into RuralNet.
74
4.6. EVALUATION
Figure 4.8: RuralNet connected to another RuralNet system.
Figure 4.9: Documents in RuralNet.
RuralNet is composed by a mesh network and therefore, it can also provide ex-
tra applications that are useful in private networks, such as videocall or messaging
services.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section we present some experimental results where the purpose is to assess
the correct operation of our RuralNet system. We will study how bandwidth is
shared among dierent subscribers when we have homogeneous or heterogeneous
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types of Internet connectivities and subscribers. We also evaluated the behaviour
of the distribution network and the impact on round-trip time in our prototype.
4.6.1 Evaluation with one client
Our rst step is testing the connectivity of one client to RuralNet. We deploy a
test bed using Castadiva to emulate a mesh network with the structure of our
designed architecture.
The Main Server was an AMD XP 2000+ PC with 512 MBs of DDR RAM. It
has a Fast-Ethernet connection to the Internet, and a similar connection to a root
Access Point. The operating system used is Debian 3.1.
Concerning the clients, these are simulated using four laptops with dierent
capabilities. The best performing one has an Intel Pentium 4 processor at 1700
MHz, and the worst one has was an Intel Celeron processor at 150 MHz. All of
them are equipped with IEEE 802.11b PCMCIA Wireless Cards (maximum data
rate of 11 Mb/s). We also used another machine as an FTP server for experimental
purposes.
The strategy followed to make several long-run measurements consisted of de-
veloping a series of scripts that allowed automating the evaluation process. Every
client has a script that starts an FTP connection to our FTP server, which is ac-
cessed only through the RuralNet system. We control the throughput of the FTP
server so that we can model dierent connection speeds with RuralNet 's main
server.
We run the tcpdump [SVV89] tool at the Main Server in order to trace all the
incoming and outgoing packets. We begin our tests by using only one client, and
measure the accuracy of the bandwidth management system oered by the TC
tool. So, our client downloads data uninterruptedly from the FTP server, allowing
us to compare the requested data rate with the actual throughput received. Figure
4.10 shows the obtained results.
It includes dierent intervals, where each interval represents the actual range
of throughput values experienced by the client; the mean value is also represented.
By observing these results we conrm that the requested bandwidth value is close
to the throughput provided by the system, except for the last value where 8 Mbit/s
are requested and only about 6Mbit/s are nally delivered. When the requested
bandwidth surpasses the maximum value achievable with IEEE 802.11b technol-
ogy, then the Wi-Fi link becomes the bottleneck.
4.6.2 Interactions among dierent clients
We now proceed with a set of tests where we have all four clients active. We will
study the interactions among them when limiting both their bandwidth and the
bandwidth towards the FTP server.
We begin by experimenting with dierent bandwidth values for each client. We
set the bandwidth of the four users to 128, 256, 512 and 1024 Kb/s, respectively.
Our purpose is to check if the system can indeed make eective the dierent
user privileges. Figure 4.11 shows the obtained results. As can be observed,
the RuralNet system can oer the requested bandwidth according to the user
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Figure 4.10: Connection speed for one client.
Figure 4.11: Download speed for the 4 clients under analysis.
conguration. We also observed that the throughput values sometimes suer from
variations that deviate them from the requested ones. We consider that these small
discrepancies are due to wireless media noise and not to the bandwidth control
algorithms used.
We now extend the previous example by acting upon the link speed between
RuralNet 's server and the FTP server so as to assess the impact on clients' per-
formance. We experiment with two dierent speeds for this link: 1024 Kb/s and
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Figure 4.12: Download speed when the bandwidth towards the FTP server is
limited to 1024 Kb/s.
256 Kb/s. In neither case there is enough bandwidth to serve the four clients at
their requested data rate.
Figure 4.12 shows that, when the maximum aggregated data rate is limited
to 1024 Kb/s, the two slowest connections use their requested bandwidth of 128
and 256 Kb/s. However the other two high speed connections tend to reach an
equilibrium at a similar data rate value during the period when both are active.
When we further reduce the bandwidth at the bottleneck link to 256 Kb/s
(Figure 4.13) we nd that the throughput value for all the connections becomes
stable at a value close to 64 Kb/s, as expected (fair resource sharing).
Though currently we apply this strategy of evenly sharing available resources
when they become much lower than the aggregated bandwidth requested, we could
instead apply a dierent policy. As an example, a solution based on a weighted fair
queueing policy, would means that, when the available bandwidth becomes too low,
users would receive a channel bandwidth that is proportional to the bandwidth
they have paid for.
4.6.3 Round-trip time
We also evaluated the behaviour of the distribution network using ping sessions
and evaluating the impact on round-trip time. Figure 4.14 shows the Round-trip
time for each packet. We consider two dierent scenarios: for a clean environment
and for a noisy environment. The rst one is supposing a network without any
interference. The second one is a scenario with other wireless networks causing
interference. A real scenario is between both of them.
We can observe that, in a noisy environment, the round-trip time is higher than
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Figure 4.13: Download speed when the bandwidth towards the FTP server is
limited 256 Kb/s.
Figure 4.14: Evaluation of the distribution network.
in a clean environment, and the packet loss is also increased. We also observe that
90% of the total packet interchanges are successfully completed for a round-trip
time in the interval from 0.1 to 0.8 seconds, (acceptable to a subscriber without
causing annoyance) and only 10% of the trac suers from poor performance.
More specically, 4% of the trac experiences too high delays, being considered
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lost in practise.
Packet loses are caused by the collision between packets sent by dierent devices
on the wireless network, and the delay time is caused by the retransmissions caused
by collisions.
4.7 Maya: Our Mesh Networks Management Tool
Now we present Maya, a tool designed for network management and conguration
that combines simplicity of use with a full set of features. Maya is used to manage
the RuralNet network. It is also compatible with the rmware developed by the
OpenWRT [Ope10] team, which oers all the functionality of a Linux distribution
for embedded systems. Maya builds upon the OpenWRT platform by extending its
functionality so as to adapt wireless routers to the needs of the RuralNet network.
With Maya, an administrator is free to congure the wireless mesh routers
whenever he is within the signal range of any of the wireless routers. Obviously,
Maya has been developed to oer a secure infrastructure avoiding that clients
perform administrative tasks, changing the conguration of the devices. Since the
trac generated by Maya is very low, it does not aect client connections and the
overall network performance.
4.7.1 Implementation and Functionality
We divide the implementation of Maya in two dierent parts: the Maya graphical
user interface (GUI), and the conguration setup module.
Figure 4.15 shows Maya's management screen, which combines the simplicity
of a web-based design with the convenience of integration with the OpenWRT
platform. Since Maya is completely compatible with the OpenWRT platform we
oer new functionality for mesh networking while using the most widely adopted
open source rmware for wireless routers.
The system GUI has been implemented using standard web programming lan-
guages such as PHP, Javascript, HTML, and CSS. The combination of standard
Web languages allows achieving complex solutions, and yet oer a powerful user
interface in a simple and straightforward manner. It also uses a MySQL database
engine to store conguration parameters.
The conguration setup module is in charge of conguring the mesh network
by enforcing that the new conguration is updated on all wireless mesh routers.
The setup module has been implemented using C language. Shell scripting has
also been used to remotely execute instructions at wireless routers.
The basic operation mode of the proposed application allows to simultaneously
manage the wireless routers conforming the distribution network. New infrastruc-
ture nodes can manually be added to the mesh network by specifying their IP
address, or they can be imported from a le. Once the network has been es-
tablished, Maya oers the network manager all the functionality to enable/disable
each of the wireless routers, and to change any of the network's parameters, such as
the ESSID or the selected channel in some/all routers at the same time. Moreover,
Maya includes a security module to protect the network from possible attacks by
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Figure 4.15: Maya's management interface.
unauthorised clients. In the following sections we provide implementation details
for each of Maya's main features.
4.7.2 The Wireless Router Enabling/Disabling problem
On a wireless mesh network most of the wireless mesh routers are only accessible
using a wireless link. Therefore, an administrator can't actually turn them o
completely since that would make it impossible to turn them back on. Therefore,
alternative techniques are required to oer pseudo on-o switching. With Maya,
enabled routers are those accepting all types of trac. On the contrary, disabled
routers are those which discard all trac (routing trac included), though they
remain active. Such option is very useful in several scenarios, such as prevent-
ing the access to a group of clients who are connected through a specic router,
disabling the router performing gateway functions to isolate the ad hoc network,
or reducing the routing trac by disabling routers that are not being used. We
implement this functionality in the Maya system using the IPtables [Izu03] tool,
a well-known utility for Linux based systems.
Thanks to the rewall functionality of IPtables, we can easily isolate a router
from receiving any kind of trac. However, once a router has been disabled, we
need control messages sent by the network manager to get them back up. To
enable a previously disabled router we developed a protocol based on the use
of UDP broadcast sockets, which basically implements a mechanism to send a
message to a network node without using the routing protocol. To do that, on the
booting process, each router will create a socket listening on a default management
port (we have selected the 10500 UDP port) that is the only port that the rewall
never blocks. This socket has the broadcast option enabled, so it also receives
broadcasted packets. Note that, in order to avoid excessive ooding, the protocol
was designed to ensure that a message would only be rebroadcasted once per
node. For that reason, all management messages include sequence numbers and
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Algorithm 4.3 OnReceivingaBroadcast() function of the Maya tool.
for (every received message) do
Perform a table look-up;
if (is an old message) then
delete the message;
else if (target IP == my IP) then
execute the corresponding actions and send back an ACK message;
else
send the message to the IP broadcast address;
each router keeps a table with the last sequence number received for every IP
address in the network. Algorithm 4.3 shows the steps followed by each router
receiving a broadcast message on the selected UDP port.
4.7.3 Network Parameters Setup
For each router added to Maya, a link to the standard OpenWRT conguration
web page is generated in Maya's GUI (see Figure 4.15). Through this interface we
can manually congure each router in the traditional manner. The Maya system
oers an advanced functionality, commonly demanded by network managers, which
consists of applying a new conguration to all routers, or only to a subset, at
once. To do that we just have to pick the target routers, the network parameter
to change, and the new value. With only a few clicks we can modify, for example,
the ESSID or the channel at all selected routers.
To implement this functionality correctly, and to avoid network partitioning
as we change critical parameters, it is important to choose the correct order to
update routers and a suitable method to make those changes.
With respect to router parameter updating, Maya oers two dierent methods:
an SSH connection if the router is enabled and reachable (which means that a
path of enabled routers exists between the source and the target), or a set of
UDP messages if the router is disabled or unreachable. As we have mentioned
before, the order in which conguration changes are made in the network devices
is important. If we want to change a parameter like the ESSID and we begin by
applying changes to the nearest routers, all the remaining routers (more than one
hop away) become unreachable, and so the updating process cannot continue. The
right sequence for this task must be the opposite one: to begin applying changes
on far away nodes with respect to the management server, and then gradually
move towards routers that are nearer.
To obtain a snapshot of the wireless mesh network topology we build a tree
including all active routers through ICMP echo packets sent to all routers, and
we then check the TTL (Time To Live) eld in the IP header. The lowest the
TTL, the highest the number of hops. Hence, the algorithm starts by picking
routers with the lowest TTL. Whenever a router is added to the network, and
after any enable or disable action, TTL values are recalculated for each router;
this value is constantly updated into the router database. If a router is disabled or
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Algorithm 4.4 ApplyNetworkConguration() function of the Maya tool.
Get a list of selected routers having TTL=0;
Apply changes to them;
Get a list of selected routers having TTL>0;
Sort them in increasing order;
Go through the list, applying changes one by one;
not reachable, ICMP packets will not be able to reach it. In this case we consider
a TTL equal to zero.
Algorithm 4.4 shows the steps followed to establish the correct order for ap-
plying network conguration parameters.
4.7.4 Security Issues
Changing network conguration parameters is an action restricted to the network
administrator. So, we must protect our system to avoid possible client-side attacks.
To change the conguration on those mesh routers that are enabled we use SSH
connections; since a password or the use of a public key is required, and since all the
transmitted information is encrypted, the method is considered secure. However,
when trying to perform similar conguration tasks on disabled routers, we are
limited to the use of UDP messages. If they are sent as plain text, they can be
intercepted and reproduced easily. So, for disabled routers, we use RSA public-key
cryptography to provide a digital signature that ensures the authenticity of UDP
messages. Maya's public key is distributed to all nodes, and each node sends its
public key back to the management application. A message signed with a sender's
private key can be veried by anyone who has access to the sender's public key,
conrming that the sender signed it and that the message has not been tampered
with. Public keys are exchanged when a new router joins the network, and this
process is carried out using an SSH connection. The management server stores
the public key of each router in a database.
4.7.5 UDP Message Issues
The UDP protocol does not provide the reliability and data ordering that TCP
does. So, datagrams may be lost or arrive out of order. Nevertheless, since it intro-
duces no extra overhead to oer complex functionalities, it is faster and lightweight,
being optimal for time-sensitive applications.
In the scope of Maya we cannot use TCP to access disabled routers since
bidirectional communication channels are not available. The technique used is to
broadcast UDP packets throughout the network, hoping that the target router is
able to listen to the message. However, when changing the parameters of several
routers, it is important to have a feedback about the failure or success of each
individual operation. Hence, some sort of acknowledgement message is required.
For that reason, when the destination router receives an UDP message, it sends
another message back to report to the management server about the operation's
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Figure 4.16: Format of the management UDP messages.
successfulness. In case that the operation fails for any reason, the UDP message
must be transmitted again.
We found experimentally that three retries and three seconds of waiting time
between retries is a setting which works ne in moderate sized mesh networks.
However, default settings can be congured by the user. Figure 4.16 shows the
UDP message elds used in Maya. Both the command message and the acknowl-
edgement share the same format.
The message is only partially encrypted since some elds are required by in-
termediate routers along the path, and it is not ecient to decrypt and encrypt
messages at every router. The encrypted elds include the parameter to change,
the new value and an identier (ID). The ID represents the last action executed,
and it is used by the management server to create a system log for security reasons.
With respect to the plain text elds, we used the sequence number, the source IP,
the broadcast IP and a HIT eld.
When an ACK message is not received after issuing a command and a retry
is required, the ID remains the same but the sequence number increases. The
sequence number and the source IP are the elds required to keep the routers'
tables updated. Broadcast IP is the address where messages are sent to, and it
represents the broadcast network address. The last parameter is the Host Identity
Tag (HIT), a concept introduced by the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [Gur08].
Basically, we use the SHA-1 algorithm to transform the public key into an unique
identier for a router. This parameter replaces the target IP.
4.7.6 Evaluation
We evaluated Maya using the Castadiva emulator (see Chapter 3) to conrm
its correct behaviour. We studied the system performance under dierent trac
conditions to prove its reliability.
4.7.6.1 Performance Evaluation of Maya
Initially we test the functionality ofMaya without any type of trac: the only data
owing in the mesh network corresponds to the activity of the routing protocol.
We then perform some tests by activating TCP trac ows between randomly
selected nodes. We evaluate the delay of the SSH connections and of the secure
key exchanging, the eectiveness of the UDP messages, and the packet loss rate.
Our emulator uses four WRT54G Linksys routers for the distribution network.
The main management server is a PC with a 2000+ XP AMD Athlon processor,
512MB of DDR RAM and an IEEE 802.11g Conceptronics USB card. It uses
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Figure 4.17: Comparison of the latency associated to Maya's management tasks
when varying the number of hops.
a Linux based operating system with wireless extensions v19 and wireless tools
v28. We distribute the wireless routers in a linear topology where each router
only reaches the previous and next router along the path. The management server
is located at an edge of the network; hence, the maximum number of hops for a
message is of four.
4.7.6.2 Evaluation of Maya's Functionality
We rst evaluate the functionality of Maya. We select a range of scenarios with
dierent number of hops between source and destination and evaluate the time
that Maya requires to perform the three following actions: (a) change network
parameters of active routers using SSH connections, (b) change network parame-
ters of disabled routers using UDP messages, and (c) do a secure key exchange.
We evaluated two dierent cases: with an unloaded scenario where only the traf-
c is due to the AODV routing protocol, and a loaded scenario where the trac
generated by Maya has to compete with several bandwidth-hungry TCP ows.
Figure 4.17 shows the results obtained under no load. The results conrm
that lowest times correspond to UDP messages since UDP is not a connection-
oriented protocol. The two other functions are implemented using SSH-based
commands, which implies additional trac to create a secure connection. The
key exchange process requires transferring les between the two endpoints. This
operation consumes more resources than merely executing a set of commands from
a remote node, which explains its higher cost. We also observe that distance does
not signicantly aect performance.
We now evaluate Maya's eectiveness in a scenario where a set of TCP ows
compete with Maya's management trac. This scenario is more realistic since
typically the network is loaded when management and maintenance tasks take
place. We varied the number of TCP ows from 1 to 20, and congured TCP
connections to use frames of maximum size (1500 bytes). Figure 4.18 shows that,
as the number of intermediate hops and the number of competing TCP connections
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Figure 4.18: Overhead of management tasks requiring UDP messages, SSH con-
nections and key exchanges when varying the number of TCP ows, at dierent
hop distances.
increase, the delay in performing management operations grows steadily. Results
also conrm that the operation suering from higher performance degradation
is key exchange. To complete a key exchange between the management server
and a wireless router when setting the number of active TCP ows to maximum
(20), Maya requires about 10s, 15s, and 20s, for distances of 1, 2, and 3 hops,
respectively. Notice that these are worst case results that apply in extreme cases
of congestion.
Comparing parameter updating through SSH and UDP, we again observe that
SSH imposes a greater overhead due to both TCP connection setup delay and
the authentication process. On the contrary, when selecting UDP broadcasts to
communicate with disabled routers, datagrams may arrive out of order, appear
duplicated, or be lost. In the event of losses, our application will re-send UDP
messages for up to three times, which increases the overall delay to complete the
corresponding operation, but also improves reliability.
Figure 4.19 shows the probability that an UDP message arrives correctly with
respect to the number of hops and the network trac. We observe that, as we
increase the number of hops and the number of TCP connections, the probability
of success decreases. For a distance of three hops the probability that the UDP
message arrives correctly is of 50%, 47%, 39%, and 38% when we have a scenario
with 1, 5, 10, and 20 TCP ows, respectively.
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Figure 4.19: UDP message arrival probability.
4.8 Deploying RuralNet in Mozambique
Information and communications technology can provide rapid, low-cost access to
information about almost all areas of human activity [Nat01]. From distance learn-
ing in technological Turkey and long-distance medical diagnosis in the Gambia, to
information on market prices of grain in India, the Internet is breaking barriers,
making markets more ecient, creating opportunities for income generation and
enabling increased local participation. Sadly, this utopian promise applies only to
an elite. While information poverty is rarely blamed as a direct cause of human
suering, the digital divide raises ethical questions of universal access. The entry
costs to secure equipment and to set up services are far beyond the means of most
third-world communities. Startup costs and expenses of technical maintenance
compete with resources needed for essential human survival. But nowadays, pol-
icy makers are challenged to nd justication for investment in ICTs when local
and national resources are limited, and where the urgent needs of people for basic
nutrition, health care, and education remain unsatised.
If the access of information is a basic need of the world's population, new
ways of accessing the Internet are required to achieve this goal. RuralNet is an
architecture for enhance the access to the Internet of an ISP, and extend the
coverage are using a low-cost infrastructure, increasing the number of users that
can directly benet from the use of Internet. It is formed by o-the-self devices
easy to nd in the markets of a developing country, the architecture is easy to
maintain, and the system is easy to use and administrate. Therefore, we believe
that RuralNet accomplishes all the requirements to be a candidate solution to ght
the digital divide.
4.8.1 Why we chose Mozambique as our scenario?
Since we work in the Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, we make contact with
other associations hosted in this university which also ght the digital divide. In
this way, we started a collaboration with the university association called PoliClick,
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Figure 4.20: Diusion of Technology.
and also with the non-governmental organisation Telecomunicaciones Solidarias
(TeSo). These associations have contact with three scenarios in three dierent
developing countries where we can take prot of using RuralNet. These three pos-
sible scenarios are: the Universidad de Guinea Ecuatorial (UNGE) in Equatorial
Guinea, the Universidad de Pinar del Río of Cuba and the Missionarios Vicenti-
nos of Mozambique. All these three countries are a priority target to the Spanish
cooperation as showed by the Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para
el Desarrollo [AEC10].
Figure 4.20 shows an extract of the Human Development Report presented in
2001 by the United Nations [Nat01] regarding to the information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs). As we can see, Mozambique is the number 157 of 163
countries analysed, rated as a country with low human development. In 1999 only
0.4% of its population has a cellular phone, and 0% of them have Internet con-
nectivity. Equatorial Guinea (not shown in this gure) is in position number 110
(average human development), and Cuba is not rated in this document, but has
a better economical situation than Mozambique. Therefore, Mozambique would
be the country which has the greatest needs for investment in new technologies to
decrease the lack of infrastructure of the ICTs.
We also chose Mozambique because there we met the community Missionarios
Vicentinos of Nacala, a religious community involved in the development of the
country with more than 20 years of experience. They also have the ideal scenario
for testing the rst prototype of RuralNet : dierent schools in a limited area, with
the basic infrastructure needed for deploying our architecture.
Other problems have been found in the project evaluation to discard the other
two countries, e.g., some policy problems were found in Cuba, or lack of trust
problems with the counterpart, as found in the university of Equatorial Guinea.
4.8.2 Objectives in Mozambique
The objective of this project consists of deploying RuralNet in a real scenario,
allowing the access to dierent TCP/IP services for dierent users located in ru-
ral areas without any aordable connectivity access to the Internet. Specically,
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Figure 4.21: Region of Nampula
our objective focused on connecting to Internet dierent high schools and occu-
pational training schools of dierent rural areas, all managed by the Missionarios
Vicentinos.
4.8.3 Deploying RuralNet
This project is designed using the knowledge of the research group Grupo de Redes
de Computadores (GRC) of the Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, and the col-
laboration with the non-governmental organisation Telecomunicaciones Solidarias
(TeSo), the university association PoliClick of the Universidad Politécnica de Va-
lencia and the community Missionarios Vicentinos of Nacala (Mozambique). Ba-
sically, the GRC provides the technical knowledge and the software to deploy the
infrastructure, while TeSo and PoliClick provide the computers, the experience in
cooperation projects and other material needed in dierent places to deploy this
project; the Missionarios Vicentinos provide the place and the manpower.
We sent three volunteers to Mozambique between years 2008 and 2010 for
coordination purposes, and to teach the use, administration and maintenance of
the network. As a result, each volunteer has done its master thesis in Computer
Engineering about this activity [Bat08, G10, Mar09].
4.8.4 Scenario
Our scenario is the city of Nacala, in the region of Nampula. Nacala, also known
as Cidade de Nacala or Nacala-Porto, is on the northern coast of Mozambique.
The city had 207.894 inhabitants in 2007, being the fourth city of the country by
number of population. Its major industries were cement, sisal and cashew. Other
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Figure 4.22: Selected schools of Nacala.
Node Latitude Longitude Altitude
San Juan Bautista 14° 33'15.40"S 40° 41'32.20"E 138m
Mokone 14° 32'45.30"S 40° 41'35.00"E 109m
Miramar 14° 33'30.90"S 40° 40'59.80"E 126m
Cristo e Vida 14° 32'59.00"S 40° 42'12.90"E 139m
Table 4.1: Coordinates of each node deployed in Nacala.
important employers were the seaport, its small modern hospital, and services
(banking, insurance and administration).
The Missionarios Vicentinos [Mis10] work in this city. They are a charitable
organisation ruled by the church. Their main objectives are the evangelising of
the population while improving their life-quality.
We focus on four dierent schools of Nacala: the Escola Mokone, the Escola
Taller San Juan Bautista, the Escola Miramar and the Escola Cristo e Vida.
The selection of these schools was motivated because of the following char-
acteristics: (i) all of them are managed by the Missionarios Vicentinos (ii) the
Missionarios Vicentinos is composed by missionary people without any interest
on taking prot of our system and (iii) these schools are public places where all
the people can go to use the service provided.
The Escola Taller San Juan Bautista has Internet access using an ADSL
connection. We can deploy a mesh network using the dierent centres as nodes
and with it, allow this connection to be shared using RuralNet.
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Figure 4.23: Infrastructure of a school.
4.8.5 Infrastructure
In this section we describe the infrastructure used for deploying RuralNet. As Ru-
ralNet is deployed to connect dierent schools, we dierentiate among the structure
inside a school, used to connect all computers among them and with an antenna,
and the infrastructure used for connecting the schools among themselves.
4.8.5.1 School architecture
To make the infrastructure of each school cheaper, we mix wireless technology with
Ethernet technology. Since we nally use desktop computers, we can use Ethernet
technology to connect all of them avoiding the interferences produced in a wireless
medium.
Figure 4.23 shows the schema of a school. Basically, each room has a proxy
which is the teacher's computer. Each student's computer is connected to the
proxy using a switch, which in turn is connected to an access point. The access
point is also connected to an antenna used to extend its signal range, allowing to
connect this school with other ones. This schema is repeated on each school.
4.8.5.2 Scenario architecture
Each school is connected with the other ones using an antenna, as being a node
of a mesh network. The Escola Taller San Juan Bautista is in the centre of the
network, being no more than one kilometre away from any of the other schools, and,
therefore, we use an omnidirectional antenna. The other schools use a directional
antenna to avoid interferences with among the other ones. Figure 4.24 shows the
distance between each school.
With this infrastructure, each computer may take part of RuralNet. Also, all of
them can have access to the main server, which controls the access to the Internet.
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Figure 4.24: Distance between the RuralNet nodes.
Also, each computer can use the shared resources of RuralNet, such as the FTP
server.
4.8.6 Final result
Now, more than 200 students are using RuralNet for accessing Internet in the
dierent schools of Nacala. The deployed system also allows information sharing
among the schools, as well as publishing documents and other les, and the use
of VoIP phones to be in touch among them. Inside the Escola Taller San Juan
Bautista we have installed the Maya application, which allows the control of the
entire mesh network.
The success of this prototype is also reected since theMissionarios Vicentinos
are in contact with us, discussing the possibility of extending the system to others
schools located in the same city.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter we presented RuralNet and Maya. RuralNet is a captive portal
based architecture especially designed to provide Internet access in rural areas.
Maya is the management tool for the infrastructure.
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Figure 4.25: In order: deploying an antenna for RuralNet (left up), one of our
members with an antenna (right up), a classroom of the school (left bottom), and
one of our router before being installed (right bottom).
We rst analysed the architecture of the system, putting into evidence the most
important elements that conform RuralNet 's infrastructure. We then described
three core elements of the system, which allow us to capture clients, perform a per-
user regulation of bandwidth, and oer access to an administrator-dened group
of free external web servers. We conclude with a experiment were we validate the
mesh network used by the system, nding that the service oered to clients is the
one we expect.
Maya simplies the wireless mesh networks management process by allowing
to perform critical tasks, such as global ESSID and channel changes, in a simple
and ecient manner. We also presented a set of experiments where we evaluated
the overhead of each type of management operation in two dierent scenarios:
under no load and under heavy load. The obtained results indicate that Maya's
performance is stable under all tested scenarios.
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Figure 4.26: In order: An antenna deployed for RuralNet (left up), another antenna
(right up), one of our members installing an access point (left bottom), one of the
schools of the project (right bottom).
We nally present a prototype of RuralNet deployed in Mozambique. This
prototype successfully connects four schools in the city of Nacala, sharing the
Internet connectivity of one of them, and allowing more than 200 students to have





In this chapter we present some security issues regarding to any MANET based
network or mesh network like RuralNet. There are several kinds of attacks that
can take place in these networks, but in this thesis we will focus solely on the at-
tacks that are specic to the data transmission process, which are the more specic
attacks of these networks. One of the main attacks against ad hoc networks af-
fecting their routing protocols are named routing-disruption attacks. An example
of these kinds of attacks is the selsh node, which uses the network but does not
cooperate, saving battery life for its own communications. Another similar attack
is the blackhole, which intends to disrupt the communication with its neighbour-
hood by attracting all trac ows in the network and then dropping all packets
received without forwarding them to their nal destination. The existence of these
attacks makes the network availability quite unpredictable. Notice that network
availability is a minimum requirement for developing any commercial system, such
as RuralNet.
We also present in this chapter the most common countermeasure used to avoid
this kind of attack, called the watchdog technique [STKM00], and we perform a
deep study of it. We found some drawbacks in this technique in scenarios with
high degrees of mobility. Therefore, we develop a version of the watchdog based
on bayesian lters [Ber93] which improve the accuracy of the standard watchdog,
palliating its drawbacks.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 shows an intro-
duction of security on MANETs. Section 5.2 explains the objectives we want to
achieve in this chapter. Section 5.3 describes how the standard approach of the
watchdog works and presents some of its drawbacks. Section 5.4 explains how
bayesian lters work, and how they can help us to improve the watchdog tech-
nique. Section 5.5 describes the evaluation made to validate the bayesian lters
used in a MANET. Section 5.6 compares both watchdogs to show the improve-
ments obtained with the new proposed mechanism. Finally, Section 5.7 draws the
main conclusions of this chapter.
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5.1 Introduction
As commented on Section 2.8, community wireless networks based on MANETs
and mesh networks use specic routing protocols, like AODV or OLSR, where it
is assumed that each node in the network is a peer and not a malicious node.
However, this assumption does not reect a real scenario, where nodes can have
a malicious behaviour. The open and dynamic nature of ad hoc networks make
them very sensitive to attacks. When routing protocols are aected by an attack,
the whole availability of the network is compromised.
Attacks against ad hoc routing protocols basically follow the manipulation
of the sensitive information exchanged among nodes to establish communication
routes. Accordingly, adversaries may inject erroneous routing information, re-
play old routing information, or distort routing information. These actions may
partition the network or introduce a certain trac overload, thus causing retrans-
mission and inecient routing. The main objectives of this attack are resource
saving and bandwidth appropriation. The malicious node disturbs the trac on
the network to save energy, not forwarding other node's packets and stealing the
network bandwidth for its own use.
There is therefore an emerging need for research focused on the provision of
practical proposals for securing ad hoc routing protocols. This research is essen-
tial to enable the exploitation of the potentials of such networks in commercial
products such as RuralNet.
5.1.1 Black holing Ad hoc Networks
As reported in [HP04], one of the main attacks against MANETs aects their rout-
ing protocols, being named routing-disruption attack. An example of a routing-
disruption attack is for an attacker to send forged routing packets to create a
routing loop, causing packets to traverse nodes in a cycle without reaching their
destinations, thus consuming energy and available bandwidth. An attacker might
similarly create a routing black hole, which attacks and drops data packets.
Black hole attacks are one of the most common ad hoc network attacks [MS04].
In this attack, a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as
having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. This
malicious node then can choose whether to drop the packets to perform a denial-
of-service attack, or to use its position on the route as the rst step in a man-in-
the-middle attack. In a special case of a black hole, and attacker could create a
grey hole, in which it selectively drops some packets but not others, for example,
by forwarding routing packets but not data packets.
Other similar kind of routing disruption is the selsh node. A selsh node uses
the network but does not cooperate, saving battery life for its own communications;
it does not intend to directly damage other nodes. In practise, this is another kind
of black hole attack.
In [R+08] authors have explored to what extent existing MANET routing pro-
tocols, such as OLSR or AODV, are sensible to selsh nodes, black holes and grey
holes attacks.
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In the literature, the typical countermeasure against a black hole, is to isolate
the node from the entire network. This can be accomplished by preventing nodes
to handle packets containing the MAC address of the malicious node, for instance,
by inserting a new rule in each node's rewall. However, such type of solutions are
only eective if the malicious node is detected by the other nodes of the network.
Therefore, the development of Intrusion Detection Systems for detecting this kind
of attack is mandatory to ensure the correct behaviour of the entire network.
5.2 Objectives to achieve
The objective of this chapter is to study the intrusion detection systems oered by
the literature for detecting black hole attacks. Search if they t our requirements
for RuralNet and, if not, develop a new tool or improve an existing one. The
solution developed should be robust in scenarios with some degree of mobility,
which is an important characteristic in MANETs. Also, it should have a limited
number of false detections to ensure the eectiveness of the solution developed.
Finally, the proposed solution should be tested in dierent scenarios with dif-
ferent number of nodes, and also should be tested in dierent devices, to ensure
its compatibility with any device that forms the MANET.
5.3 Watchdog-based Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS)
It is widely-known that imperfectness of preventive security measures lead com-
puter systems to embed vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious adver-
saries [DR03]. The existence of a vulnerability per se does not cause a security
hazard, and in most of the times they can remain dormant for years. An intrusion
is the consequence of an attack that succeeds in the exploitation of an existing vul-
nerability. This section denes how watchdogs can lead to the detection of such
activities, and it is also justied why such mechanisms can be considered today as
the basic bricks for the development of more sophisticated IDSs for MANETs.
5.3.1 Watchdogs and their Importance for MANETs IDSs
The watchdog is an intrusion detection mechanism proposed in previous stud-
ies [PC03, CLY06]. The main idea behind this IDS is that, because a node can
listen to the packets traversing its neighbourhood, it can monitor their activity.
Therefore, watchdogs act in promiscuous mode, thus overhearing all next nodes
forwarding transmissions. With the information about the neighbourhood be-
haviour, the watchdog can deduce if nodes are acting as selsh, black hole or grey
hole routers. This technique is independent of the technology and routing pro-
tocols used. They cope well with these kinds of attacks in any kind of ad hoc
network such as MANETs or mesh networks.
Figure 5.1 shows a basic example of the watchdog behaviour. Node A can
send packets to node D using either route {A-B-C-D} or {A-M-D}. The
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Figure 5.1: The watchdog technique.
watchdog can listen to the packets forwarded by B and M who are in range. B
forwards all packets to C but M performs a black hole attack and drops all
received packets. When M does not send the packet, the watchdog becomes
aware of it and marks it as an attacker.
Several proposals use the watchdog as the basic brick of IDS solutions. In
the Pathrater approach [MGLB00], each node uses the information provided by
watchdogs to rate neighbours. The Routeguard mechanism [HZH05] combines the
watchdog and Pathrater solutions to classify each neighbour node as Fresh, Mem-
ber, Unstable, Suspect or Malicious. Other approaches like hob-by-hop signing
[ZRCK03] and Patwardhan [PPJ+05] extend the detection capabilities provided
by the watchdog with public key encryption and signatures. As can be seen,
watchdogs are at the core of the most important types of IDS solutions for ad hoc
networks.
5.3.2 Design Approach
As previously established, the main functional requirement of the watchdog in
a particular node is to supervise the activity of the node's neighbours in order
to determine whether or not they follow the routing rule imposed by the consid-
ered routing protocols. The goal is to meet this requirement while providing a
portable solution that can be installed in devices with resource constraints such as
the intermediates nodes that compose RuralNet 's backbone network. Portability
refers here to the ability of the watchdog component to remain protocol and plat-
form independent in order to be usable in the context dened by dierent routing
protocols and dierent runtime supports.
The next subsections focus on the design decisions that must be considered to
produce a portable watchdog component.
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5.3.2.1 Detection Approach
To determine whether a node exhibits a malicious behaviour, our watchdog counts
all the packets received from its neighbours, and the packets that must be for-
warded (those that are not addressed to the node where the watchdog is under
execution). A neighbour trust level can be dened as the ratio between the received
packets for forwarding and those eectively forwarded by the neighbour node. A
node forwarding all received packets has a neighbour trust level of 1 (100%). When
a node does not forward the received packets, the watchdog changes its state to
untrusted, and marks it as malicious node. Although an ideal neighbour trust level
is 1 (100%), collisions and signal noise make that, in practise, such value level is
rarely attained.
5.3.2.2 On minimising false watchdog detections
The work published in [MGLB00] reports on the eects of false detections of
watchdogs; as it is mentioned in this work, mobility of nodes and collisions limit
the detection accuracy of watchdogs, leading them to provide false detections. The
eect of such aspects is not considered in the evaluation of the watchdog nally
provided, which limits the representativeness of such study in practise.
It is dicult for a watchdog to dierentiate whether the loss of a packet is due
to an attack or a collision. In this latter case, if an alert is generated, this may
lead to the generation of a false positive. In order to mitigate to some extend
that problem, our proposal is to introduce in the watchdog design the denition
of a tolerance threshold. This threshold denes a certain packet loss tolerance. As
a result, a node is considered as being malicious if the degree of packet loss of
such node exceeds the established watchdog threshold. In other words, an alert is
generated whenever the trust level of a particular neighbour becomes smaller than
one minus the considered threshold.
It is worth nothing that, despite the interest that the inclusion of tolerance
thresholds may have for facing the problem of the generation of false positives,
it may lead to the introduction of another one: the generation of false negatives.
A false negative appears when an attack is not detected by the IDS. If intrusion
detection time increases, false negatives can appear, and both intermittent and
temporal attacks may remain undetected. Temporal attacks are those perpetrated
by nodes that exhibit a malicious behaviour during a limited amount of time. The
existence of false negatives is neither reported in the previously mentioned paper,
although they exist, as this work demonstrates.
It is important to note, that due the high mobility of the nodes in a MANET,
most attacks are temporal. The solution designed to face this problem is the
use of devaluation techniques that consist in decreasing the weight of the oldest
received packets along the time, and thus their inuence in the computation of the
tolerance threshold. We claim that this design decision is more interesting than an
Amnesia technique (only use present information) strategy since such amnesia
may increase the number of generated false positives.
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5.3.2.3 Considerations for detecting Grey holes
Although the previously identied design decisions are well-suited for black hole
attack detection or selsh nodes, some additional considerations are required when
facing grey hole attacks. As introduced in Section 5.1.1, the goal of grey hole
attacks is to block a particular kind of network trac. If the trac blocked by a
grey hole is only a little portion of the entire trac, it is not enough to reduce the
neighbour trust level for coping with its detection. In addition, the watchdog must
be able to dierentiate the dierent types of packets handled by each node in the
neighbourhood. So, dierent thresholds must be computed for each type of packet
traversing the network. A node is thus considered as malicious if the number of
lost packets of the same kind exceeds the established tolerance threshold.
5.3.3 Implementation Trade-os
In this section we detail the characteristics of the implementation of the watch-
dog. We implement this component using the C programming language to ease
portability to devices such as laptops, PDAs or routers.
The implemented Watchdog performs ve steps: (i) reads the packets from the
wireless card, (ii) generates the neighbourhood, (iii) detects the black hole attack,
(iv) releases consumed resources if they will not be used any more, and (v) sleeps
for a random time for resource saving purposes.
The rst action of our watchdog is to read each packet that arrives at the
wireless card. The card is set to the promiscuous mode to listen to all neighbours'
packets in range. Here we can choose between using the Netlter library or im-
plementing our own socket. We decided to implement our own socket to obtain
a standalone application avoiding libraries dependence and, therefore, avoiding
dependence with a specic Linux distribution or kernel version.
With the information provided by each obtained packet, the watchdog can
dene its neighbourhood and decide if any neighbour is performing an attack.
To dene the neighbourhood list, the node running the watchdog must read each
packet received. This includes not only the packets addressed to it, but also all
those using the promiscuous mode of the wireless card. It compares the IP address
of the sender to know if it is a packet sent by itself, by an already stored neighbour
or by a new one. If it is a new neighbour, it stores the neighbour identity by using
its IP address and then trying to discover its MAC listening to all the ARP packets.
To detect an attacker, for each listened packet the watchdog distinguishes if
it must be forwarded or not. If it must, the packet is stored in a buer until the
packet is sent to the next hop. When the packet is sent, it is removed from the
list and the watchdog marks the behaviour of the listened node as normal. If it
is not forwarded, when a timeout expires, it is considered a lost packet and the
watchdog decrease the neighbour trust level of the node in charge of forwarding it.
If the number of unforwarded packets is higher than the percentage of tolerance
threshold of the watchdog, the node is tagged as malicious node and an alarm to
other nodes or to a logger is sent, depending to the security policy applied on the
network.
For resource saving, the program searches for expired data stored and deletes
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them to avoid large memory consumption. If the watchdog does not receive any
kind of packet from a given neighbour for a long time, the neighbour is considered
as out of range, and it is deleted. This timeout is dened by the user when the
watchdog is executed.
Finally, our implementation also has the option to enter in a sleep mode ran-
domly, saving energy and CPU consumption.
We must point out that the implementation is independent of the routing
protocol used since it does not modify the protocol behaviour and only listens to
the packets forwarded by nodes.
This implementation of the watchdog is released as open source software and
it can be downloaded from http://safewireless.sourceforge.net.
5.3.4 Countermeasures proposed
When an attack is detected, a node can apply its own policy to block the attack.
However, it is also convenient that this information is spread to all the neighbour-
hood to inform the rest of the nodes.
To send an alarm, there are several options available in literature. We propose
that the watchdog uses the common message structure of the common message
loggers of Linux system called Syslog-ng [Sec08], thus allowing compatibility with
other applications. We chose this implementation for the alerts and excluded
other standards more extended on IDS such as IDMEF [MM07], for simplifying
the integration of the watchdog with limited devices such as mobile nodes.
Syslog-ng allows nodes to send messages to their neighbourhood only by know-
ing the IP of the other nodes, which is obtained by the Watchdog. The alarm
message has several elds: the severity of the alert, a timestamp, the IP of the
node that sent the alert, the PID of the watchdog, an explicative alert with the
IP and MAC of the attacker, and the routes aected by the attack. With this
information, the neighbourhood can launch some countermeasures. Next, we list
an example of them.
5.3.4.1 Isolating the malicious node
The simplest way to avoid a malicious node is that each node detecting the attack
or receiving the information about the attack, isolates the malicious node. This
task is easily performed by the rewall of each node. As we use Linux based
systems, our rewall is the Iptables [Izu03] tool. Algorithm 5.1 shows the set of
rules required to perform this action.
The MAC in the iptables rule to be applied is the malicious node's MAC. First
the node blocks all packets of the malicious node, then it waits for a short time
(i.e. ve minutes) and then it nishes the isolation. The isolation must nish to
avoid denial of service attacks if the malicious node clones a MAC address.
5.3.4.2 Select an alternative route
Another way to avoid the attack is to force the routing protocol to choose another
router. This can be achieved changing the routing table. Algorithm 5.2 shows the
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Algorithm 5.1 Isolating a malicious node.
iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m mac mac-source neighbour's mac -j
DROP;
iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp -m mac mac-source neighbour's mac -j
DROP;
sleep 300;
iptables -D INPUT -p udp -m mac mac-source neighbour's mac -j
DROP;
iptables -D OUTPUT -p udp -m mac mac-source neighbour's mac -j
DROP;
set of rules required to perform this reaction.
Algorithm 5.2 Selecting an alternative route.
route -del host destination_node_ip;
route -add host destination_node_ip gw new_neighbour_ip;
In these rules, the destination_node_ip is the node starting the Ekiga call, and
the new_neighbour_ip is another neighbour that is used to forward the packets.
Only one node must apply these rules.
5.3.5 Evaluation of our watchdog using Castadiva
In this section we present a case study for our watchdog using real devices.
5.3.5.1 Experimental Setup
We deployed a small prototype of RuralNet using the Castadiva emulator presented
on Chapter 3. Our studied network integrates ve nodes, named A, B, C, D, E and
initially has the topology shown in Figure 5.2. The RuralNet core does not aect
this scenario since the Internet connectivity is not necessary in this case. Nodes
A and D acts as users of RuralNet and are Ubuntu-based laptops running a VoIP
application (called Ekiga [San10]). Thus, an Ekiga client runs on each of these
laptops. The other intermediate nodes (B, E and C) act as the backbone network
of RuralNet. The malicious node M also runs as a process in another access point.
We start an Ekiga conversation (that generates about 145 packets/s) between
the laptops at both extremes. Node A runs the watchdog and monitors all the
packets forwarded. The computer running the watchdog is a Pentium IV Core
Duo 3Ghz with 1GB of RAM. We test the watchdog in dierent scenarios using a
proactive routing protocol (OLSR) and a reactive routing protocol (AODV). For
the OLSR we use the OLSR-Unik implementation [AAO04], and for the AODV we
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Figure 5.2: Experimental setup: A watchdog in RuralNet.
use the implementation of the Uppsala University [oU10]. We use both protocols
to check the independence of our component against the routing protocol used.
Malicious node M performs a black hole attack [HP02] on all VoIP-related
packets exchanged between A and D. If the attack meets its objective, then the
video and voice ows between A and D will be dropped, thus freezing the VoIP
call. Initially M is not part of the network. The attack approach proposed in this
paper copes with the aforementioned challenge.
5.3.5.2 Validating our Implementation of the Watchdog
The rst step is to validate our implementation of the watchdog. For this reason
we generate the simplest possible scenario in a MANET and perform a black hole
attack. We use Castadiva for emulating this scenario, shown in Figure 5.3. In
this test, a previous communication between node A and node D is hijacked by
node M, who later performs a black hole attack. Node A is running a watchdog,
which detects the attack in the 100% of the cases. This is an optimum scenario
where there is no noise or other factors that can aect the watchdog's accuracy.
Therefore, in the next section, we perform a deeper study of the watchdog and the
presence of false positives and false negatives caused by environmental noise.
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Figure 5.4: Network's throughput aected by noise.
5.3.5.3 Watchdogs in Scenarios with Noise
In this section we evaluate the false positives and the false negatives obtained by
the watchdog due to environmental noise.
We consider a scenario withminimum interference where only Ekiga is running.
A scenario with maximum interference is dened as the maximum noise tolerated
by a videocall where the image is not frozen for more than one second. We call
noise level to the number of trac ows used to generate noise. Each trac ow
is composed by 200 UDP packet per second, and the size of each packet is 1024
bytes. We select 200 packets for each trac ow because less packets make no
signicant visual changes on the video test, and so there are no signicant changes
on the test. Our test shows that a noise level of 12 trac ows, is the maximum
interference that does not freeze the videocall for more than 1 complete second
for every 3 conversation seconds. We consider this interference as the maximum
tolerated by an user. Figure 5.4 shows analytically how the dierent levels of noise
aect the throughput of the network.
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Figure 5.5: Relation between the minimum tolerance threshold needed to avoid
false positives using OLSR and AODV.
False positive Figure 5.5 describes the results of the test performed when vary-
ing the background noise from 0 to 12 trac sources. This gure shows the
tolerance threshold needed by the watchdog to avoid a false positive using both
OLSR and AODV protocols. We can observe that, when we increase the noise, a
higher tolerance threshold is needed by the watchdog and less packets are received
by the users of the videocall. This need of increasing the tolerance threshold is
due to the packet loss due to the collisions caused by the background trac.
Concerning the dierent routing protocols, we observe that, when the watchdog
is used in a MANET or a mesh network with AODV, the tolerance threshold
required is smaller than in a network using OLSR. This is explained because, in our
tests, the videocalls with AODV have less average trac throughput. This means
that less trac is forwarded on each hop and, therefore, there is less probability
of collisions that prevent the watchdog from listening the packet forwarding.
False negatives Figure 5.6 (up) shows an example of the interval when the
watchdog can generate a false negative when the tolerance threshold is set to 50%
(a very high value only for testing purpose) and has stored previously 10.000 suc-
cessful forwarded packets without any devaluation technique. The trac analysed
is the one generated by the Ekiga videocall tool. In this case we can see an interval
of almost 90 seconds where an attack can be performed without any notication
by the watchdog. This detection time is proportional to the number of packets
previously stored.
Figure 5.6 (bottom) shows the impact of dierent devaluation values in the
time required to detect a malicious node for the same test. We make dierent
tests changing its value from 2000, 5000, 10000 or 20000 maximum packets stored.
Using only the last 2000 or 5000 packets stored, the detection time of the attack
is increased and the watchdog has a worse performance. For values of 10000 and
20000, we can see the reduction of the detection time for the attacker, especially
when there is a huge amount of packets stored. The more packets we devalue, the
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Devaluation when 20000 pckts are stored.
Devaluation when 10000 pckts are stored.
Devaluation when 5000 pckts are stored.
Devaluation when 2000 pckts are stored.
Without Devaluation.
Figure 5.6: False Negative interval when the tolerance threshold is set to 50% (up)
and relation between the time needed for detecting an attacker and the number of
packets forwarded previously when using dierent values of the devaluation option
(bottom).
faster we detect the attack. But if we set a value for the devaluation option that
is lower than the number of packets received per second multiplied by the seconds
that the watchdog stores a packet before decides if it is lost, the watchdog is unable
to detect any attack in a short time. In Figure 5.6 (bottom) we can appreciate a
comparison of this mechanism with dierent tests. As we can see, for values lower
than 10000 packets the time to detect an attack is increased. But for a value of
10000 or 20000 packets we obtain a substantial improvement. We can summarise
that devaluation is an improvement to reduce the attack detection time.
5.3.6 Evaluation using ns-2
In this section we perform several tests using the ns-2 [UBr98] simulator. We
chose this simulator instead of Castadiva because we want to test scenarios with
a high number of nodes. In this case, the use of a simulator is recommended.
In order to use the ns-2, we implemented a specic watchdog module for this
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Figure 5.8: Attacks detected by the watchdog when changing the mobility of a
scenario.
simulator (available at http://safewireless.sourceforge.net/). Using this
simulator we can test networks with a large number of nodes, changing the number
of attackers and their mobility. Figure 5.7 shows a preliminary study of how the
percentage of malicious nodes and the total number of nodes of the scenario aects
the probability that an attack is performed in a trac ow. As we can see, not
only the percentage of attackers aects the probability of nding an attack in one
test, but also the total number of nodes in the scenario.
Afterwards we implemented the watchdog mechanism for this simulator and
performed several tests varying the mobility of the nodes and the number of attacks
to assess the eectiveness of the watchdog. Figure 5.8 shows the results obtained
with dierent parameters. We can see that mobility clearly aects the number of
attacks detected; however, it decreases as mobility increases. With a mobility of 1
m/s, nearly 100% of the attacks are detected. However, when we increase mobility
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Figure 5.9: Number of false positives generated (up) and false positive ratio (bot-
tom) when changing the mobility of a scenario.
up to 15 m/s, the detection is reduced to 80%. These results are independent of
the number of malicious nodes deployed in the simulation. It aects o the total
number of attacks, but not the ratio of the attacks detected.
Another studied eect is the false positives problem. Figure 5.9 presents a
ratio between false positives and attacks in the simulation. Here we can see that,
when the degree of mobility and the number of nodes increases, the ratio of false
positives decreases. Despite the fact the number of false positives is increased when
we increase mobility, the number of attacks is also increased, causing the number
of attacks detected to increase too. Therefore, the total ratio of false positives is
decreased.
Overall, we conclude that the watchdog does not cope well with mobility, es-
pecially at high node speeds. In fact, the higher the node speed is, the more false
positives and false negatives the watchdog incurs in. A deeper study about the
relationship between watchdog performance and mobility is discussed in Section
5.3.7.
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Figure 5.10: False positives due to watchdogs timeouts.
5.3.7 Detected drawbacks of the watchdog mechanism
The main problems detected for a watchdog based mechanisms are: (i) how the
environmental noise aects the watchdog and the diculties to cope with it, and
(ii) how the watchdog can infer whether a node is in range or not when nodes have
a high degree of mobility.
Although the watchdog methodology should be enough to detect malicious
nodes, packet collisions and signal noise cause, in practise, the false positives and
false negatives problem to emerge. It is dicult for a watchdog to dierentiate
whether the loss of a packet is due to an attack or a collision. In this latter case,
if an alert is generated, it may lead to the generation of a false positive. This
eect is palliated by the use of a tolerance threshold. This tolerance means that
a node will ignore a percentage of packet loss. Hence, the value of this parameter
represents a trade-o between detection speed and false positives. If we pick a low
tolerance value, noise would cause benevolent nodes to be marked as malicious. If
the tolerance value is set to high, the watchdog will need too much time to detect
an attack. In fact, when it is performed in MANETs or wireless mesh networks
with a high degree of mobility, the possibility of detecting an attack becomes
minimal.
The previously presented Figure 5.6 (up) shows a schema of the watchdog
response in the presence of an attack. In this experiment there is an interval
of almost 90 seconds where an attack can remain unnoticed by the watchdog.
As shown in this gure, the watchdog methodology requires sning enough data
packets to decide whether a node is an attacker. This means that more time is
needed to make a decision compared to a network without a tolerance threshold. If
the attacker is moving, there is a possibility that the malicious node moves outside
the watchdog's signal range, and thus it would not be detected. Therefore, false
negatives can appear, and both intermittent and temporal attacks may remain
undetected.
The second problem is how a watchdog can determine whether a neighbour
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is in range or not. As we remarked before, the watchdog has the advantage of
using only local information, but this has also some disadvantages, such as the
watchdog not knowing when a neighbour goes out of range. This problem is
solved by using timeouts: when the time that passes after the last neighbour
packet listened surpasses a certain value, the watchdog considers this neighbour to
be out of range and will not consider it for future tests. The main problem of this
strategy is how to nd the best timeout. A low value forces the watchdog to restart
all calculations for a neighbour before a decision about it being malicious or not is
made, possibly not detecting a malicious node and thus causing false negatives. A
high value causes that, when a neighbour goes out of range, the watchdog would
consider it to be in range for a long time. In that case, the watchdog would
expect retransmissions from this neighbour, but would not listen to any. As a
consequence, it would decide that this neighbour is a malicious node, thus causing
false positives. Figure 5.10 shows an example of a false positive caused by a high
timeout value. When node B moves to position B', the watchdog of node D thinks
that B is within range until the timeout is triggered. As a consequence, D would
expect to listen to the packets forwarded by B, and, otherwise, it would mark it as
being a malicious. This is the main reason why, in Section 5.3.6, the false positives
are slightly increased when we increase the mobility of the nodes. We can also
consider this as another type of scenario aecting the watchdog's performance.
5.4 Adapting Bayesian Filters to IDS of MANETs:
The Bayesian Watchdog
We now propose to use a bayesian ltering technique to lter the noise caused
by node mobility in the watchdog monitoring process. This watchdog based on
bayesian lters, can fade the false positives and false negatives problem using his-
torical information obtained by the watchdog in the previous time. The obtained
proposal is protocol independent, allowing it to be easily adopted by any kind of
MANET.
5.4.1 Bayesian Filtering.
Bayesian lters [Ber93] probabilistically estimate a dynamic system's state from
noisy observations. At time t, the state is estimated by a random variable θ,
which is unknown and this uncertainly is modelled by assuming that θ itself is
drawn according to a distribution that is updated as new observations become
available. It is called belief or Belt(θ). To illustrate this, let's assume that there is
a sequence of time-indexed observations z1, z2, ..., zn. The Beli(θ) is then dened
by the posterior density over the random variable θ conditioned on all sensor data
available at time t :
Belt(θ) = p(θ|z1, z2, ..., zt)
In our approach, the random variable θ belongs to [0,1]. Then we use for the belief
the distribution Beta(α, β) that is suitable for this interval:
110
5.4. ADAPTING BAYESIAN FILTERS TO IDS OF MANETS: THE
BAYESIAN WATCHDOG
Belt(θ) = Beta(αt, βt, θ)
where α and β represent the state of the system, and it is updated according to
the following equations:{
αt+1 = αt + zt
βt+1 = βt + zt
The Beta function only needs two parameters that are continuously updated as
observations are made or reported. In our approach, observation zt represents the
information from the watchdog about the percentage of non-forwarded packets
obtained in time interval [t, t+ 1] .
5.4.2 Why Bayesian Filters?
Working on the protocol behaviour or studying the topology changes is not the
only way for detecting misbehaviour in a system. In the literature we can nd a
reliable and extensive set of tools for detecting abnormal behaviours considered
malicious in other elds, such as the SPAM lters. A SPAM lter can segregate il-
legitimate spam email from legitimate email. These email lters are usually based
on bayesian lters [SDHH98], which allow the mail client to learn about the user
decisions. Bayesian lters are not only useful for detecting SPAM. Other works
such as [BB04, dLHMR08] also successfully use bayesian lters for predictions of
abnormal behaviour. Buchegger et al. [BB04] uses them for implementing repu-
tation systems for P2P and MANETs, while Leoni et al. [dLHMR08] use bayesian
lters for predicting disconnections in a MANET. Thus, bayesian lters seem to be
a useful tool for detecting abnormal behaviour in noisy environments and, there-
fore, a good tool for improving our intrusion detection system. Our proposal is to
combine bayesian lters with the information obtained by our watchdog to design
a tool capable of segregating malicious nodes from benign ones using historical
information, thereby preventing both false positives and false negatives.
5.4.3 Assumptions
In a few words, each node on the network has some assumptions that can be
summarised as follows:
1. Every node installs a watchdog, thus allowing for detecting misbehaviour
(e.g., the number of packets that nodes should forward but that they do not
do).
2. The percentage of packets that nodes do not correctly forward is used as
input for the bayesian lters in order to predict the percentage of non-
forwarded packets in the near future. If such a percentage is higher than
a certain threshold, then the node is considered a malicious node. Note that
it is not possible to assume that good nodes forward correctly all packets
because of radio noises, packet losses and other similar characteristics of the
aerial medium, which cause some delivery attempts to fail.
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3. Every node that detects this malicious behaviour enables consequently ap-
propriate actions to avoid malicious nodes from inuencing the network's
functionality. Every device can take its own recovery actions, or, conversely,
all nodes can reach a consensus on the collaborative actions to deal with the
situation. However, we focus on signalling malicious nodes, assuming another
component to take care of mitigating the consequences of such attacks.
5.4.4 Bayesian Filtering Adapted for our IDS
Our approach is based on the information of the incoming packets that devices
have not forwarded, and that nonetheless they should have done. Our bayesian
watchdog relies on some basic assumptions:
1. Every device is equipped with a wireless card that allows for promiscuous
mode: any device can listen to the packets traversing its neighbourhood and,
hence, monitor the activity of one-hop distant nodes.
2. Each node has an implementation of a watchdog sensor (let's indicate as i).
The i-th watchdog of a given node monitors the incoming and outgoing trac
of every neighbouring node. In this way, by analysing the packet headers, it
is able to count the packets that nodes did not forward.
3. Each node has at least three neighbours. We assume a density of the network
that makes dierent paths possible for reaching a destination, and each node
is monitored by dierent neighbours.
The watchdog of device i is in charge of listening the trac in its neighbourhood
and calculating the percentage of packets not correctly forwarded by every neigh-
bouring device j. If a given j forwards less than a given percentage of packets,
the watchdog considers j as misbehaving. Device i does not know a priori such a
percentage for each neighbouring node j and, therefore, it denes a random vari-
able θi(j) to estimate it for j. In fact, θi(j) is the viewpoint of device i for what
concerns device j. It is worthy highlighting that taking only the last observation is
not suciently reliable since this could be eected by noise. So, old observations
should be considered.
Our watchdog makes use of bayesian ltering. Variable θi(j) complies with the
Beta distribution with parameters (α(i,j), β(i,j)). These parameters are continu-
ously updated with new incoming observations of the percentage of non-forwarded
packets. Node i makes periodical observations each t seconds (with t constant) of
the behaviour of node j. Let s be the percentage of packets observed by i that are
not forwarded by node j in this observation period. Parameters α(i,j) and β(i,j)
are updated as follows: {
α(i,j) := u · α(i,j) + s
β(i,j) := u · β(i,j) + (1− s)
(5.1)
Values α(i,j) and β(i,j) are initially set to 1.
Variable u is a fading mechanism for past experiences. This fading mechanism
allows for redemption of a neighbour if its behaviour changes to a correct one along
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Algorithm 5.3 Pseudocode of the bayesian algorithm for predicting black hole
attacks.
BayesianBuer[x,y]: a bi-dimensional square matrix storing (α, β) for each cou-
ple of nodes X and Y.
watchdog: is the observation obtained by the sensor. Represents a % of the
packet loss.
BAYESIAN FILTERING:
for node ε MANET do
start new watchdog sning.
after expiring of TIMER()
BayesianBuer[x,y].alpha ←u * BayesianBuer[x,y].alpha + watchdog
BayesianBuer[x,y].beta ←u * BayesianBuer[x,y].betha + (1-watchdog)
done
the time. This fading mechanism will be useful if there are false positives due to
the environmental noise. Greater values for u correspond to considering the old
observations more signicantly.
5.4.5 Watchdog Reputation Rating
With the beta function dened previously we can dene the reputation function




1 P (θi(j)) < γ
0 P (θi(j)) ≥ γ
(5.2)
where




If Ri(j) = 0, node i reputes j as malicious. This means that node j is malicious
if the estimated percentage of packets that are not correctly forwarded is more than
a given value γ, named tolerance threshold. This tolerance threshold may depend
on the environmental noise and must be dened for each scenario.
Figure 5.11 shows an example of a reputation function using a beta distribution
when alpha is equal to 1 and beta is equal to 3. If we set γ to 0.6, the probability
of being a benign node is the area of the beta function highlighted in the gure;
the probability of being a malicious one is the complementary area of the function.
In this example we can assume that the estimated node is non malicious because
more than 60% of the function's area is in the quadrant dened by a value gamma
of 0.6.
5.4.6 Implementation trade-os
The bayesian ltering used in our watchdog approach is based on some parame-
ters that, in several cases, need to be tuned for any specic scenarios through a
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Figure 5.11: Example of a reputation function.
previous training procedure. In particular, the bayesian ltering uses the following
parameters:
5.4.6.1 Tolerance Threshold
A higher value for the tolerance threshold (γ) requires more time for the watchdog
to detect an attack, as a higher value of alpha is needed in function 5.2 to set the
reputation as malicious; to achieve this higher value of alpha, the bayesian lter
needs to perform more observations. But, on the other hand, the watchdog is more
robust against environmental noise (less false positives). Conversely, if we set a
low value for gamma, some nodes aected by noise would be declared as malicious
ones and false positives would appear.
5.4.6.2 Fading Mechanism
This parameter (value u) indicates the weight of the old information obtained by
the bayesian watchdog. When closer to 1, the old observations weight similarly
to the new ones. In case of a change in the behaviour of a given node, since the
misbehaviour detected in the latest observation periods is as relevant as the good
behaviour observed in the past, the bayesian lters require more time to learn that
the node has changed to a bad behaviour. On the other hand, the eects of noise
in the lter become less relevant and they are mitigated by the past observations.
Therefore, the percentage of false positives is lower. Clearly, for smaller values of
u, the opposite behaviour should be observed.
5.4.6.3 Updating Time
This is the period between two subsequent updates of parameters α and β ac-
cording to the observations harvested about the packets that, mistakenly, are not
forwarded. Too frequent updates can cause problems to the bayesian lters if
the noise is relatively high. If the lter's parameter is updated frequently and
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the packet losses are high, it is likely that the number of packets received in the
update period is nearly 0%, thus causing nodes to be wrongly considered as ma-
licious. Conversely, if the observation time is too long, parameters are updated
too infrequently and, hence, the time to detect a malicious node may become
unacceptable.
5.4.6.4 Neighbour Timeout
This parameter is an implementation issue, and it is also present in the standard
watchdog. Since the watchdog only uses local information, it is impossible to know
exactly when a node goes out of range. This is solved by using a timeout. When
a certain period of time passes by without receiving any packet of a neighbour,
the watchdog considers that this neighbour has moved out of range. The main
problem is how to nd the optimal timeout. A low value forces the watchdog to
restart all calculations of a neighbour before a decision about it being malicious or
not is made. This creates the possibility of not detecting a malicious node, thus
causing false negatives. A high value means that, when a neighbour goes out of
range, the watchdog would consider it to be in range for a long time. In that case,
the watchdog would expect retransmissions from this neighbour, but would not
listen to any. As a consequence, it would decide that this neighbour is a malicious
node, thus causing false positives.
5.5 Evaluation
As for the standard watchdog, we have performed several tests using the ns-2
simulator [UBr98] in order to evaluate the approach in large scenarios. In our
simulation we considered a network of 50 nodes moving in an area 870x870 m.
wide.
We have performed our experiments considering both static and dynamic sce-
narios. Mobility aects the accuracy of the watchdog due to two important aspects:
(i) routes used for the trac ow need to be recalculated each time the topology
changes, causing packet losses; and (ii) if the attacker is moving, there is a possi-
bility that the malicious node moves outside the watchdog's signal range before it
is detected. Both characteristics of these scenarios cause false negatives and false
positives to be increased.
5.5.1 Static Scenario
We use random scenarios for validating the implementation of our bayesian watch-
dog. In the rst place we perform several tests to evaluate the behaviour of the
watchdog's module in a static scenario. Figure 5.12 shows how the bayesian watch-
dog detects the 100% of the attacks independently of the number of attackers that
there are in the network, therefore achieving 0% of false negatives. The absence of
mobility makes the number of false positives negligible, but that is not a realistic
setting in MANETs and wireless mesh networks.
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Figure 5.12: Actual detections and false positives in a static scenario.
5.5.2 Dynamic Scenario
The experiments described below are targeted at nding the best tuning of param-
eters in order to improve the eectiveness. The experiments have been conducted
for dierent motion speeds of the MANET devices, thus verifying how the speed
can aect the detection of malicious nodes.
5.5.2.1 Evaluation of the Gamma Value
We perform dierent tests in scenarios with dierent mobility speeds and chang-
ing the tolerance threshold. Figure 5.13 shows the obtained results. For both
diagrams, the x axis represents the various thresholds tested. In Figure 5.13.a and
Figure 5.13.b, the y axes measure the percentage of actual attacks detected and
false negatives, respectively. For the results analysis, it seems that any threshold
between 0.75 and 0.85 decreases the false positives while keeping a good detection
rate.
A survey of the ns-2 trace shows that a higher value of gamma (closer to 1)
causes the bayesian watchdog to be more strict when detecting an attack, decreas-
ing the false positives but also decreasing the percentage of detection. This is
caused by the fact that, as discussed in Section 5, the watchdog needs a higher
value of alpha to decide if a neighbouring node is malicious, and therefore, more
time is needed to detect the attack.
5.5.2.2 Evaluation of the Fading Value
The next step is to evaluate what is the inuence of the fading value upon the accu-
racy of detection. Figure 5.14 shows the results obtained when varying the fading
value of the bayesian watchdog. We use a gamma value of 0.85 for these tests, as
it seemed the most suitable according to the results of the previous experiments
for the tolerance threshold.






















































Figure 5.13: Percentage of (a) actual attacks detected and (b) false positives for
dierent tolerance threshold and for dierent devices' speed.
against false positives. However, when a node starts behaving maliciously, it takes
longer to detect the attack. Therefore, such a longer time decreases the accuracy
of detecting actual attacks. As a result, the optimal fading value may depend on
the needs of the network; e.g., if the routing protocol needs to recalculate new
routes frequently due to a high value of the node's speed, a higher value of fading
is recommended. However, if a malicious node performs intermittent attacks, a
lower value of fading is needed.
5.5.2.3 Evaluation of the Updating Time
As commented in Section 5.4.6.3, a short interval for the updating time would
cause a high value of false positives, but would also increase the detection accuracy.
Figure 5.15 conrms this statement and also shows us that a value of 1 second is
optimal in our scenarios.
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Figure 5.14: Percentage of (a) actual attacks detected and (b) false positives for
dierent fading values and dierent mobility speeds.
5.5.2.4 Evaluation of the Neighbour Timeout
The higher the neighbour timeout is, the more information about a neighbour is
stored in the watchdog for a longer time, and so, the more robust the system is
against noise. But this also causes more false positives to appear, as described
in Section 5.4.6.4. Figure 5.16 shows how much the increase of the false positives
is as we increase the neighbour timeout. In this gure we can see that, with a
low neighbour time, the detection is decreased, and with a value greater than
0.2 seconds, the detection is stabilised. With regard to false positives, they are
increased when the neighbour timeout value is also increased. Therefore, a value
of 0.2 seconds for the neighbour timeout value is the optimal trade-o that we are
looking for in these scenarios. Note that 0.2 seconds double the interval between
packets in our simulation. Thus, in other scenarios where the trac changes, this
value will be dierent, and it would be updated accordingly.
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Figure 5.15: Attacks detected (up) and false positives produced (bottom) when
varying the neighbour timeout.
5.6 Comparison between the Bayesian Watchdog
and the Standard Watchdog
Figure 5.17 shows a comparison between the bayesian watchdog and the standard
watchdog in a set of scenarios where we vary the degree of mobility. For these tests
we set up the bayesian watchdog with a value of 0.85 for gamma, a value of 1 for
the fading, 2 seconds for the observation time and 10 seconds for the neighbours'
timeout. These are the optimal values obtained in the evaluation section. In the
standard watchdog we set a tolerance threshold of 20%. This value was empirically
obtained for these scenarios decreasing the false positives and false negatives with
an optimal detection rate. As shown in these gures, the bayesian watchdog is
more accurate when detecting attackers in scenarios with high mobility. This is
due to the bayesian lters being more robust against noise, and so the number of
false positives decreases.
Not only does the bayesian watchdog improve accuracy in detection, but in
almost the 95% of the tests, the bayesian watchdog also detects the attacker quicker
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Figure 5.16: Attacks detected (up) and false positives produced (bottom) when
varying the neighbour timeout.
than the standard one. This increase of the detection speed is one of the causes
for the higher accuracy of detections, since the bayesian watchdog is less aected
by the problems introduced by mobility, as explained in Section 5.5.2.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a study of one of the most common attacks in
ad hoc networks: the black hole attack. A black hole attack is caused when a
node does not cooperate to forward the neighbours' packets. In the literature, the
technique used to detect this attack is called the watchdog. In this chapter we
have demonstrated that this technique is ecient in static scenarios, but it has a
high number of false positives and false negatives in scenarios with a high degree
of mobility. Therefore, we have proposed a modication of the watchdog which
includes bayesian lters. Bayesian lters are broadly used in several scenarios due
to their ability to reduce the inuence of the noise on the measurements. Here
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Scenarios with different mobility
False Positives by both watchdogs
Standard watchdog
Bayesian watchdog
Figure 5.17: Comparison between both watchdogs with dierent degrees of mo-
bility: detections (up) and false positives (bottom).
called it bayesian watchdog. We have conducted some experiments using our ns-2
based implementation to verify the approach. The integration of bayesian ltering
with the watchdog technique has reduced the number of false detections, while the







Throughout this thesis, several contributions have been made to the area of com-
munity networks, MANETs and mesh networks. The main purpose of this thesis
was to design a secure low-cost architecture to provide Internet connectivity in
rural areas of the developing world. We called this architecture RuralNet.
We rst analysed the architecture of the system, putting into evidence the
most important elements of RuralNet 's infrastructure. We then described the
core elements of the system, which allow us to capture clients, perform a per-user
regulation of bandwidth, and oer access to an administrator-dened group of free
external web servers. The RuralNet application here described is free software, and
it can be downloaded for free at http://ruralnet.sourceforge.net/
We assessed the viability of our system by providing a set of subscribers with
Internet connectivity in our test bed. A performance evaluation was made focusing
on the throughput achieved and on the overhead imposed on the devices used. We
found that the service oered to clients is the one we expected, while the system
can be gradually scaled up as the number of subscribers increases.
For this evaluation we created a platform for testing our proposed architecture
before deploying it in a real environment. Hence, we developed a small test bed in
our laboratory to do a preliminary evaluation of the feasibility and performance
concerning our mesh networking architecture, including testing the capability of
the hardware devices used and documenting all the software packages required to
tune the system. This test bed is called Castadiva.
Castadiva is a novel architecture to improve research in the MANETs eld
by allowing to make real test bed experiments in a simple and straightforward
manner. This tool is optimal to test and evaluate our RuralNet prototype.
Castadiva combines the convenience and productivity of Java with the power of
the Linux kernel and accompanying tools. The system was designed to simplify the
tasks of scenario generation and starting trac ows among independent, IEEE
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802.11-based, wireless nodes.
The architectural design of Castadiva dierentiates wireless nodes, used for
the actual experiments, from the core application, which has management and
control purposes. This core application provides an easy interface to dene network
topologies and trac ows between nodes. Those denitions are then translated
into run-time instructions sent to test bed nodes when experiments are on-going.
An important issue when designing Castadiva was that of ns-2 compatibil-
ity. We consider it an important goal since we wish to compare results obtained
with both platforms. The results obtained in both platforms evidence the correct
behaviour of Castadiva.
The performance evaluation of Castadiva was made focusing on coordination
among nodes. We observed that the use of the SSH protocol with the support
of an Ethernet allows nodes to synchronise the start of an experiment with high
accuracy, being all instructions read at once; afterwards, the test bed relies on
individual clocks to synchronise instructions throughout the remaining time of an
experiment.
To summarise, the advantages of using Castadiva with respect to other MANET
test beds are: (1) it is a very low-cost test bed since each node costs about 50$, (2)
it is fully compatible with the ns-2 simulator, allowing to compare results between
both in a straightforward manner and, (3) does not occupy a lot of physical space.
Castadiva is free software developed under the GNU GPL licence, and can be
downloaded at http://castadiva.sourceforge.net/
Another aspect studied in this thesis was security of mesh networks and MA-
NETs, and, therefore, it also aects RuralNet. The main attack on this networks
is the black hole or selsh node, where a node does not cooperate with the network
to send others nodes' trac. In the literature we can nd the watchdog as the
most widely adopted solution. We evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of it.
As the main advantage we can say that the watchdog only uses local information
and, therefore, it is avoids bad inuences from other nodes. In contrast, it has
the disadvantage of not being so accurate in networks with high mobility, where
false positives and negative detections appear. Most of the false positives and
negatives are caused by the erroneous measurements of the packets that nodes
should forward, but this is not what occurs. The erroneous measurements are
mostly caused by the unreliability of the wireless medium and the mobility of the
nodes. Then, we must improve this mechanism if we want to use it in MANETs or
mesh networks. Moreover, if we think that the watchdog is a basic brick on several
dierent IDS, we realised the importance that any improvement on it would have.
Therefore we have devised a technique to integrate bayesian ltering techniques
inside the watchdogs, and we have conducted some experiments inside an ns-2 im-
plementation to verify the approach. The integration of bayesian ltering inside
watchdogs has decreased the number of false positives detected while the percent-
age of detection of the actual attacks has been kept quite high (or, even slightly
improved). This implementation of the watchdog is available under the GNU/GPL
licence, and can be downloaded from http://safewireless.sourceforge.net.
Finally, we deployed a prototype of RuralNet in some schools in Mozambique,
where our architecture is now used by more than 60 computers to access Internet,
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providing this service to hundreds of students.
The experience acquired made evident that, by combining both wireless and
web technologies, we are able to oer a cheap and ecient solution to provide
Internet services to rural areas where users are sparsely located.
6.2 Publications Related with this Thesis
The research work related to this thesis has resulted in 16 publications; among
them we have two journal articles, and 14 conference papers (4 in national con-
ferences and the others in international conferences, some of them indexed by the
Computer Science Conference Ranking or the Computing Research and Education
(CORE)). We now proceed by presenting a brief description of each publication.
We have organised the dierent publications based on the chapter were the con-
tents have been discussed.
6.2.1 Castadiva
[JJCP07b] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. Castadiva:
a test bed architecture for mobile ad hoc networks, in Symposium on Per-
sonal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC 2007), Athens,
Greece, September 2007. IEEE Communications Society.
In this paper we present the Castadiva tool, presenting its architecture and
showing some tests with synthetic trac. This conference is indexed as
CORE B.
[JMJ+07b] J. Hortelano, M. Nácher, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni.
Performance evaluation of a mobile ad hoc network test bed architecture, in
XVIII Jornadas de Paralelismo, pages 253-261, Zaragoza, España, Septem-
ber 2007. CEDI
This paper compares Castadiva with ns-2. Several tests compare our test
bed with the most spreaded simulator are performed, explaining the little
dierences between booth tools.
[JMJ+07a] J. Hortelano, M. Nácher, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Man-
zoni. Evaluating the goodness of MANETs performance results obtained
with the ns-2 simulator, in First International Workshop on Network Sim-
ulation Tools 2007, Nantes, France, October 2007. ACM/ ICST.
In this paper we add external trac functionality and present the useful-
ness of a tool that can use real devices to generate simulations. For example,
we use web cams to generate a demonstration of this extra functionality.
[JJCP08] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. Evaluat-
ing the Performance of Real Time Videoconferencing in Ad Hoc Networks
Through Emulation in Principles of Advanced and Distributed Simulation
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(PADs 08), Rome, Italy, June 2008. 22nd ACM/IEEE/SCS Workshop.
In this paper we present the results obtained when performing a videocall
in a MANET, and how the numbers of hops inf the network aects this
videocall. This conference is indexed as CORE A.
[HCCM09] J. Hortelano, J. C Cano, C. T. Calafate and P. Manzoni. Test-
ing Applications in MANET Environments through Emulation (2009) in
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Decem-
ber 2009.
This Journal includes the information presented in the publications showed
below and an extensive evaluation of the use of media trac in dierent sce-
narios with dierent levels of noise. The ISI of the Journal Citation Reports
(JCR) of the year 2008, grants this journal with an index impact of 0,976;
and, ordering all the publications by this index impact, this journal is listed
in the position 29 of a total of 67 in the category of TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS.
[WAJ+10] W. Vossen, A. Torres, J. Hortelano, J. C Cano, C. T. Calafate and P.
Manzoni. Extending an emulation platform for automatised and distributed
evaluation of QoS in MANETs in XXI Jornadas de Paralelismo, Valencia,
España, September 2010. CEDI
This works add extra functionality to Castadiva for evaluating the QoS of
wireless devices. It also improves the automation of Castadiva for performing
a sets of tests.
6.2.2 RuralNet
[JJCP06b] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. RuralNet:
a captive portal based system supporting wireless Internet in rural areas, in
International IFIP Workshop on Wireless Communications and Information
Technology in Developing Countries, WCIT 2006, Santiago de Chile, Chile,
August 2006. IFIP.
In this rst work we present RuralNet, including its architecture, function-
ality and a preliminary evaluation of its behaviour.
[JJCP06a] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. Providing
low-cost wireless connectivity to rural communities, in XVII Jornadas de
Paralelismo, pages 115-120, Albacete, Spain, September 2006. Universidad
de Castilla La Mancha.
In this paper we study the behaviour of RuralNet when multiple users access
to the network, and how the system shares the bandwidth among them when
it is not enough. We make several tests with dierent users and present the
validity of the entire system.
126
6.2. PUBLICATIONS RELATED WITH THIS THESIS
[JJCP07a] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. A wire-
less mesh network-based system for hotspot deployment and management,
in The Third International Conference on Networking and Services, Athens,
Greece, June 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
In this paper we extend the evaluation to a mesh network. The latency
of the entire system and the repercussion of this for the users.
[JJCP07d] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. The
RuralMaya project: strengthening Internet support in rural environments
through wireless technologies, in WITFOR 2007 Symposium, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, August 2007. IFIP.
This paper discusses the possibility to extend the functionality of Rural-
Net to a developing country. In particular, we focus on the usefulness of this
architecture to rural areas of Africa. We also focus on the low cost of the
chosen devices and the reduced cost of the total deployment. Additionally,
we add to RuralNet the application Maya, an application to congure the
access points of a mesh network. Maya was developed by another research
colleague.
[JJCP07c] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. Rural-
Maya: Internet de bajo coste para zonas en desarrollo, in Simposio Inter-
nacional por el XXXV Aniversario de la Institucionalización de los Estudios
Superiores en Pinar del Río, Pinar del Río, Cuba, October 2007. Universi-
dad de Pinar del Río.
This paper about RuralNet discusses the possibility of deploying RuralNet in
a real scenario in a developing country like Cuba. A study of the area, with
the advantages and disadvantages of this technology in a specic country
like Cuba are analysed.
[HMC+10] J. Hortelano, J. Márquez, J. C Cano, C. T. Calafate and P. Man-
zoni, RuralMaya: Internet de bajo coste para países en vías de desarrollo
in Diálogos transdisciplinarios en la sociedad de la información, Era Digital
i/2010. May 2010.
This journal includes all the information shown above about RuralNet and
Maya; also new improvements are included into RuralNet to be used in a
developing country.
6.2.3 Standard Watchdog and Bayesian Watchdog
[HRM09] J. Hortelano, J. Ruiz and P. Manzoni. The Watchdog: a Black hole
Intrusion Tolerance implementation for Ad hoc Networks in XX Jornadas
de Paralelismo, a Coruña, Spain, September 2009.
In this work we perform a rst analysis of the standard watchdog as a basic
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brick for a Intrusion Detection System. We focus on how it can be used to
detect an attacker in a MANET, and how to deploy countermeasures against
such attack.
[HRM10] J. Hortelano, J. Ruiz, and P. Manzoni. Evaluating the usefulness of
watchdogs for intrusion detection in VANETs. In ICC'10 Workshop on Ve-
hicular Networking & Applications, Cape Town, South Africa, 2010.
This paper performs an analysis of how mobility aects the standard watch-
dog's accuracy. We use VANETs as the studied scenario. This work reects
that the watchdog must be improved if we want to use it in scenarios with
high nodes' mobility.
[JJCP10] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, and P. Manzoni. Watchdog
intrusion detection systems: Are they feasible in MANETs? in XXI Jor-
nadas de Paralelismo, Valencia, Spain, September 2010. CEDI
This paper performs an analysis of why mobility aects the watchdog accu-
racy. We perform a study of the false positives and false negatives produced
by mobility in several scenarios, and we analyse their cause.
[JJC+10] J. Hortelano, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate, M. de Leoni, P. Manzoni, and
M. Mecella. Black hole attacks in P2P mobile networks discovered through
bayesian lters. In P2P Collaborative Distributed Virtual Environments
(P2P CDVE 2010), Crete, Greece, October 2010. Springer.
In this work we present the bayesian watchdog and perform a comparative
with the standard one, showing the improvements obtained using bayesian
lters in scenarios with high degrees of mobility.
6.3 Future Work
In the development of this thesis several issues emerged which deserve further
scrutiny in the future. The ones we consider more relevant are the following:
 To improve Castadiva by adding other technologies like Wi-Max to the test
bed.
 To improve RuralNet with the experience obtained with the prototype de-
ployed in Mozambique, adding some extra characteristics to convert RuralNet
in an suitable tool for developing countries.
 To extend the coverage of our prototype deployed in Mozambique to another
school, the Instituto Agrario Martir Cipriano, located 50km far away of
our network. For this purpose, we will deploy dierent nodes to generate a
path between our system and this school.
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Figure 6.1: Detecting cooperative attacks.
 To decrease the false positives rate and false negatives rate of the bayesian
watchdog by sharing information among nodes. We can use a publish/sub-
scribe [DQA04, LO07, LHAS09, LO08, LS08] system for sharing information
among nodes in an ad hoc network, and generating with this information a
voting system.
 To improve the bayesian watchdog to be robust against cooperative attacks.
A cooperative attack is caused when two nodes work together causing a black
hole, and the other nodes of the network can only reach the signal range
of the rst one. Hence, the second one can cause an attack dropping the
packets obtained by its accomplice. We can use the voting system and the
publish/subscribe system to detect a cooperative attack. Figure 6.1 shows
how a node can deduce a cooperative attack using this method. (1) First,
a node M2 performs a black hole attack. Node M1 is an accomplice and
continues forwarding packets to M2. (2) All neighbours send the vote about
M2 to the subscription system. The majority said that M2 is a malicious
node. (3) This information is shared with all nodes. (4) M1 ignores the
voting system and still sends data toM2 to perform the collaborative attack.
(5) Nodes A and B can see that M1 still sends packets ignoring the voting
system. Therefore A and B consider M1 as an accomplice and change the
vote of M1, preventing it from using the network. Then the route used by
A for sending to C will be corrected to pass through hop B.
 To study other attacks related to MANETs and mesh networks, and develop
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